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CAPITALISM, MANAGERIALISM AND THE MARKET: THE PROBLEM OF POLITICS 
IN THE OJLTURE OF BUREAUCRATIC INDIVIOOALISM 
Peter Martin McMylor 
============================================================ 
Abstract 
This thesis addresses a core proo.Lelu of the huinan sciences: the 
relationship between communal and individual forms of life. In so 
doing it seeks to raise questions about the acceptance of liberal 
individualism. This is achieved by the development of certain themes 
in the work of the philosopher Alasdair Macintyre, especially those 
present within his major work After Virtue. This thesis is not a 
critical study of Macintyre, but instead attempts to extract, from the 
work of this major anti -liberal philosopher, elements that can be 
profitably developed by the human sciences and contribute to a renewal 
of a socialist politics which is more than one more version of liberal 
progressivism. 
The introductory chapter outlines the nature of the problems 
posed for any kind of communalism in a liberal polity, the major 
themes from Macintyre's work in the last three decades are outlined, 
in relationship to the question of liberal modernity. 
This is followed in Chapter One by an out line of some cultural 
themes concerning concepts of self and community briefly touched on in 
Macintyre's work. 
Chapter Two looks at the impact of liberal culture on its major 
ideological competitor, Marxism, stressing Macintyre's complex 
relationship with the Marxian tradition. 
Chapters Three and Four examine some of the historical 
assumptions embodied within Macintyre's After Virtue. Chapter Three 
looks at the impact of the capitalist market on our social and moral 
attitudes. The account of this process is shown to be closely related 
to the work of the historian Karl Polanyi. 
Chapter Four looks at the historical relationship between 
liberalism and bureaucratic practices. In conclusion, Chapter Five 
examines Macintyre's alternative to liberal individualism, and 
connects his narrative account of a human life with other recent 
developments, in thought and experience. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
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When we've worn ourse~ves out with our soft nihiLism, the Russians 
wou~d Like to arrive with their hard nihiLism. They fee~ human~y 
superior. Even the Russian dissidents, especia~~y the right wing, take 
the high tone with us. They say "we haven't got justice or persona~ 
freedom but we do have warmth, humanity, brotherhood and our 
afflictions have given us some character. AU you can offer us is 
supermarkets. " Whereas the best defence that LiberaL democracy can 
make goes Like this: "True, we're shor>t on charisma and fraternaL 
Love, aLthough you have it in debased forms, don't kid yourseLves 
about that. What we do have in the West is a kind of rationaL 
citizens' courage which you don't understand in the Least. At our best 
we can be patient, we keep our heads in cr&s&s, we can be decent in a 
coLd steady way. Don't underestimate us." 
Do you buy this? 
No. 
Why don't you? 
I don't think you can be manageriaL and nobLe at the same time. 
Saul Bellow 
The Dean's December 
Submitted to the University of Durham in 1987 
as a result of research conducted in the Department of Sociology 
and Social Policy, University of Durham 
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PREFACE 
In the mid-1980s it might seem foolish to write a thesis that raises 
inherently speculative questions about the political and moral worth 
of our social order. In the economic and intellectual clirnate 
encouraged by the present British Government, such an activity is 
becoming almost extinct at the level of post-graduate work. It can go 
almost without saying that I believe such work to be important and 
worthwhile. But why write a thesis on such a large matter as the 
status of the epoch? No one is more aware than I am of the inadequacy 
of my treatment of so many large and intractable questions. But I felt 
compelled to write the thesis to uncover what lay behind a growing 
sense that something important to the socialist tradition was 
disappearing from it, and from modern society generally. The immediate 
motivation was a strong sense of recognition of my own half 
constructed thoughts, in the pages of Alasdair Macintyre's After 
Virtue. In this it would appear that I have not been alone, for as 
Macintyre points out in a reply to critics, 
I have had in the form of letters, even occasionally 
of telephone calls, a quite extraordinary response from 
members of those communities whom I identified as heirs of 
the tradition of the Virtues . . . not only in the United 
States but also in Spain and in Italy, some intellectuals, 
some not at all so . . . thus I have some assurance that 
what I articulated was not just something thought by me, 
but something thought and felt by large numbers of people 
who recognise themselves as unable to be heard saying what 
they really mean in modern societies. (1) 
I owe a good many practical and intellectual debts to those who have 
- (vii) -
helped me try and say what I really mean. Most important of these is 
to my supervisor Huw Beynon, without whose unstinting kindness and 
friendship and clear sighted intelligence it would have been quite 
impossible to write this thesis. It was the late David Rosenberg who 
initially steered me towards Durham, his powerful, critical mind is 
much missed. The thesis owes much to long discussions, over several 
summers in Durham, with Terry Austrin, and to Eric John, because of a 
long conversation about Macintyre one December at Spode House. Denys 
Turner of Bristol University has always been generous with his 
encouragement and time. I have learned from Scott Meikle and Hillel 
Tick tin about what the Marxist Socialist tradition could really be 
about, although I know how little they will like this thesis' content. 
Lastly, I must thank all the good friends I have made in Durham over 
the past few years, for it is profoundly true, that without the 
Aristotelian virtue of friendship nothing worthwhile can be achieved. 
Durham 
November 1986 
Footnote 
l. 'Moral Rationality, Tradition and Aristotle: a reply to Onara 
O'Neill, Raimond Gaita, and Stephen R.L. Clark, Inquiry, Vol.26, 
No.4, December, 1983, p.465-466. 
-(viii)-
To the memory of my Father and Mother 
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INTRODUCTION 
The astute journalist Neal Ascherson recently described the experience 
of re-reading an early Malcolm Bradbury novel Stepping Westward. The 
novel was written 25 years ago and describes a young writer going to a 
US university from Britain: 
He reaches an utterly strange continent: here are 
universities with cement towers ... couples in ranch-style 
houses with patios, extractor fans and dental floss, paper 
cups, supermarkets . . . Everyone is obsessed by sex and 
everyone wants to be masterless. So strange? It was then. 
Now it sounds like prosperous life in outer Richmond or 
outer Stirling - or the new suburbs of Bonn. The gap has 
closed. The United States no longer seems marvellously 
unfamiliar. It impresses a European by its wealth and space 
But not its newness; we have the gadgets too, 
sometimes better ones, and gawky adaptions of the 
lifestyle. . . The politics of the American cowboy Right 
which baffled Bradbury's hero, for whom "conservatism was 
a defunct intellectual fashion" have been the rhetoric of 
the British Government for the last seven years. (1) 
What has been the response to this change, especially political 
change? It has been mixed. There have been adaptions to this apparent 
modernity, from the use of advertising agencies by the Labour party to 
the questioning of the role of public ownership in the definition of 
'socialism'. Yet perhaps the strongest ideological reaction from the 
Left to Margaret Thatcher, has come from that most oft quoted 
expression of hers for a 'return to Victorian values'. Acres of print 
have been spent on it, Left conferences have been organised around the 
theme, to show either how bad Victorian values were or how complex the 
reality of them was compared with simple quotations from Sam Smiles. 
It seems. almost as if the Left felt happiest in being able to cast 
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Thatcherism as part of the past so it could assert its own modernity, 
without confronting the actual social changes that Thatcherism, as 
modernity,was actually ushering in. 
Nonetheless, the Left 1 s reaction is not entirely misplaced for it 
highlights a real ambiguity and potential contradiction at the heart 
of New Right Conservatism. This is, in essence, the conflict between 
economic liberalism and the desire for a hierarchical and communally 
regulated social order, both of which feature, ideologically within 
the repertoire of various strands of the New Right. 
Let us look at this in more detail. The great strength of the Right, 
in recent years, has been its possession and advocacy of an economic 
1 solution 1 to the all too visible failure of Keynesianism in the 
mid-1970s. Its solution has, of course, been sharp monetary control 
and deregulation of the economy. The intellectual case for these 
policies was made by a new generation of able publicists, academics 
and journalists. In Britain the central figures in this advocacy were 
Peter Jay, then economics editor of The Times and Samuel Brittan of 
The Financial Times. The case was adopted by the Conservative Party in 
opposition. The crucial figure here was, of course, Margaret Thatcher. 
But in the early years of her leadership Sir Keith Joseph 1 s very 
public rethinking of past-conservative positions had a big impact on 
the Right. In any case the Conservative Party was predisposed to be 
sympathetic to a free market case. 
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But this was not the only element in a reviving conservatism, there 
was also the demand for what was termed as 'a return to standards' in 
education, the family, public behaviour etc. In other words, there was 
a gesture towards forms of behaviour rooted in hierarchy and in some 
respects a pre-modern social order. Now clearly there is at least a 
potential conflict here. Michael Walzer has described the American 
neo-Conservative intellectual Irving Kristol as standing 
with one foot firmly planted in the market, while with the 
other he salutes the fading values of an organic society. 
It is an awkward position. (2) 
The fact that this conflict has been relatively well-managed by 
politicians like Thatcher and Reagan, should not be allowed to 
disguise or minimise the long run difficulties of this position. 3 The 
Left in particular is rather too quick in passing over this 
difficulty, seeing the New Right as fairly homogenous in composition. 
Even Andrew Gamble, who has contributed probably more than anyone to 
an understanding of the British Right, tends to see the matter as a 
difference of emphasis: 
The neo-conservatives have no difficulty in accepting the 
formula of the free economy and the strong state, 
he writes, 
but the significance of the two terms is reversed. 
neo-Liberals put the objective, of a free economy first, 
the strong state is a means for achieving this. The state 
is not valued in itself. Just the opposite is true for 
neo-conservatives. For them the objective is a strong 
state, a state which possesses authority but which is not 
afraid to use its power of coercion. (4) 
This view has a certain plausibility, and as a tactical alliance, may 
work for some time, but in the long run the aspirations of these two 
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groups are quite different. One does not have to be too impressed by 
the neo-Liberal, hard Right, of the FCS, with its calls for the 
legalisation of incest and heroin and the abolition of the NHS, to see 
that a quite different agenda is in operation from that of the Monday 
Club and the Salisbury Review. 
These differences have been there from the New Right's early stirrings 
in the late 1960s and early '70s. In 1973 Samuel Brittan published a 
book entitled Capitalism and the Permissive Society - dedicated to 
Nigel Lawson and Peter Jay. This book is in part, an appeal to the 
then youthful radicals, to give up their opposition to competitive 
capitalism on the grounds that it will further their desires more 
effectively than any Left-wing alternative. He claims that: 
The values of competitive capitalism have a great deal in 
common with contemporary attitudes, and in particular with 
contemporary radical attitudes. Above all they share a 
similar stress on allowing people to do, to the maximum 
feasible extent, what they feel inclined to do rather than 
conform to the wishes of authority, custom or convention. 
He goes on to make an almost classic statement about the nature of 
unalloyed consumer capitalism: 
Under a competitive system, the businessman will make 
money by catering for whatever it is that people wish to 
do - by providing pop records, or nude shows, or candy 
floss. He will not make anything by providing what the 
establishment thinks is good for them. (5) 
Brittan goes on to argue that the competitive market of capitalism can 
be equally useful for constraining the moral criticism of 
conservatives against, for example, the 'hedonistic young' as it can 
be against the critics from the Left, who wish to shape the activity 
of the economy for some 'higher national purpose'. Brittan identifies 
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what he calls 'permissiveness' quite clearly with the Liberal 
tradition of 'personal liberty' and sees 'competitive capitalism' as 
'the biggest single force' acting on its side. 6 In this respect, as in 
so many others, Brittan is modernising and popularising the ideas of 
his mentor von Hayek, who has always been anxious to distance himself 
from the European Conservative tradition, in, for example, his famous 
essay, 'Why I am not a Conservative' . 7 
The neo-Conservative element within the New Right have not been 
unaware of these emerging tendencies and potentialities that Brittan 
enthuses about. The leading theorist of neo-Conservatism, Roger Scruton 
has referred to the possible danger of consumer capitalism as a form 
of 'pathology' of property (thereby protecting the sacredness of 
ownership itself). He writes: 
Property - now reduced to the status of "corrnnodity" ie to 
its fluid expendable form - no longer has a distinctly 
human character. It is in a world of mere consumption that 
people become prey to that "fetishism of commodities" 
persuasively described in Capital. (8) 
This, though, is Scruton in a rather abstract muse, but recently, the 
Salisbury Review (which he edits), published an essay by the 
Conservative sociologist Bryan Wilson, entitled The Demoralisation of 
Society which seems to be sharply aimed at the very competitive 
industrial order that is celebrated by neo-Liberalism. Wilson's topic 
is the removal of explicitly moral criteria and reference from much 
of the public realm. In other words a move from a society based upon 
forms of social integration to one of system integration. 9 He raises 
the question of the quality of life and the political dangers of a 
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society which has moved from a situation with at least elements of a 
common morality to one without a public evaluative framework. He 
concludes that: 
The economic order may survive - may survive better -
without a public Lhat responds primarily to shared diffuse 
moral sentiments, and which can be mobilised rationally 
for economic roles. Social control in the role may suffice 
to elicit adequate performance. But beyond the economic 
order there is a wide civil arena in which men also act, 
and social control there presents a less acceptable face. 
Yet if that civil space is peopled by those whose emotions 
are uneducated, who are fed on hedonism and cynicism and 
are untrammelled by inner restraints, shall we escape new 
forms of oppressive social control to contain the latent 
hostilities between people who do not trust the system and 
a system which cannot trust the people? (10) 
Here we find many familiar conservative themes: a fear of the 'masses' 
of the uncultured or uneducated, those without self-discipline, the 
concern for culture for a way of life, for human relationships; yet 
along with these we find the suggestion that the modern capitalist 
economy might not just provide the context for all this, but might 
actually prefer or even promote this process. Such a conservative is 
in a very difficult position indeed, for is not he/she allied to the 
very forces that would destroy that which is to be defended! 
What can a socialist learn from this division within the ranks of the 
New Right - a political lesson, no doubt, to exploit, for that is a 
necessary part of politics. But also, perhaps, something about the 
nature of reality, for if ideologies attempt to comprehend or 
articulate and present and organize 'reality', and are themselves 
contradictory, then perhaps the situation they face is itself, 
contradictory. For Samuel Brittan's intervention, referred to above, 
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into what was the height of the 'New Left' period in the early '70s, 
was itself a register of divisions internal to radical aspirations. In 
fact, Brittan was attempting to exploit a conflict in the culture and 
ideology of the Left and radicalism generally that emphasised freedom 
as self-actualisation and liberation from past constraint, which vied 
for dominance perhaps successfully, with the values of integration, 
solidarity and community. 
we kno\v from Gareth Stedman Jones' recent work that socialism itself 
was originally formulated at the beginning of the 19th century as an 
attempt to replace, with a total philosophic/moral and economic 
system, the older pre-industrial order fragmenting under the pressures 
of secularism and capitalist economic development. 
Since socialism claimed to be a science of human nature, 
and to have solved the mystery of social harmony and 
universal happiness, it impinged directly upon the 
territory of pre-existing moral theory - par excellence 
the Christian Church ... therefore, I argue that utopian 
socialism was indeed a religious movement, but not in any 
meaningful sense a Christian one. It was a new humanist 
religion, whose gospel was the new science. (11) 
Utopian socialism was to put the world back together again after 
• i 
capitalism S dismemberment of it. Later socialisms especially 
Marxian, may have broken with Utopianism in terms of historical and 
economic analysis, but the sociologist Peter Berger has plausibly 
argued, that modern socialism's power of attraction derives from 
its unique capacity to synthesize modernizing and counter-
modernizing themes. (12) 
By this he means that socialism is the bearer of key elements of the 
Enlightenment: history as progress, human perfectability, science as a 
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problem solver and a liberator from superstition. In addition, of 
course, socialism embodies a strong belief in the ability of human 
beings to order their lives and institutional arrangement on a 
rational basis. 
However, unlike that other child of the Enlightenment, liberalism: 
Socialism has also successfully incorporated the themes 
that have arisen in protest of the discontents of 
modernity, notably the theme of renewed community. (13) 
In this move it can be claimed that socialism, unlike liberalism, 
tried to give positive content to the ideals of the French Revolution, 
liberty, equality, fraternity. Socialism made fraternity its 
distinctive hallmark of what its version of the 'modern' future would 
be. 
It seems, then, that the position of socialistS in modern complex 
capitalist market societies, possess some of the same ambiguous 
elements as that of the New Right: they both possess close ties both 
intellectual and organisational with elements of the liberal tradition 
but both are suspicious of and anxious to limit liberalism's movement. 
It would, I believe, be very difficult for any socialist to disagree 
with the substance of this following analysis of liberalism by Roger 
Scruton. Scruton sees that the fault with liberalism is that: 
it reposes all politics and all morality in an idea of 
freedom, while providing no philosophy of human nature 
which will tell us what freedom is. It isolates man from 
history, from culture from all those unchosen aspects of 
himself which are in fact the pre-conditions of his 
subsequent autonomy. (14) 
Thus exactly as socialists have always claimed, liberalism proclaims 
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only negative freedom, freedom from, not freedom to do something 
substantive; in accordance with ones nature as a human being. Yet are 
not Scruton's left critks like Anthony Arblaster15 right to argue that 
the effects, Scruton and his neo-Conservative colleagues have, is to 
help usher in and then bolster a Right wing Government's use of state 
power against the forces, (many of them traditionally minded), that 
oppose economic liberalisation. In this process they run the risk of 
having done nothing to challenge the liberal idea of freedom but 
rather (pace Brittan) merely strengthened its sphere of influence. 
However, rather than just scoring ideological points, it would perhaps 
be useful if we gave some thought as to why there is such a peculiar 
yet manifest distance between an argument like Scruton's and its 
actual embodiment in office. In this context it becomes extremely 
important to recall that socialist activists and intellectuals have 
been no more successful, in incarnating their version of substantive 
community, in the actual practice of left-wing parties coming to power 
in the western world, in the post-war era. Indeed, is it not one of 
the chief complaints of neo-conservatives, that these socialist 
Governments have in effect been, liberal modernisers, rationalising 
out the pre-modern elements of the civic culture? Rather than 
presenting a threat to freedom (Worsthorne' s phrase 1 not too little 
freedom but too much 1 ) , they have in reality increased the realm of 
negative freedom, ie freedom from constraint in areas like censorship, 
marriage, fertility, sexuality etc (the Wilson government in Britain 
in the 1960s, the Whitlam government in Australia in the 1970s, the 
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Mitterand government in France and the Gonzales government in Spain in 
the 1980s) have all passed liberal refonning legislation in these 
areas. But nowhere in the West have socialists shown any signs, even 
within the most favourable of social and economic climates, of being 
able to step bcj.rond the pule of the negative freedoms of the liberal 
tradition, to embody any notion of what the positive shared freedom of 
a socialist society would actually look like. 
The reasons for this are many and complex, more traditional analysis 
in terms of state and class power and the manipulation of ideologies 
etc are not irrelevant. But I would like to suggest that the very 
symmetry and apparent impotence of certain kinds of Right wing and 
Left wing critique of western societies, suggests that the 
institutional and intellectual power of liberalism is very great 
indeed - so great that it seems to enter into the very tenns of 
reference of those who seek to oppose it. It is to the investigation 
of the material roots and impact of the culture of liberalism, 
individualism and the negative tradition of freedom, that this thesis 
directs itself. 
To understand our situation we need to understand the nature and roots 
of what I will rather loosely call our liberal culture - the full 
meaning of which will emerge in due course. This is done, in order to 
see if a break with this culture is both possible or desirable. Yet to 
suggest a break with liberalism is a familiar cry; too familiar. It 
can easily be another call to progress, 'to transcend the limits of 
the present', 'to be creative', 'to be new' . 16 In other words, to risk 
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a break that will turn out, on closer inspection to be a repetition of 
liberalism itself in a guise that may be either of left or right. To 
understand liberalism is, in part, to understand ourselves ,_n the 
West, whatever our formal ideological identity. It requires us, in 
some respects, to attempt to step outside the pale of our own 
assumptions; to reconstruct some of our own taken for granted ideas, 
implicitly comparing them with other ways of viewing the world that 
have held sway in the past. It is for this reason that it is most 
helpful to examine a writer, who in almost his entire career can be 
seen as attempting this kind of critique of modern liberal society. 
. . 1 d . t 17 H1s name 1s A as a1r Macin-yre. 
It is vital to recognise Macintyre • s importance at the outset. 
For he is one of the very few philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition who in this century has thought it important and indeed 
possible to use philosophy to investigate what might be called the 
classical problems of western thought; •What is the good life?•, 1 How 
should we live?•, 1 Is the way we live now either just or good? 1 He 
asks such questions about the fundamental basis of our culture, by 
relating thought and belief to the social and political context in 
which they have their existence. 
Macintyre•s scope is the tradition of western thought as we inherit it 
from the Greeks and Hebrews. In his refusal of disciplinary boundaries 
and in the capaciousness of his work, he can be seen as that most 
unusual animal, an Anglo-Saxon 1 Grand theorist•. He draws freely from 
history, linguistics, sociology, anthropology as well as from 
~--
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philosophy. But not only this, he also challenges the very form of 
these disciplines, which he rejects as arid, positivistic neutrality c1 
·'f~ ~stead he writes a narrative, in which 
t-hp ni vision into stages, presupposes standards of 
achievement and failure, of order and disorder. It is what 
Hegel called philosophical history and what Collingwood 
took all successful historical writing to be. (18) 
Macintyre comes from the Left, with a Trotskyist-Marxist formation, 
deeply throughgoing in his social criticism and now sceptical and 
ambivalent about all existing political philosophies. But he is a most 
unusual post-Marxist, for he refuses to join in the familiar 
celebration of liberalism of most former Marxists, instead he attempts 
to retain the kernel of Marxism• s criticisms of liberal society and 
culture, whilst being doubtful of the feasibility of its political 
prograrnrne(s). From such a position, he will provide us with valuable 
resources for an understanding and criticism of liberal culture. A 
criticism that casts light on the predicament of liberalism's critics 
and would be opponents, as well as on liberalism itself. 
In this light, the thesis attempts to contribute to the ongoing and 
vitally urgent task, of internal discussion, self-clarification and 
reconstruction, that is taking place within the Left as a response to 
a widely recognised crisis. 19 It attempts therefore, to recognise and 
absorb into the Left, work like Macintyre's, that is both critical of 
the dominant liberal culture and the Left's response to it. 
Principally by illustrating how this liberal culture both shapes and 
limits some of the assumptions of its most devoted opponents. 
- l3 -
In what follows in this chapter I will principally be concerned with 
an exposition of Macintyre's work with special reference to After 
Virtue. This is to give the reader a sense of the overall structure, 
development and continuity of that work over nearly 30 years. 
Inevitably, this will mean some drastic simplification and 
foreshortening of argument, especially in the case of After Virtue, a 
book of over 150,000 words of closely reasoned analysis. This has 
meant that a degree of further exposition of particularly important 
points, will be necessary in the main body of the thesis. 
The intention, then, is to explicate and develop, Macintyre's work 
(principally After Virtue20 ) and work either adjacent to his or 
referred to by him. (Philip Rieff' s work falls into this latter 
category, whilst authors like Christopher Lasch and Richard Sennett 
clearly have similar preoccupations to Macintyre. 21 These works are 
referred to in Chapter One.) To a large degree Macintyre's framework 
and understandings are assumed by the thesis. Some critical comments 
are made but they are largely of a secondary nature. Tensions and 
alternatives are highlighted from within his work, especially in the 
case of Marxism, which was raised as the central issue at one stage of 
his intellectual career. 
The thesis then, is in no sense a critical appraisal of Macintyre, its 
main purpose is to open up and develop his thoughts, reveal some of 
its presuppositions; in some cases extending these out with new 
material taken from within the broad tradition of historical 
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sociology. The basic aim is to apply his analysis in a manner that 
highlights the problems that capitalist modernity poses for anyone 
with socialist commitments; without in any sense claiming to resolve 
them. Secondly, it attempts to utilise elements of Macintyre's 
presentation of a non-Liberal vision, in order to show some of our 
Liberal culture's shortcomings, and revealing some elements of this 
social order, that cannot be absorbed into the core assumptions of 
liberalism, and which may again guide our thinking about alternatives. 
What is Macintyre's contribution? His work is principally that of a 
philosopher, concerned especially with moral philosophy. But to say 
this gives no sense of the range and scope of his work. His principal 
aim is to use philosophy but with history, sociology and 
anthropology used in aid - to illuminate some contemporary social and 
political problems. He has written on Marxism, 22 general politics, 23 
psychoanalysis, 24 theology, 25 , philosophy of social science, 26 medical 
ethics and the history of ethics27 and this is not an exhaustive list. 
Almost all these elements come together in what must be regarded as 
his magnum opus, After Virtue. 
This deeply influential book seems to be a summation of his career, 
for in it he addresses and reworks the central themes of his earlier 
work, especially A Short History of Ethics, 28 
Change, 29 and Against the Self Images of the 
Secularisation and Moral 
31 Age. As he puts it in 
the preface to After Virtue his work emerged from 
a growing dissatisfaction with the concept of "moral 
philosophy" as an isolable area of enquiry. 
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He states that as in his earlier work: 
a central theme . . . was that we had to learn from history 
and anthropology of the variety of moral practices, 
beliefs and conceptual schemes. The notion that the moral 
philosopher can study the concepts of morality merely by 
reflecting Oxford arm-chair style, on what he or she and 
those around him and her say and du .is barren. 
However, just as he noted the variety of practices and beliefs: 
it was as clear to others as it ought to have been to me 
that my historical and sociological accounts were and 
could not but be, informed by a distinctive evaluative 
standpoint. More particularly I seemed to be asserting 
that the nature of communities and moral judgements in 
distintively modern communities was such that it was no 
longer possible to appeal to moral criteria in a way that 
had been possible in other times and places - and that 
this was a moral calamity. But to what cou~I be 
appealing, if my own analysis was correct? (31) 
This is ultimately what almost all Macintyre's work attempts to deal 
with, and it is in this process that he has elaborated his case 
against our liberal culture: a case that he has been putting together 
from the beginning of his work. So before addressing the mature work 
of After Virtue, I want to begin by examining some of his earlier 
work. This will help our understanding of the later work, partly 
because it possesses a relative simplicity compared to the rich 
complexity of After Virtue, but also, because it reveals what has been 
rejected on the way. 
To do this I will concentrate on his important and path breaking essay 
'Notes from the Moral Wilderness' that appeared in 1957-58. This essay 
displays a remarkable continuity of thought across a quarter of a 
century, when read in the light of After Virtue. It, like the later 
work, draws on the resources of the past for a critique of liberalism, 
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the classical world, Christianity and Marxism. Macintyre has been at 
various stages a Christian (a Church of Scotland background), a 
Christian Marxist, a Marxist and now perhaps a rather disconsolate 
anti-modernist - but not a Conservative - with signs of some movement 
b k h . . . t 32 At h t dr . th t d. t-. ac to C r1St1an1-Y. eac sage, aw1ng on ese ra l~lons, 
still viewed, in some sense, as continuing to be indispensible. 
Why is he an opponent of Liberalism? The answer is to be found in the 
position he staked out in the period of the early New Left. Here the 
experience of Stalinism was seen as having given a new lease of life 
to liberal ideology: 
a position we are all tempted into is that of the moral 
critic of Stalinism. (33) 
h . f . . f h . 1 34 d Here, e 1s, o course, wr1t1ng or t e Journa New Reasoner an 
stands full square with this grouping - although, unlike most of them, 
he was himself a Trotskyist, for a third way between liberalism and 
Stalinism. 
At once the uncertainties and difficulties of this position are made 
clear, as problems and doubts always are in Macintyre's brave work: 
Moreover I cannot even say with certainty from what 
standpoint I ask this question. And this, I suspect, is 
not merely a matter of my own private confusion. The 
various characters who walk through these pages, the 
Stalinist, the moral critic, the Revisionist and so on, if 
they succeed in being more than lay figures do so not just 
because they are present in the real world, but also 
because they represent moments in the consciousness of all 
of us, masks that we each wear or have worn at some time 
or other. (35) 
Here for the first time, a typical Macintyre form, the use of 
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characters that he changes and develops in his work, as a means of 
illustrating his argument. In After Virtue these characters are 
replaced by the manager, the therapist and the aesthete. They like the 
above, are representative figures but also elements of our own 
consciousness. 
What is the weakness in this revived liberalism? It is principally in 
the appeal to moral principle (and what follows echoes through all 
Macintyre's work): 
the fragility of their appeal to moral principle lies in 
the apparently arbitrary nature of that appeal. Whence 
come these standards by which Stalinism is judged and 
found wanting and why should they have authority over 
us? (36) 
The moral (Liberal) critic seems to have won independence from the 
Stalinist bureaucracy, ie leaving the party, 'freed' the critic from 
an organisation that had, albeit for wicked pur!X)ses, 
institutionalised belief. The moral critic, Macintyre argues, has 
exchanged this conscious dependence, for an unconscious one, of 
dependence on the prevailing Liberal culture of the west. This 
liberalism turns out to be the flip side of Stalinism. Stalinism 
identifies what is morally right with what will be the outcome of 
history. The individual, including his or her moral !X)Sition, is 
pre-determined by history: 
The "ought" of principle is swallowed up in the "is" of 
history. 
On the other hand the moral critic effectively removes himself from 
history becoming a "spectator". Principles are invoked as valid but 
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quite external to the actual course of historical events. 
The "ought" of principle is completely external to the 
"is" of history. ( 37) 
ie, to what is actually happening or what is likely to happen. This is 
desCL ibeu by him as 
For it is of the essence of the Liberal tradition that 
morality is taken as autonomous . . . it is the doctrine 
that moral principles can have no non-moral basis. Our 
judgements on specific moral issues may be supported by 
the invocation of more general principles. But in the end 
our most general and ultimate principles, because they are 
that in terms of which all else is justified stand beyond 
rational justification. In particular, by any appeal to 
facts historical or otherwise. (38) 
It follows that the hallmark of liberalism is the arbitrariness of 
moral judgement. For the moral critic condemns Stalinism on the basis 
that he or she chooses values to condemn it, ie the facts of Stalinism 
are confronted with a set of moral principles. From this it is 
possible to discern the likely social role of the radical critic in 
western society. It is expected that there will be protesting 
minorities on particular issues. Radical public protest, especially by 
intellectuals,can be viewed as the critic, exhibiting his or her self 
choosing a set of private values, embodying and reinforcing the 
arbitrary and abstract nature of western pluralism. 
Is there an alternative to this arbitrariness which does not involve 
accepting Stalinism or something equally repellent? Macintyre suggests 
at this stage that there is, and that it lies in a return to a more 
authentic Marxism. This naturally means rejecting the then widespread 
Stalinist versions of the theory, which meant seeing historical 
developments as the product of simple objective laws and a rigid 
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division between the material basis of society and its politics -
cultural superstructure. Marxism, he argues, is not about the creation 
of a socialist material base, created by force or manipulation, upon 
which will arise, a socialist superstructure. The two, argued 
Macintyre, will be created together or not at all, and in the process 
any version of a means-ends morality is rejected. 
He states that: 
the economic basis of a society is not its tools, but the 
people co-operating using these particular tools in the 
manner necessary to their use, and the superstructure 
consists of the social consciousness moulded by and the 
shape of this co-operation. To understand this is to 
repudiate the ends-means morality for there is no question 
of creating the economic base as a means to the socialist 
superstructure. Creating the basis, you create the 
superstructure. There are not two activities but one. (39) 
Macintyre then goes on to show us how Stalin's economistic version of 
Marxist theory in terms of conceptualising historical change in terms 
of positivistic laws led to a severing of Marx's economic theory from 
his concept of human nature, with disastrous consequences. He states 
bluntly: 
Marx inherits from Hegel a conception of the 'human 
essence'. Although human life at any given moment is not a 
realisation of this essence, because human life is always 
limited in ways characteristic of the basis of a given 
form of society. (40) 
He continues that capitalism, for Marx, creates the possibility of 
realising human potential in new ways but that this realisation must 
never be interpretated as an abstract law, standing over and above 
human beings and independent of human will. 
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It is this that points us towards Macintyre's third way. It suggests a 
Marxist theory, which regarded history as providing a basis for 
standards, but without making the process automatic or devolving it 
from human choice and commitment. Macintyre is involved here, as so 
often later, in trying to transcend the liberal distinction between 
human nature and morality. That is, in constructing a relation between 
what I am, what I can be, what I want to be and what I 
ought to be. (41) 
Macintyre is arguing for a Marxist naturalistic basis for morality. In 
his claim that 
morality expresses the most permanent and long run human 
desires, ( 42) 
we can see the embryo of his view developed in After Virtue that it is 
necessary to revive the role of the virtues as guides for 'untutored 
human nature', in enabling the realisation of a human telos. In 'Notes 
from the Moral Wilderness', it is even possible to discern the same 
structure of argument as found in After Virtue concerning morality and 
the pursuit of human purposes, the Greeks, the Bible, the Medieval 
world are all commended for keeping 
the connection (broken by liberalism) between the moral 
life and the pursuit of what men want, (43) 
whether in notion of the pursuit of philosophy (Aristotle) or as God 
offering to meet your desires (the Bible), or God meeting your desires 
by fulfilling your nature (Thomist synthesis of Aristotle and the 
Bible). 
It is r-1arxism, for Macintyre at this point, that performs the feat of 
restoring this pattern of thought lost to liberalism but in Marx, 
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placed firmly in the secular context of human history and practice. 
Marxism is a bridging theory. For most of human history, long run 
desires cannot achieve fulfilment, humanity fails to understand its 
real, long term needs and desires. That is until the possibility of 
doing away with class society and the creation of real human community 
becomes possible. 
This Marxist view suggests that morals are necessary to protect these 
long term desires, or the end of our natures, but in the present they 
seem to lose their point, and then morals become objectified and alien 
to us. With morality objectified or standing above us, so desires 
become wild and anarchic. At this stage of Macintyre•s thought, 
capitalism seems to both heighten this division but also to create the 
material conditions to resolve it. He suggests 
capitalism provides a form of life in which men rediscover 
desire in a number of ways. They discover above all that 
what they want most is what they want in common with 
others; and more than that a shared human life is not just 
a means to the accomplishment of what they desire, but 
that certain ways of sharing human life are indeed what 
they most desire. (44) 
Macintyre finds in his Marx no trace of a means-ends morality 
characteristic of StaliniRm, but the notion of a real but developing 
essential human nature. He interprets this to mean that human conduct 
is not merely to be judged by its effectiveness in bringing communism 
closer, but that in your behaviour now, you to some degree embody the 
human nature which communism will fully realise. 
This is Macintyre•s third way and clearly it depends upon the reality 
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and plausibility of Marx's essentialist notion of human nature and 
Marxism as a general theory of this nature's development in history. 
Whatever Macintyre's views now, this remains a possible resolution to 
the problem of Liberalism. Some of the reasons why few take such a 
view seriously and a very tentative outline of some recent work that 
tries to take Marx seriously is given in Chapter 2. Were it possible 
to update such a view of Marxism it would promise a most powerful 
challenge to Liberalism. 
What, then, has been Macintyre's response to his loss of confidence in 
a Marxist resolution to his dilemma? He has principally deepened and 
extended his critique of liberalism) both philosophically and 
sociologicallyJand surveyed the philosophical and cultural resources 
of the past for an alternative to Marxism as a solution. Nonetheless 
he remains committed to the fundamental diagnosis of the New Reasoner 
piece. In the preface to After Virtue he quotes from the essay a 
critical remark about the then revisionist communist Leszek 
Kolakowski: 
One cannot revive the moral content within Marxism by 
simply taking a Stalinist view of historical development 
and adding liberal morality to it. (45) 
He reaffirms his view that leaving Stalinism, by turning to the 
Liberalism, Jf which Marxism had originally emerged to criticise, is 
not good enough, 
since I continued, and continue, to accept much of the 
substance of that criticism, this answer was not available 
to me. (46) 
So is there a non-liberal alternative? 
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After Virtue is his answer. Macintyre tells us that this work arose 
out of an attempt to write two books, one on the fate of morality in 
the modern world and another on the philosophy of social science. In 
the process he discovered that the arguments of one book required the 
A'7 
arguments of the other.~' 
After Virtue begins with a 1 disquieting suggestion 1 • Macintyre 
develops the now familiar view, present in all his work, that in 
modern liberal society, the moral basis has fragmented. It is not that 
we are confused over particular moral questions but rather we have 
lost the basis for understanding what a coherent moral argument is. 
This is because our moral vocabulary has lost the institutional 
framework and shared conceptual understanding, which originally 
provided it with meaning and persuasiveness. With moral vocabulary 
ripped from its context, we are left only with the fragments of the 
originally meaningful moral scheme. The fragments are used, or 
referred to in everyday life, so we continue to act as if there 
continued to exist, an over arching moral framework, within which to 
relate to one another. In practice we have a marked tendency to appeal 
to different bits of the fragments, hence our difficulty. 
The cultural and intellectual response to this situation is the 
emergence of emoti vist ethics, in which arguments about values are 
considered to be nothing more than statements of individual 
preference, argument tends to become a species of rhetoric, which 
makes a person's feeling present to the world; so they can exhibit the 
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choosing of a position - as we see in the following definition the 
moral critic has resurfaced in a new guise. 
Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgements 
and specifically all moral judgements are nothing but 
expressions of preference, expressions of attitudes or 
feeling, in so far as they are moral or evaluat.i ve in 
character ... factual judgements are true or false; and in 
the realm of fact. there are rational criteria by means of 
which we may secure agreement. . . . But. moral judgements, 
being expressions of attitude or feeling, are neither true 
nor false and agreement. . . . is not. to be secured by any 
rational method for there are~o~. It is to be secured if 
at all by producing certain non-rational effects on the 
emotions or attitudes of those who disagree with one. We 
use moral judgements not. only to express our own feelings 
and attitudes but also precisely to produce such effects 
in others. (48) 
It is crucial to grasp that Macintyre is not. claiming that this 
philosophical theory is very widely accepted, although its emergence 
in the late 19th century and early 20th century is not. without 
significance. Indeed in his A Short. History of Ethics, he pointed to 
several powerful critics of the view. 49 But rather the point is that. 
something very much like emotivism, is in fact, institutionalised and 
operational in a society like our own. 
This is indeed central to the whole of Macintyre's approach and 
provides the justification for his importance, for social theory, for 
he argues that moral philosophy, including emotivism: 
characteristically presupposes a sociology. For every 
moral philosophy offers explicitly or implicitly at. least 
a partial conceptual analysis of the relationship of an 
agent to his or her reasons, motives, intentions and 
actions, and in so doing generally presupposes some claims 
that these concepts are embodied or at least can be in the 
real social world. (50) 
The link between the theory and the practice can be seen to be 
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provided in this case by nothing less than Weberian sociology, which 
also places values beyond argument, and focuses on a discussion of 
means. Therefore neither emoti vism {'Or Weberism sociology, are mere 
theory, but simultaneously an analysis of, and the embodiment of 
contemporary life. 
The pc)int can be made clearer, if we look at the difficult example of 
nuclear weapons. In a public arena without shared moral criteria, the 
debate over the possession and use of nuclear weapons has some 
peculiar features. There are, of course, many grounds for opposing 
nuclear weapons, some pragmatic and tactical, but others take a more 
'moral' form. It is the latter form that concerns us here. 
Many, although by no means all, people who oppose nuclear weapons on 
'moral' grounds, do so because they are members of communities that 
Macintyre describes as bearers for the traditions of the virtues. They 
tend to oppose the possession and use of nuclear weapons, on the 
grounds - which have a long pedigree - that the intention to kill vast 
numbers of people in a war, is immoral. Such an intention is a central 
part of current nuclear strategy, given the targeting of Soviet 
cities. Clearly such an objection could be rooted in the abstract 
moral principle of the 'moral critic', but groups within the 
opposition do also rest their claim in the existence of a shared human 
nature, which is not being realised by such an intention. This would 
be the position of certain kinds of humanist; certainly the Christian 
tradition of the 'just war• forbids the intention of killing civilians 
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for this reason, certain kinds of socialist and anarchist would have 
similar grounds for opposition. This is the structure of the early 
(Marxist) Macintyre's argument as in, for example, the value to be 
found in the bravery of the deaths of the 'good' communists, 
displaying something of the potential of human nature whose 
1 . t" . . 51 rea 1sa.1on lS commun1sm. 
How does the state respond to such claims? Its apologists do not 
normally make a direct appeal to moral principle as would the liberal 
critic. It is normally conceded that the use of nuclear weapons would 
be a truly appalling thing, but that the missiles must remain 
targetted. This is because bureaucratic organisations, on this view, 
operate on an implicit means-ends morality. Such forms can have no 
concept of the intention to do something as being evil. A modern 
bureaucratic state's only relevant criteria is effectiveness. That 
this particular threat to exercise nuclear weapons has proved to be 
effective: 'there has been no war for 40 years in Europe' . The ends 
are chosen, there can be no intrinsically evil means, only means that 
would fail or whose use would jeopardise the ends. Means are not 
internally related goods to ends, they are but a medium for attaining 
what is wanted. 
Emotivism is embodied then in bureaucratic forms, and in the process 
the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative forms of 
behaviour becomes critically blurred. Bureaucratic organisations, 
private or public, are involved in a competitive struggle for scarce 
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resources, to put at the service of predetermined ends. Managers have 
to use their resources towards achieving those ends as effec(~vely as 
possible. About the ends, of course, no reasons can be given in the 
actual practice of managing. The Manager is one of Macintyre's key 
characters in our moral drama and his theorist is Weber. For, as he 
puts it: 
If 
Weber's thought embodies just those dichotomies which 
emotivism embodies and obliterates just those distinctions 
to which emotivism has been blind. Questions of ends are 
questions of values, and on values reason is silent, 
conflict between rival values cannot be rationally 
settled. Instead one must simply choose between parties, 
classes, nations, causes and ideals. (52) 
the manager obliterates the manipulative/non-manipulative 
distinction at the level of the organisation, the therapist 
obliterates it at the personal level. The manager treats ends as given 
and is concerned principally with technique, now to transform the 
resources at his/her disposal into a final product, eg investment into 
profits. The therapist also has a set of predetermined ends, to which 
to apply technique. Mental illness, frustration, dissatisfaction etc 
are to be transformed to create 'healthy' ie self-directed, organised 
contented individuals. But neither manager or therapist can 
meaningfully argue about the moral content of ends. 
If Weber is the theorist of the manager, then for Macintyre, Erving 
Goffman gives us the therapeutic vision of society. The therapeutic 
self in Goffman is a spectral self that flits from role to role, being 
no more than a "peg" on which the clothes of the role are 
hung. (53) 
But the 'I' has not disappeared in Goffman, rather it stands over and 
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against each of its roles. Its sense of 'freedom' seems to reside 1n 
its relative indifference to any particular role and an awareness of 
the ultimate contingency of each situation. 
It is out of these two key figures that the culture of what Macintyre 
terms 'B t' d. 'd 1' •54 ureaucra 1c In lVl ua 1sm is discernable: the manager 
grounded in organisational effectiveness, the therapist in the 
sovereignty of the indiviudal as free self. In so far as both 
characterize moments in our lives, moral debate becomes histrionic, an 
assertion of ungrounded, unshared assumption; success in such roles 
takes the forms of conversion or manipulation rather than rational 
persuasion. 
Macintyre argues that this position emerges for both institutional and 
intellectual reasons. The fragmentation of a shared system of 
argumentation, (his pre-Enlightenment unity) occurs, for institutional 
reasons, because of the secularisation of the state, the fragmentation 
of religious and cultural organisation, (the Reformation and growth of 
Nation States), the emergence of new economic and social forces. But 
this change is also a change in what is accepted as a viable argument. 
In philosophy, the response to the breakdown of shared understanding, 
was, in the hands of figures like Hume and Kant, to seek to ground 
ethics in the individual. Kant sought rational principles that any 
individual could accept, whilst Hume and many others in the 18th 
century sought to ground morals in human passion (see Chapter 3). But 
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for Macintyre it is what their thought has in corrunon, that is more 
important, ie the negative features of their argument. These features 
explain why the attempt to find in philosophy what had been lost in 
religion failed because 
reason for him (Kant) as much as for Hume, discerns no 
essential motives and teleological features in the 
objective universe available for study by physics ... what 
is true of them is true also of Diderot, of Smith and of 
Kierkegaard. All reject any teleological view of human 
nature, any view of man having an essence which defines 
his true end. (55) 
In other words they reject what the earlier Macintyre had noticed as 
crucial to Marx, as a way of overcoming the alternatives of Liberalism 
and Stalinism. 
More detail on the nature of the rejection of teleology is found in 
Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. But in essence, Macintyre 
argues that without some teleological framework, in which the concept 
of the virtues is at horne, we are forced in our culture, to ground 
morals in the individual. A position that may well lead to the 
adoption of a Nietzchean perspective: the assertion of our individual 
morals and desires through the power of the will. This is the dark 
side of ernotivisrn, a self that has no criteria external to it, will 
impose itself on reality, perhaps by subtle manipulation, perhaps by 
rhetoric, but perhaps also by force! 
If the cultural strength of emotivisrn is that moral conclusions cannot 
be derived from factual premises, it follows that only factual claims 
are open to communal or public verification. Macintyre will not accept 
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this. After Virtue has a principle purpose in attempting to reconnect 
the two, via a return to a form of Aristotelianism. 
Aristotle is important for Macintyre for two reasons. The first is 
that his is a form of thought that has proved itself as capable of 
providing the intellectual basis of at least three different cultures. 
Ancient Greece, the Arab Islamic Empire and Medieval Europe. The 
second reason lies in the teleological nature of Aristotle's 
arguments. For an emotivist culture can only arise when in both theory 
and practice, the distinction between man as he happens to be 
and 'man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos' . 56 is rejected. 
Aristotle derives concepts of purpose and intention from factual 
premises, and so doing heals this gap. 
It is these issues of purpose and intention that are involved in 
Macintyre's arguments concerning the social sciences. For the 
Fact-Value split only applies in this arena, if we are committed to 
producing universal laws of predictability, based upon certain 
versions of what natural scientists do. Doing this 1neans stripping the 
social sciences of references to purposes and intentions. But if we 
reject such a view, as Macintyre contends that we should, and view 
human action and indeed the whole of human life in a teleological 
framework, then it becomes less difficult to move from facts to morals 
and norms. Macintyre's intention seems to be to construct the social 
sciences, as versions of practical reason, not seeking universal laws, 
but as producing value laden guide lines for human communities. 
- 31 -
Aristotle then serves duty in filling the gap in Macintyre's scheme 
that Marx's own teleology of human nature and history, once filled. 
But Macintyre has clearly lost faith in essentialist metaphysics. For 
he rejects wha.t he sees o.S Asist-ot-le' s 'mPtaohvsical bioloqy •.5 7 Gut 
L ....._ ~- Q ,U 
paradoxically, as we see in Chapter TWo, it is precisely in a revival 
in metaphysical realism that has allowed a regeneration of a version 
of Marxism premised upon Aristotle (cum Hegel's) metaphysics. Such a 
view would, in effect, fulfill the promise of the young Macintyre. 
A fuller account of Macintyr~)Aristotelianism, ie without metaphysics 
is put forward in Chapter Three and in the concluding chapter. The 
core of .· the arguments is that Aristotle avoids abstract moral 
imperatives bearing down on recalcitrant human nature - as in versions 
of the Kantian and more general Protestant tradition by the 
employment of practical reason as embodied in the tradition of the 
virtues. The virtues being settled dispositions, acquired by practice, 
which enable us to behave in ways that allow us to flourish, in human 
practices and pursue the good life. Virtues are to be used in 
cooperative human activity, ie in practices, carried out according to 
standards of excellence characteristic of those practices; examples 
would include painting, sports, musicianship, farming. Missing, 
significantly, from Macintyre's account of such practices are most 
forms of modern work organisation. While work was still tied to the 
household it could be seen as a vital part of a human practice 
sustaining various communal forms of life, but when 
. . . work moves outside the household and is put to the 
service of impersonal capital, the realm of work tends to 
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become separated from everything but the service of 
biological survival and the reproduction of the labour 
force, on the one hand, and that of institutionalised 
acquisitiveness, on the other. Pleonexia, a vice in the 
Aristotelian scheme, is now the driving force of modern 
productive work. The means-end relationship embodied in 
such work - in a prnrluction line, for example - are 
necessarily external to the goods which those who work 
seek ... (58) 
Modern capitalism is a form of institutionalised life that can be 
destructive of the virtues, rnarginalising and relegating them, to 
small areas of human activity. 
It is the concept of a practice that enables Macintyre to keep 
Aristotle's teleology, without his so called metaphysical biology. 
Practices find their place in life shared with others, but the role of 
the virtues is not limited to distinct practices. Macintyre argues 
that virtues sustain individuals and communities in very different 
situations and practices. Life is perceived as narrative, in which 
virtues enable subjects to fulfill both short run and long run 
intentions, with relative harmony and as such make for the 'unity of a 
single life' . 59 
This unity of a single life is naturally connected with that of other 
lives, both now and in the past, via the complex tissue of 
responsibilities, roles and commitments that I share in. So the 
narrative order of my own life is part of a variety of communal 
narratives, and indeed, of moral traditions. It is in that context 
that Macintyre attempts to answer the problem or question, what is the 
end of human life to be? 
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To ask "what is the goal for me?" is to ask how best I 
might live out that unity (of a life P.M.) and bring it to 
completion. (60) 
It is to view the life of an individual and community as a narrative 
quest, a narrative quest that pursues the good. But what is the good? 
Briefly and inadequately - we pursue the problem in the final chapter 
- Macintyre believes the good is to be found in the looking for it. We 
start to look for the good in the social and moral particularity that 
we inherit from the past, family, town, profession, nation, class etc. 
This means that pursuit of the good is always in part a communal 
enterprise, developing further, or even rebelling against what we 
inherit. Though clearly Macintyre believes that a total rebellion, or 
repudiation of the past, is impossible and in so far as we think it is 
we suffer from painful liberal individualist delusions. 
Ultimately, then, Macintyre's teleological framework is a perspective 
on human life, and human community as story. This, then, is the 
strength and perhaps the weakness of the mature Macintyre. The 
rejected Marxist naturalistic essentialism, is replaced by an 
Aristotle stripped of his naturalistic essentialism and replaced by 
notions of narrative unities. But, as Macintyre argues, the culture of 
'bureaucratic individualism' minimises practices with a narrative 
teleological structure guided by the pursuit of goods internal to 
practices. Compared with Marxist essentialism, such a structure must 
seem fragile indeed, but clearly narrative elements cannot be 
eliminated from human life, as they constitute a part of human 
consciousness, so Macintyre places his hopes on our ability to build 
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upon these elements, in the formation of human communities. 
Having given the reader a sense of the basic framework and orientation 
of Macintrye 1 s work, I now turn to exnmine the role and treatment of 
this work, within the thesis, in a little more detail. It is important 
to emphasise again the centrality of the sociological and historical 
dimension to Macintyre 1 s work. As he put it in his 1966 book on 
ethics: 
moral concepts change as social life changes. I 
deliberately do not write "because social life changes" 
for this might suggest that social life is one thing, 
morality another, and that there is merely an external 
contingent causal relationship between them. This is 
obviously false. Moral concepts are embodied in and are 
partially constitutive of forms of social life. (61) 
In this and in all his substantive work, Macintyre seems to be 
expressing the concept that Philip Abrams has called structuring which 
attempts to resolve the old sociological problem of agency. This 
problem is expressed by Abrams as: 
How do we, as active subjects, make a world of objects 
which then, as it were, become subjects making us their 
objects. It is the problem of individual and society, 
consciousness and being, action and structure. (62) 
Just as Macintyre refuses the false dichotomy between social life and 
moral concepts, so Abrams rejects the structure - action division 
within sociology. Interestingly, their resolution of the problem takes 
exactly the same form; Macintyre sees moral concepts embodied in 
social life that changes over time, so Abrams argues that the way out 
from the agency dilemma 
is to insist on the need to conceive of that dilemma 
historically to insist on the ways in which and the extent 
to which the relationship of action and structure is to be 
understood as a matter of process in time. (63) 
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Macintyre refuses to consign moral concepts to some interior area of 
the mind, where 'choice' takes place, rather he sees social 
transformation as involving transformation of that arena, being 
intrinsic to the transformation of other areas of social life. This is 
why moral philosophy presupposes a sociology and a history, it is as 
Abrams has remarked about Norbert Elias: 'a unified working-out of 
meaning-and- structure' . 63 
This, then, is one major justification for the thesis for it attempts 
to make some small contribution to Macintyre's project, by exploring 
the relationship between his 'philosophical history' and sociological 
and historical analysis. It uses historical materials to explicate in 
a more concrete form, the transformations that Macintyre's work 
depends upon for its coherence. Macintyre, himself, in response to 
criticisms by Marx Wart of sky, has called for this supplementation. 
Wartofsky' s view is that After Virtue requires more adequate social 
history to achieve in Macintyre's words an 
adequate exploration 
flourished 
and to enable us to gain an 
of why individualist theory 
adequate understanding of the kind of mistakes involved in 
coming to accept it. (65) 
In accepting this and decrying the separation of the history of 
philosophy and social history, he states that: 
it is a measure of the appositeness of Wartofsky's 
criticisms, that the project of which After Virtue is a 
first sketch will on my own view remain radically 
incomplete until its narrative history is written. (66) 
This thesis is not such a history but does in some small measure 
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attempt to make good an absence Macintyre concedes from After Virtue -
but upon which the work depends, namely some analysis of that 
transforming process, he describes in terms of 
the self comes to acquire the status of "the individual", 
the individual becomes defined as that which is capable uf 
making contracts; anything in the self's environment 
becomes potentially the property of some individual 
••• (67) 
the transition either from feudalism to capitalism or from pre-modern 
to modern society. 
Macintyre is committed to some version of this narrative being true 
and as he says 
the version that I judge to be thus vindicated is that of 
Karl Polanyi's Great Transformation. (68) 
Macintyre claims that his preference is a methodological one, 
principally that involves the way Polanyi weaves economic, social and 
theoretical elements together in his narrative. But this is not to be 
taken as the whole story, for Macintyre's relationship to Polanyi' s 
work is much deeper than this. For both Polanyi and Macintyre are 
writing morally evaluative narratives, albeit in slightly different 
idioms, of the rise of modern capitalist society as in some important 
respects, a narrative of loss. Both of them are opposed to the denuded 
means-ends morality of modern capitalism's economic framework and the 
consequences this has for the rest of society. Moreover, the sources 
and basic inspirations of their respective criticisms are the same. 
The Austrian Polanyi was a Christian Socialist economist member of the 
Austrian Socialist Party until fleeing the Nazi's in 1934. Like 
Macintyre, he was a Christian deeply impressed by Marx's analysis of 
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capitalism though not accepting all of his work. In the 1930s he, as 
Macintyre did in the 1950s, wrote with sympathy on the convergent 
relationship between Christianity and Marxism, especially in 
opposit--ion to P . 69 aSC:lSffi. Also like Macintyre, was greatly 
impressed by Aristotle's social and economic analysis, for essentially 
the same reasons ie that this analysis applies a normative overarching 
f k t t . f . d . 1 1 t. h. 70 ramewor o ques 1ons o econom1c an soc1a re a 1ons 1ps. In 
examining Polanyi's assumptions we learn much about the implicit 
social analysis involved in the narrative of After Virtue. 
The thesis reflects to some degree the form of Macintyre's work. As it 
contains both analysis and evaluation, a part of Chapter One and 
Chapters Three, Four and Five involve a development of the 
sociological/historical nature of Macintyre's work. Whilst Chapter Two 
and Chapter Six involve more philosophical and evaluative discussions. 
These examine the plausibility and coherence of solutions to our 
problems that Macintyre has endorsed at various stages, principally 
Marxism and Aristotelian narrative teleology. In Chapter Six I 
emphasise the importance of Macintyre's use of the concept of 
narrative. 
In Chapter One I look at some questions connected with individualism. 
Although the main focus of the thesis is on what might be termed 
macro-sociological questions in Macintyre's work, ie our focus on the 
market and the state nonetheless, his crucial formulation of our 
culture being that of 'bureaucratic individualism' means that 
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reference to the individualist side, cannot be entirely avoided. 
Chapter One, therefore, develops the sources Macintyre uses to develop 
his character of the therapist~ principally the work of Philip Rieff. 
It draws also from the work of cultural sociologists whose works 
relate to that of Rieff in its preoccupation and analysis eg Richard 
Sennett. It also refers briefly to the work of George Simmel, whose 
ideas are taken up in Chapter Three as a sociological complement to 
Macintyre • s framework. This work is contrasted with more traditional 
Marxist formulations which posit an optimistic transcendence of the 
individual/society dichotomy. 
In Chapter Two this Marxist resolution of problems is examined by 
looking at some aspects of the fate of Marxism in the century since 
Marx's death. The chapter looks at the philosophical claims of Marxism 
to resolve the problem of modernity, by seeing how social and cultural 
pressures exert themselves on that philosophy. Emphasis is given to 
recent philosophical work that appears to reopen Marxism's great 
philosophical/practical claims, but in following Macintyre we raise 
doubts about the reception of such theory in our current social and 
cultural context. 
In Chapters Three and Four I turn to examine the underlying historical 
assumptions behind Macintyre's account of the changes in our 
understanding of the moral order. This was done in Chapter Three by 
developing Macintyre's account of the way the emergence of the market 
system is internally connected with the fragmentation of the moral 
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order. Here the connections between Macintyre's and Polanyi's accounts 
are emphasized. In Chapter Four I 
managerialism and bureaucracy in 
utilise Macintyre's analysis of 
modern capitalist societies. 
Bureaucratic power and authority is seen as exemplified in the modern 
state. ~his analysis is grounded through the use of one particular 
historical example, that of 19th century English Radicalism in Oldham. 
The bureaucratic form is seen to be rooted in the conflicts of civil 
society and the nature of liberal ideology. The account shows how 
liberal politics are based around questions of exclusion and 
formulated in terms of individual rights, which are best 'managed' by 
bureaucratic control. The bureaucratic form can manipulate the 
historically constituted liberal self, by blurring the distinction 
between ends and means, by offering the hope of neutral technique, 
legitimized by the democratic acceptance of sovereign wills. 
In the concluding chapter I look further at Macintyre's notion of the 
narrative unity of a life, relating it briefly to some elements in 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy. I emphasize, following Macinty~e, the 
prevalence of narrative elements, and shared understandings, in human 
relationships and communities. 
I conclude by illustrating the relationship between Macintyre's 
preoccupations and the invocation by some, especially American 
radicals, of the Republican tradition of civic virtue; and the role 
played by tradition and communalism in the British miners recent 
, 
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struggle against bureaucratic and managerial power. These are seen as 
illustrative examples of the survival albeit precarious of 
particular communal and traditional forms, in conflict with our market 
order. 
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Chapter One 
Politics in the Culture of the Therapeutic 
Living on his surfaces, as he does, the therapeutic is an acutel-y 
sensitive man; it is onl-y deep down that he has l-earned to be l-ess 
vul-nerabl-e. 
Philip Rieff 
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I 
Bureaucratic Individualism; that is how Macintyre describes our 
contemporary culture. Before defining exactly what he means by this, 
we will briefly rehearse the condition of its rise. The key move for 
Macintyre is the rejection of functional teleology. As we have noted 
in the introduction, in the European context, this means a rejection 
of Aristotelian notions in philosophy and science as well as allied 
notions in theology. The central concept of the classical and medieval 
tradition on this reading, was one functional concept, the concept of 
man having an essential nature endowed with functions and purpose. 
Once such a vision is rejected then the way is left open for the kind 
of argument that claims no 'ought' can be derived from an 'is'. But 
Macintyre notes that it is not just the medieval and classical world 
that was the horne of such concepts of functional teleology: 
It is rooted in the forms of social life to which the 
theorists of the classical tradition give expression. For 
according to that tradition to be a man is to fill a set 
of roles each of which has its own point and purpose: 
member of a family, citizen, soldier, philosopher, servant 
of God. It is only when man is thought of as an individual 
prior to and apart from all roles that 'man' ceases to be 
a functional concept. (1) 
However, the problem then arises for the autonomous self, freed from 
the constraints of natural or divine teleologies and the hierarchial 
demands of an encompassing social role, as to how it can give any 
substantive content to its own moral and thereby social claims. 
Attempts are made to fill this gap in the forms of 19th century 
utilitarianism and 20th century analytic philosophy. Both forms fail, 
according to Macintyre, but are, nonetheless, important presences 
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within our culture. Utilitarianism fails because pleasures are 
incommensurable, we can formulate no real way of ordering them in 
terms of priority; no overall concept of happiness is available to 
base our decisions on. Thus 
it follows that the notion of the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number is a not ion without any clear content 
at all. It is indeed a pseudo-concept available for a 
variety of ideological uses. (2) 
Analytic philosophy attempts to ground an appeal to moral rules on 
reasons which are objective. To be a rational agent, ie to be able to 
make appeal to such rules, you require a degree of freedom and well 
being. Therefore, to be a rational agent you must have a right to 
these goods. The problem with this is that rights are very 
historically specific concepts, they are not general rules, because 
they do not exist everywhere, so they cannot be the minimal 
characteristics of a rational agent, ie objective and suitable for 
anywhere, which means we cannot move from them to general and 
. 1 1 't . 3 un~versa mora cr~ er~a. 
Macintyre argues therefore, that both utilitarianism and analytic 
philosophy are really unsuccessful attempts to save the autonomous 
moral agent from the Enlightenment's failure to provide secular 
justification of moral utterances. These two newer attempts at 
justification apparently did not resolve the situation that 
each moral agent now spoke unconstrained by the 
externalities of divine law, natural teleology or 
hierarchical authority but why should anyone else now 
listen to him? (4) 
In tnis context we are left, if not actually in articulated theory, 
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then in practice, with emotivism. We all continue to talk and argue as 
though some attempt to provide universal and rational foundations for 
our utterances, had actually been successful. This leads to a very odd 
situation, for we all attempt to protect the independence and freedom 
of our selves, but living in our current situation we are inevitably 
involved in 
modes of practice aesthetic or bureaucratic which involve 
us in manipulative relationships with others. {5) 
So in order to avoid falling prey to manipulation ourselves, we are, 
in effect, forced to practise it on others as we seek to incarnate 
within social practice our beliefs and aspirations. 
In this situation concepts derived from earlier attempts to provide 
rational foundations for our moral positions are still present within 
our culture. Two central concepts for understanding 'bureaucratic 
individualism' are 'rights' and 'utility'. Utility haunts the 
bureaucratic and managerial aspects of our culture, but as we see in 
Chapter Four, the claim to understand what would constitute such a 
basis for utility, such as prediction and shared concepts of 
'effectiveness', are based on faulty premises. On the other hand, the 
concept of 'rights' is used to express and protect our belief in our 
autonomous action. 
Rights as implied by expressions like 'natural rights' 'the rights of 
man' and now, in our own century 'human rights' . It is assumed that 
rights attach to human being because they are human. Macintyre claims 
that: 
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there is no expression in any ancient or medieval language 
correctly translated by our expression in Hebrew, Greek, 
Latin or Arabic, classical or medieval, before about 1400, 
let alone in Old English, or in Japanese even as late as 
the mid-nineteenth century. (6) 
Macintyre, of course, realises that this does not prove that no such 
rights exist, merely that they were unknown. But naturally, such 
widespread absence across cultures should put us on our guard. But in 
essence Macintyre rejects the existence of such rights because, he 
claims ,all attempts to prove they exist have failed and in reality 
modern philosophers retreat to claiming them on the basis of supposed 
intuition. They may, of course, exist even if we cannot demonstrate 
their existence but as he dryly remarks, this argument could equally 
be used to defend claims about unicorns and witches! 7 They are moral 
fictions just as the concept of utility is: both are supposed to 
provide us with the objective and impersonal moral criteria that we 
lack. 
The terms of 'utility' and 'rights' are the terms on which the culture 
of 'bureaucratic individualism' fights out its political debates. 
Bureaucratic organisations make their claims within our culture in 
terms of utility: whilst individuals make their claims in terms of 
rights. If this pair of terms are fictions, then they are also quite 
incommensurate with one another, they are the forms of an unsettable 
conflicts . On this basis it is easy to see why protest and the 
feeling of indignation are prominent. Macintyre points out that: 
to protest was once to bear witness to something and only 
as a consequence of that allegiance to bear witness 
against something else. But protest is now almost entirely 
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that negative phenomenon which characteristically occurs 
as a reaction to the alleged invasion of someone's rights 
in the name of someone else's utility. (8) 
This form of argument has recently been developed by the cultural 
historian Christopher Lasch who has made the point that the Black 
Civil Rights movement in the US in the 1950s and 1960s seemed to 
pursue its ends via an appeal to an earlier conception of democracy. 
He argues that: 
It articulated the goals of blacks in a way that appealed 
to everybody. It attacked racism. Not just white racism, 
but racism. The black power movement, starting in the 
mid-60s, which seemed to be much more militant and 
attacked Martin Luther King . . . actually redefined the 
goals of the black movement, black power, as an attack on 
white racism, as if racism was only a white phenomenon, in 
ways that made it much easier in the long run to redefine 
blacks in America as essentially another interest group 
claiming its share of the pie and not making larger claims 
at all. ( 9) 
Lasch sees this in terms of the decline of a specific notion of a 
public realm and public language, which creates a pressure against 
presenting demands as anything other than a claim for the specific 
interests of quite specific groups of claimants or better still, 
victims. One consequence of the triumph of this form of competitive 
interest group liberalism has been a 
moral elevation of the victim and the increasing tendency 
to appeal to victimisation as the only recognisable 
standard of justice. If you can prove that you've been 
victimised, discriminated against, the longer the better, 
that becomes the basis of claims ... (it) ... has little 
reference to that of other groups or to the society as a 
whole ... (10) 
In Macintyre's terms the original civil rights movement would be part 
of an older civil and religious tradition in which claims could still 
be made to objective and agreed moral criteria, shared in the public 
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realm. Such traditional movements are prey to pressures to be 
instrumentalised along the rights/utility axis of interest group 
liberalism, because they exist on the margins of the dominant culture. 
But what happens on the subjective side of the Macintyre bun~aucratic 
individualist couplet; what happens to the self as the public realm 
declines to an arena of interest group assertion? If 1 utility 1 is 
culturally borne by the actions of the manager character, then the 
stripped down self, deprived of its functional role, is under the 
tutelage of the therapist. But to what does the cultural power of the 
therapist adhere? What is it about the therapeutic attitude that makes 
it so distinctively modern? 
II 
COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL 
As has often been remarked, from its origins in classical thought, the 
sociological theory that emerged in the 19th century was much 
concerN,:rl with the whole question of community. Robert Nisbet argues 
that: 
the idea of community holds the same pivotal importance in 
the 19th century that the idea of contract had held in the 
Age of Reason . . . In the 19th century, however, we find 
contract waning before the rediscovered symbolism of 
community. In many spheres of thought, the ties of 
community-real or imagined traditional or contrived - come 
to form the image of the good society. Community becomes 
the means of denoting legitimacy in associations as 
diverse as state, church, trade unions, revolutionary 
movement, profession and co-operative. (11) 
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Philip Rieff, whose work as we have noticed is Macintyre's source for 
his concept of the therapeutic, has emphasised the connection between 
community and the sense of well being and health that flowed from 
membership of communities. According to Rieff much philosophy can be 
seen as the 'elaborated systems of symbolic integration •12 often in 
the modern era with the particular intention of integrating themselves 
as philosophers, as much as anyone else. 
This community based view of well being, has deep roots in the 
classical tradition. It is perhaps most clearly seen in Aristotle's 
definition of Man as a citizen an active definition, teleological in 
form, that saw that whether a man could fully express his humanity or 
not depended upon his membership of the political community. So for 
Aristotle, a citizen is 
he who enjoys the right of sharing in the deliberative or 
judicial office 
and that it followed from this that 
a state, in its simplest terms, is a body of such persons 
adequate in number for achieving a self-sufficient 
existence. (13) 
In this situation an individuals continued well being, material, 
emotional and psychological, depended upon the continued existence of 
that community, defined by Aristotle as the City-State. 
Nor are such views of merely antiquarian interest. They held until 
recently, a central place in virtually all social theory. Rieff like 
Nisbet argues for its centrality, whether in the Conservatism of 
Bonald, the Liberalism of De Tocqueville or the Revolutionary 
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Socialism of Marx. In Rieff's heavily Durkheimian analysis of 
community's therapeutic function, it is the Priest, philosopher or 
Magician who cures personal disorder via commiting people to the 
symbol system of the community. These communal symbols are what Rieff 
calls 'commitment therapies•. 
Behind Shaman and priest, philosopher and physician, 
stands the great community, as the ultimate corrective of 
personal disorder culture is the system of significances 
attached to behaviour by which a society explains itself 
to itself. A culture that is not thus self-explicative 
must be undergoing, in the measure of the negative 
condition, a profound change. (14) 
To say this is to raise the question and the problem of what happens 
when the community itself is in a state of disorder, or undergoing a 
profound change. Rieff, like Macintyre, but in another idiom, is 
suggesting that these cultural changes are so great as to destroy the 
therapeutic power of the community, for 
. . . then, in the destruction of all idealisations upon 
which traditional and classical communities were based, in 
theory and in practice, is to be sought the origin of 
modernity. (15) 
In order to explicate this analysis a little, we will briefly sketch 
elements of a theory, of the conditions that gave rise to a thera-
peutic culture. We have seen in Macintyre's work how once the self was 
stripped of its functional teleology, which linked human-nature-
as-it-is with human-nature-as-it-might-become, there was generated 
considerable confusion. The contradiction between an inherited 
ethical/religious system, to which many wanted to remain loyal, and 
the reality of 'human nature' seemed great. This tended to produce 
two responses: on the one hand the conservative tradition which 
viewed the moral demands of the community as rational moral law which 
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we had a duty to obey - Kant 1 s response - on the other the Romantic 
view, from Rousseau down to D.H. Lawrence and beyond, which viewed 
moral regulation as a painful weight on the goodness of human nature. 
The latter tradition pushed for greater detachment of the individual 
from communal restraint, as it was now perceived. 
However, this latter movement was only one of several processes at 
work that helped produce the modern self. Bryan Turner has helped 
bring some much needed conceptual clarity to these processes. He 
suggests three distinct elements, Individualism, Individuality and 
Individuation. 16 Individualism he suggests, is best understood as the 
conception of individuals possessing particular individual rights with 
a strong emphasis on external relations between separate and formally 
equal individuals on the basis of some form of social contract. 
Individualism, in this form, is the principal source for the notion of 
rights, which Macintyre saw as a crucial component of 1 bureaucratic 
individualism 1 • 
The concept of individuality is as Turner puts it: 
a romantic theory of the interior and private nature of 
personal life. (17) 
The nature and consequences of such a form are notoriously difficult 
to analyse. The powerful and formative impact of new forms of thought 
of German and English intellectuals at the turn of the 19th century 
are the key instances. As ever, its perhaps George Steiner who sees 
the social origins and consequences of the interior and intensely 
personal, when he notes: 
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It is the historicisation of the personal which is the 
commanding truth and legacy of the French Revolution 
Time had changed. The inner temporalities, the orderings 
of remembrance, momentariness, and, above all, of futurity 
by virtue of which we compose our grasp of self, had 
altered the closely argued metamorphic relations 
between the Revolution and the new densities of personal 
time in Wordsworth's Prelude, are famous ev1dence. But 
there is scarcely a recorded life or body of experience in 
the 1790s, in the Napoleonic era, in the decades of 
explosive urbanisation, technological change, and social 
challenge that followed which do not bear witness to the 
irruption of the political into the private. (18) 
Perhaps the most significant cultural change of the 20th century has 
been the diffusion of this once minority intellectual sensibility, 
amongst the bulk of the populations of the countries of the Western 
World. 19 
Finally, the third process, Individuation, refers to the process 
whereby people are individuated by bureaucratic practices and 
disciplines. Almost all the apparatuses of the modern state and large 
scale private bureaucracies are involved in such processes, as 
taxation, educationl certification, health and welfare regulation as 
well of course, as the practices of police surveillance. This is a 
major theme of the darker tradition of social analysis from Weber, 
through the Frankfurt School down to Foucault: a principal 
preoccupation being 'the death of the individual' in those processes. 
As Turner puts it: 
The paradox of individuation is that, in making people 
different and separate, it also makes them more subject to 
control and regulation. Individuation is essentially 
registration, the precise determination of persons within 
a network of files, records, documents tabulations and 
portfolios. (20) 
But as Turner also notes, although this process does mean the 
regulation of the individual, that its critics suggests, individuation 
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is also a necessary basis for meeting basic levels of human need with 
some degree of equality, through health and welfare agencies. It would 
seem to follow, therefore, that individual ism is in some measure an 
ideology connected with civil and political rights, whilst the process 
of individuation is the necessary accompaniment of wider social 
rights. The irony is, that at least in the public domain, the rise of 
universalistic criteria of citizenship have the effect of eliminating 
the 'individual' and the particular upon which the sense of 
individuality flourishes. 
Many of these processes, although still in embryo, were evident to 
19th century social theorists. At the beginning of the century perhaps 
the most perceptive was Alex de Tocqueville. In the fast emerging 
secular liberal culture of his time, he delin~£d the sensibility at 
home within such societies. He saw clearly, that it was not powerful 
bonding sentiments but critical detachment, which most found more 
conducive to well-being. De Tocqueville's work especially Democracy in 
America, was an attempt to examine the relationship between the 
condition of the psyche and the social structure. He argued that in 
politically unequal societies, the social bond is firm and therefore 
the sense of communal purpose is high. But in conditions of equal 
citizenship, what would happen to public life once individualism had 
sapped its virtues. As he put it: 
Individualism is a mature and calm feeling, which disposes 
each member of the community to sever himself from the 
mass of his fellows and to draw apart with his family and 
his friends, so that after he has thus formed a little 
circle of his own, he willingly leaves society, at large 
to itself. ( 21) 
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It seemed that within a deeply differentiated democratic culture, 
truly for the first time there arose the possibility of every person 
standing for themselves, each leading a truly private life and most 
importantly trained to understand rather than to love or hate their 
neighbours. A sense of reflective choice and detachment, that provides 
the context for making sense of E.M. Forster's famous remark 
concerning his desire, that if he had to choose between betraying a 
friend and betraying his country, he hoped he would be brave enough to 
betray his country. 
A remarkable similar analysis, to De Tocgueville's, although couched 
in different terms, was produced rather later in the century by 
another theorist of modernity, George Simmel. We will meet Simmel 
later in our discussion of the market in Chapter Three, but we must 
briefly summarise his importance for understanding the modern self. In 
his most important work The Philosophy of Money, Simmel examines the 
growth of freedom and its relationship with the movement to a market 
based money economy. In a money economy individuals are able to 
participate in the social order without totally committing their whole 
personalities. They. are sustained as material individuals by 
participating in an ever more complex set of impersonal exchanges. 
These exchanges, in turn, produce universal objective standards - ie 
prices - which provides general social knowledge of the rates at which 
commodities will be supplied. Although this increases the individuars 
reliance on the whole society, it does, however, reduce an 
individual's reliance upon particular persons. The growth of universal 
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standards results, along with the growth of the social division of 
labour, in greater substitutability between the providers of goods and 
services and so increases choice. These changes reduced the importance 
These processes generate what Simmel describes as objective culture, 
ie that embodied in production and exchange, which in effect means the 
reification of human activity. Human society may begin to take on the 
aspect of an objective and fateful natural process. Human intervention 
into this objective culture seems less and less effective. Yet at the 
same time Simmel notes tendencies corresponding to De Tocqueville' s 
predictions. For this process of reification also seems to allow the 
individual to create a sphere of free self development. This is due to 
the rather abstract quality of life, freed from direct concern with 
particular people or things, which allows the development of a deeper 
and detached inner nature. As Simmel puts it: 
If modern man can, under favourable circumstances, secure 
an island of subjectivity, a secret closed off sphere of 
privacy then this is due to the fact that money 
relieves us to an ever increasing extent of direct contact 
with things, while at the same time making it easier for 
us to dominate them and select from them what we 
require. { 23) 
Pushed to its logical conclusion, Simmel feels that this process can 
only strengthen the ego as 
all the material contents of life become increasingly 
objective and impersonal, so that the remainder that 
cannot be reified becomes all the more personal, all the 
more the indisputable property of the self. 
And as he adds concerning the mechanisation of culture, in this case 
the typewriter: 
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No matter how socialistic all such mechanical contrivances 
may be, the remaining private property of the intellectual 
self becomes all the more jealously guarded. (24) 
The self, withdrawn and self-preoccupied, is possibly in danger of 
disappearing altogether, in societies with modern complex economies. 
This is a major theme for what might be termed the dark side of social 
theory. De Tocgueville, Simmel, Weber and the Frankfurt School and the 
inheritors of this tradition (which must include Macintyre albeit in a 
distant sense), as well as Reiff, Lasch, Richard Sennett and others, 
insistently ask not just 'is this all that modernity amounts to?' but 
rather, 'can we bear it at all?'; can we learn to cope with such 
privacies? 
Philip Rieff notes that the classical tradition in both its 
conservative and its radical forms was agreed, despite their 
differences, that the good life was the life of a good citizen. As he 
put it: 
In short, security cured and security carne through member-
ship in an 'organic' community. This was the basis of 
conservative and radical political theory alike: community 
cures through the achievement by the individual of his 
collective identity. To cure a man, one need only return 
him to his community or construct a new one. (25) 
It is within this context that Rieff notes the importance of Marxism 
for presenting the image of a new community. In some of Marx's 
writings we see elements that recall the analysis of the pessimistic 
tradition in social theory, as for example, in his attack on so called 
natural rights in On the Jewish Question Marx writes: 
Thus none of the so called rights of man, goes beyond 
egoistic man, man as he is in civil society, namely an 
individual withdrawn behind his private interests and 
whims and separated from the community. Far from the 
rights of man conceiving of man as a species-being, 
species-life itself, society appears as a framework 
exterior to individuals a limitation of their original 
self-sufficiency. The only bond that holds them together 
is natural necessity, need and private interest, the 
conservation of their property and egoistic person. (26) 
Here Marx is making the almost standard criticism of many social 
theorists, but Rieff is surely right in seeing Marx's importance, for 
he offers a way forward, a transcendence of this situation, not merely 
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rational appraisal of it. Rieff makes the point well: 
Marxist diagnosis, without the Marxist ideal of a new 
community, would be not socialism but sociology. Marx's 
utopian vision of a communist identity, predicate of true 
individuality, combines both the radical and conservative 
tradition. r-1arxism is more than theor1': at the same time 
it is a type of commitment therapy. (27) 
I will return to the structure of Marx's solution to modernity later 
in the chapter and assess its viability in Chapter Two. But I now want 
to briefly outline another response to the problems of modernity, 
which takes us to the heart of the question of the therapeutic. This 
is what Rieff calls the analytic attitude. 
III 
THE ANALYTIC AND THE NARCISSISTIC 
The analytic attitude seems to emerge as a response to, and an 
acceptance of the stripping away from the self of binding attachments 
and communal purposes. But it can differ profoundly from the romantic 
celebration of this process. It is frequently deeply anti-utopian, in 
that it accepts that there are no positive communities within which 
one could merge oneself. It is disbelieving that any such communities 
could be constructed. It is what Rieff christened in the late 1950s 
'psychological man' . 28 
The analytic, as a cultural type, involves first of all detachment, 
which itself, as Simmel noted, is both product of and support for 
certain characteristics of our individualistic culture. Secondly it 
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involves the construction of what Rieff calls 'negative 
communities' . 29 Positive communities were those that offered salvation 
to the individual by subordinating them to some communal purposes 
either religious or political, which in turn transformed the 
individual. Negative communities are almost self-sustaining, 
capitalist market societies are our clearest model, they do not offer 
a type of collective salvation, and are not transformative but 
informative; understanding and not passion must be the basis of their 
. d 30 att1tu e. 
Several things follow from this view of advanced capitalist societies, 
as culturally negative. Without communal purposes actions tend to 
become increasingly based on rationalistic self interested forms of 
justification. Given this, controls (necessary to regulate the 
impersonal but potentially conflictual relations) must be established 
in ways other than that produced by transcendent transformations of 
the individual. In a liberal indi v·i..tj,;W..istic culture such controls 
over an individual life tend to be informational or psycho-
therapeutic, intended to rationalistically manage the problems of 
living as a detached individual in society. The clearest character 
type of this kind was the intellectual of the late 19th century and 
early 20th century. For Rieff this type is undoubtedly exemplified by 
Freud himself. The essence of Freud's theory is that in rational 
detachment, we will learn that particular style in which our 
individuality can flourish within the materially feasible 
opportunities that are compatible with our rationally arrived at sense 
of personal limitation. 
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It is, however, with the notion of the rational that problems appear. 
How is this concept to be arrived at, and coherently grounded in order 
to have power to curb desire, but without damaging spontaneity. George 
Steiner has pointed to the difficulties and peculiarities of analytic 
thought, 1n terms of the violence that it does to the object of 
analysis as a process of reducing or taking apart, without any 
certainty about what will be found. He argues for the great difference 
in the radicalism of analytic and Marxist thought. He writes: 
We are ready to ask very large and inherently destructive 
questions. This is radicalism in a special sense. Not 
Hegelian Marxist radicalism with its implicit futurity, 
with its almost axiomatic presumption that we go to the 
root of a problem in order to solve it, and because we 
know that destruction, uprooting, is only a necessary risk 
before solution. No; our going to the root of things is 
more ambivalent. We would do so even when we are not 
confident that there is a solution. It may be, in fact, 
that the aspect of demolition, the apocalyptic strain, 
gently, tempt us. We are fascinated by 'last things', by 
the end of cultures, of ideologies, of art forms, of modes 
of sensibility. We are certainly since Nietzsche and 
Spengler 'terminalists' . OUr view of history, says 
Levi-Strauss in a deep pun, is not anthropology but an 
entropology. (31) 
These distinctions between two very different modes of thought are 
quite crucial. The dominance, for whatever external or contingent 
reason, of the analytic attitude, seems to underlie much of 
contemporary Marxism's difficulty. But so far we have been treating 
Rieff' s account of the rise of the analytic and the therapeutic in 
abstract outline. Is there a more precise way of grounding the decline 
of 'positive communities', if this is indeed the case, in real 
processess? 
Much of Richard Sennett's work, especially his path breaking The Fall 
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of Public Man is directly concerned with a process that seems 
analogous to the decline of 'positive community', Sennett begins from 
the work of Alex De Tocqueville, especially the analysis and 
predictions of Democracy in America. The influence of De Tocqueville 
and the assumptions at work in The Fall of Public Man were intimated 
in an earlier book with Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class, 
in which Sennett arguesthat: 
what needs to be understood is how the class structure in 
American is organised so that the tools of freedom become 
sources of indignity. (32) 
Sennett and Cobb claim that because awareness that one's class 
position is flexible, this means that it is likely to be seen as an 
attribute of the self, rather than located in terms of family, or 
region. The claim that there exists equal opportunity within a context 
in which there is some real opportunity for upward mobility, has the 
effect they claim, when combined with the existence of real 
inequality, of turning the injuries of class inwards. 
What this means is that class, at least in the modern American 
context, is no longer culturally perceived as an external objective 
reality, but instead has come to be understood as an emanation 
springing directly from the self, ie a subjective definition of 
success or failure. Sennett and Cobb compare this situation with the 
situation of craftsmen in the Italian Renaissance, when there was also 
competition between workers for success. But they point out that these 
craftsmen would have thought it ridiculous 
to think of a dignified man being reflected in his ability 
to make a good piece of jewelry ... what he created would 
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establish his repute independent of his person, the 
jewelry or silver perhaps keeping his name alive after his 
death. (33) 
However, today it seems as though this has been reversed, the 
interviews which Sennett and Cobb conducted with American workers, 
seem to indicate that ability and excellence are a measurement of the 
person's inner being. 
The demonstration of worth now has become a demonstration 
about inner capacity in the man greater than his tangible 
works, about a virtue which permits him to transcend 
situation after situation, mastering each but attached and 
identified with none. (34) 
As with Sirnrnel, Sennett sees the increasing fluidity and objectivity 
of lives dominated by production and exchange, leading people to dive 
ever inwards to find meaning and definition. The key concepts here are 
authenticity and intimacy. 
Paradoxically, being driven inward for meaning and definition, must 
within our culture, result in a drive outwards with subjectively 
derived utterance, to assert what one really is! Sennett applies 
Lionel Trilling's analysis of the cultural move from sincerity to 
authenticity, to the social order. 35 These terms refer to the shift 
from the language of personal sincerity spoken before the 19th century 
to a language of individual authenticity spoken after it. Sincerity is 
used here to mean, 'the exposure in public of what is felt in private' 
and authenticity means 'the direct exposure to another of a person's 
own attempts to feel'. 36 In this process the distinctions between 
public and private become blurred. It stops being possible to see that 
keeping strong and dangerous feelings from others, can be morally 
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expressive 
Instead self-disclosure becomes a universal measure of 
believability and truth. (37) 
The consequences of this are that: 
the more a person concentrates on feeling genuinely rather 
than on the objective content of what is felt, the more 
subjectivity becomes an end in itself, the less expressive 
he can be. (38) 
In essence Sennett seems to be arguing that this process equates 
•feeling• with human development, ie to be a person is connected with 
strength of feeling, so the more you feel, the more real you are. This 
dehumanising process took shape in the 19th century, and Sennett finds 
evidence for it in the ways people become convinced that they 
themselves did not have real personality,but instead went in search of 
those public figures, politicans, artists, actors, conductors, who 
seemed to feel more intensely than they did, and hence seemed more 
real. As sennett puts it: 
Being expressive and having extraordinary talent - that 
was the formula on which personality entered the public 
realm. ( 39) 
Artists and performers 
. . . used shock tactics to make the moment of performing 
all-important, those who could arouse and shock the 
audience were perceived as powerful persons and therefore, 
as of superior status, rather than in the servant status 
of the 18th century performer. In this way as the 
performer came to rise above his audience he came to 
transcend his text. (40) 
On this basis the common life or public life of society was eroded, as 
the fictions and rituals of public life, by which performers could 
distance themselves for the necessary impersonality of public life, 
failed to stand up to the new criteria of authenticity and intimacy. 
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By these standards public life must always be found wanting. Full of 
strangers it is hostile and forbidding. There arises then the urge 
amongst people to seek havens from impersonal contact, to create areas 
of warmth in a cold world. It is this, that Sennett terms Destructive 
Gemeinschaft. 41 This means that the classical ideal of community and 
the life of the citizen are degraded, 
community becomes a weapon against society, whose great 
vice is now seen to be its impersonality. (42) 
Such a culture is preoccupied by its own disposition and is localist 
in outlook. 43 The prominant personality type is narcissistic. Here 
Sennett reveals the affinity between his account and Rieff's portrayal 
of the analytic attitude, when he argues that 
psychoanalysis in particular, was founded on the faith 
that in understanding the inner workings of the self sui 
generis without transcendental ideas of evil or of sin, 
people might free themselves from these horrors and be 
liberated to participate more fully and rationally in a 
life outside the boundaries of their own desires. Masses 
of people are concerned with their single life-histories 
and particular emotions as never before, this concern has 
proved to be a trap rather than a liberation. (44) 
The impersonal quality of the world makes the search for community 
into a retreat into smaller groups, ever more narrowly defined and 
with greater emotional weight put upon these relationships. The most 
highly valued yet paradoxically least realised state according to 
Sennett, is intimacy, because the basis on which it is sought is 
destructive of real intimacy. Sennett puts forward three elements that 
explain the rise of the intimate, desiring self. The first of these is 
the emergence of the narcissistic pesonality; Sennett like Christopher 
Lasch, notes the move in psychoanalytic data, especially after the 
second world war, towards the emergence of more narcissistic 
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l 't d' d 45 persona 1 y 1sor ers 1 suggesting a profound shift within the 
balances of the social order. Sennett suggests that the reason for 
this shift is that: 
today' s soci Pty has mobilisPd the force.s of narcissism 
that are potential in all human beings by intensifying the 
culture of personality inunanent in social relations to 
such a point that those relations now appear only as 
mirrors of self. (46) 
The second element is the emergence of the protean self, a self with 
no fixed nature,capable of changing all the time. 
This self-hood puts an inunense premium on 'direct' 
experience with other people, it detests reserve or masks 
behind which other people are felt to lurk, because in 
being distant they seem to be inauthentic. (47) 
Thirdly, this protean self interacts with others in peculiar ways in 
that it 
treats intimate interchanges as a market in self-
revelations. You interact with others according to how 
much you tell them about yourself the more 'intimate' you 
become, the more confessions you have made. (48) 
All this creates severe problems for any kind of public life and a 
coherent radical politics. Amongst such people, insecure in their 
innermost selves, they can only create community by fantasy and 
projection. The shared imagery becomes the real purpose of the 
conununity and deters rationally effective political action. Sennett 
concludes that: 
it is no accident that western bourgeois radicals of the 
last decade could so easily arrive at a notion of changes 
in immediate personal relations as 'models' of what should 
happen to the whole society. (49) 
Sennett thus condemns the 'intimate society' for essentially political 
reasons. A culture that fears the large scale will leave the real 
centres of global economic and military power untouched. Sennett fears 
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a culture whose people are so self obsessed as to be unable to 
transcend narrow self-interests or imagine an economic system built on 
anything but privatism. 
Christopher Lasch in his most recent work The Minimal Self has taken 
this argument further by looking at the effects of the profound 
uncertainties (cultural, economic, military) of life in the 1980s. In 
part this is a response to misunderstandings of earlier work on 
narcissism as being merely moralising about selfishness etc. In fact 
he argues, narcissism is, in reality, an attempt by the psyche to 
survive. He writes: 
Narcissism signifies a loss of selfhood not self-
assertion. It refers to a self-threatened with dis-
integration and by a sense of inner emptiness ... Everyday 
life has begun to pattern itself on the survival 
strategies forced on those exposed to extreme adversity, 
selective apathy emotional disengagement from others, 
renunciation of the past and the future, a determination 
to live one day at a time. (50) 
Lasch accepts the notion of the protean self as mobile and 
reconstituted, but sees it as a response to a public environment out 
of control, leaving only the option of self management and personal 
adjustment, with the aid of the caring and therapeutic professions. 
Lasch is important for he argues against both conservative critics of 
modern hedonism and liberal apologists for such a culture. Lasch 
instead roots these cultural changes, as part of the process of change 
in advanced capitalism. It is this which gives Lasch's American based 
work its wider applicability. His is an analysis of the way advanced 
capitalism remakes a social order. New cultural forms of the 
organisation of work and new forms of consumption emerge from the 
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heart of the capitalist market economy. He argues that: 
manipulative, therapeutic, pluralistic and 'non-
judgemental' style of social discipline originated 
like so many other developments with the rise of a 
professional and managerial class in the early years of 
the 20th century and then spread from the industrial 
corporation, where it was first perfected into the 
political realm as a whole. (51) 
These processes along with the rise of new professional groupings like 
social workers have introduced therapeutic management forms, into what 
was once the private sphere, substituting observation and measurement 
for moral judgement. 52 In the workplace the gradual replacement of 
skilled work with machinery and a process of collusion with the 
education system that turns education into 'man power' selection, not 
to create skills but to classify workers. Workers are split into a 
small group of administrators, technicians, managers and a larger 
group of workers who carry out instructions. 53 Added to this the 
massive invasion of life by advertising and consumerism, remoulding 
environments and cultural forms on the basis of profit maximisation 
which makes for 
the replac~ment of a reliable world of durable objects by 
a world ~flickering images. (54) 
This, in Lasch's view, is the context to which he adds in the 1980s 
the hazard>of economic recession and nuclear war; such a culture seems 
to produce survivalism not in dramatic mountain retreats only, but in 
psychological preparedness for the worst. But this is merely the other 
side of narcissistic/protean/impulse self, generated by a society 
based on the dominance of market relations. Lasch, like Sennett, sees 
here a withdrawal from politics and public life, which in turn seems 
to become one more variety of consumerism as the techniques and models 
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of advertising invade this realm too. 
It is always possible for the British reader to nestle in the cultural 
conservatism of British society, and say that all this is not the case 
in Britain. And, of course, this is largely true. But it is also true 
to say this of much of the US. What writers like Rieff, Lasch and 
Sennett argue, is that these are cultural tendencies deeply congruent 
with modern capitalism, thus becoming more and more generally 
applicable. Bernice Martin (whose work points to the way British 
culture has been changing over the past 30 years in ways described by 
Sennett and Lasch) is correct to argue: 
Neither Mrs Whitehouse's middle England nor the mainstream 
working class can seriously recognise itself in the 
picture of the New Narcissism. (55) 
However, she argues that: 
In all the cases we examined - education, the welfare 
professions and the Churches - the expressive imperative 
made a great deal of headway against earlier structures 
based on formality, hierarchy and ritual . . . spontaneity 
became the preferred mode, and it was ever roore widely 
assumed that the natural objectives of these institutions 
was to enable ego to achieve self-realisation . . . The 
basic premises of what has been called the New Narcissism 
... became deeply etched into the cultural and political 
base of these professional activities. (56) 
However, Martin's work goes on to confirm Macintyre's understanding of 
the relationship between the therapeutic 1node and bureaucratic 
utility. By the mid '70s, especially in the areas of public and 
private bureaucracies, she argues that 'the continued, if half 
concealed imperatives of utility and instrumentality• 57 began to place 
limits and reimpose some elements of structure and control. Yet as 
both Macintyre and Rieff argue it is precisely this formulation and 
- 72 -
real division of the social order that prevents genuinely corrununal 
action. This corresponds to Rieff 1 S negative corrununities, of isolated 
and increasingly protean selfs, left to struggle in an environment of 
bureaucratic necessity. 
Such a culture seems to be most inhospitable to a Marxism, which seeks 
to renew the classical corrununity ideal, as the fulfilment of an 
objectively given essential human nature. Nonetheless Marxism has been 
the major oppositional force to capitalist society and culture in the 
past hundred years, described by Rieff as 
the last great institutional example in Western history of 
a credal elite, a guiding cadre which would practise what 
it preached ... (58) 
It is to the hopes and problems of Marxism that we now turn. 
IV 
MARX Is REAL COMMUNITY 
We have noticed how Rieff saw Marx 1 s importance as being in the 
uniting of conservative and radical views of community, by transposing 
it into a communist future. Marx's view of the communist future has 
been implicitly as well as explicitly criticised by much of the 
sociological tradition. For example, Alvin Gouldner shortly before his 
death, compared Marx's vision of socialism unfavourably with 
Durkheim. 59 Gouldner saw Marx as a theorist of indefinite growth, who 
solved the classic problem of scarcity by simply producing more. 
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Gouldner argues that both Marx and Durkheim saw human desire as 
potentially infinite (always growing and developing), but that Marx's 
position is incompatible with the belief that production will solve 
the problem. He sees this as endemic to Marxism because of its refusal 
to look at the subjective side of demand and value 
for Marx it is the sheer amount of production, the sheer 
supply side of the equation alone, that will, without 
reference to the demand side, solve the problem of 
scarcity. ( 60) 
Gouldner compares this view with Durkheim's conception of the way out 
of scarcity, he quotes Durkheim thus: 
What is needed if social order is to reign is that the 
mass of men be content with their lot. But what is needed 
for them to be content, is not that they have more or 
less, but that they be convinced that they have no right 
to more. And for this it is absolutely essential that 
there be an authority whose superiority they acknowledge 
and which tells them what is right ... a moral power is 
required whose superiority they acknowledge and which 
tells them what is right . . . a moral power is required 
whose superiority (man) recognises. (61) 
Now clearly Marx did have a view of humanity having expanding wants. 
However, a case can be made that Marx was a part of a classical 
tradition, locating his vision of the future, within the terms of a 
shared public life. On this view communism is not as Gouldner seems to 
think a state beyond scarcity, because of the expansion of production, 
but rather because it is a qualitatively different social order, which 
is a realisation of humanit~s common potential,rooted in their real 
essence. In the next chapter we will give a fuller account of Marxism 
as it has developed, and the problems underlying such an essentialist 
view. But I shall end this chapter with an outline of the way Marx's 
thought attempts to transcend the contradictions of the liberalism of 
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rights and utilities,and of Rieff's negative community. 
To examine the structure of Marx's thought, it will be useful to 
borrow a sche1na that Carol Gould uses to reconstruct 
Hegel's dialectic as a logic of historical development. 62 
The three historical stages are: 
1) Pre capitalist formations. 
2) capitalism. 
3) Communal Society. 
The forms of social relations that correspond to these are: 
1) Personal dependence. 
2) Personal independence based on objective dependence. 
3) Free social individuality. 
These stages can be further characterised as 
1) Internal relations that are concretely particular. 
2) External relations that are abstractly universal. 
3) Internal relations that are concretely universal. 
With respect to the characteristic of equality, the three historical 
stages may be ordered in terms of 
1) Relations of inequality. 
2) Relations of formal equality. 
3) Relations of concrete equality. 
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Finally, the social relations in the three stages may be characterised 
as 
1) Community. 
2) Individuality and external sociality. 
3) Communal individuality. 
This is clearly a heavily Hegelian view of Marxism as a theory. As we 
will see in the next chapter there are good grounds for believing the 
Hegelian heritage stays with Marx throughout most of his intellectual 
and political life. 63 We should also recall Rieff's comment about 
Marxism that without some notion of the new community inscribed in its 
theory, it becomes mere sociology! This schema helps us explore the 
possible role of a positive community in Marx's thought. 
It is clear that in the pre-capitalist stage the individual is 
integrated into the whole, and although the community is 
hierarchically divided, it is fairly stable and self-sufficient with 
land and agriculture forming the basis of material life. The relations 
of producer to production are immediate, as Gould puts it: 
he or she produces in order to consume and consumes what 
he or she produces. Because of this immediate unity 
between labour and the natural conditions of production 
both the mode of production and the relations within which 
the individual stands appear as natural. (64) 
Relations between individuals within this organic community can be 
seen as internal. This means that people relate to each other 
personally on the basis of their status and role. This means that the 
relations between people are determined by their place within the 
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social totality. These relationships have a nature like quality, which 
means that generally, they are not enforced by external authority but 
are heavily internalised. This means according to Gould that 
individuality 
Universality 
universality 
traditional. 
remains bound to particularit}7 
belongs only to the community and this 
is limited to the local, the regional, the 
(65) 
The second historical stage, capitalism, involves the dissolution of 
the precapitalist community, both in terms of relations between people 
and the means of production, ie the emergence of landless propertiless 
workers. As is well known this requires that there exists a fund of 
capital to buy labour and a system of exchange relations. This second 
stage is apparently characterised by personal independence, but as we 
can see from the schema, this is an illusion in that dependence is not 
eliminated, but takes on an objective form. Marx suggests this 
independence is 'more correctly called indifference' . 66 Each 
individual produces out of their own self interest and simply views 
others as means of fulfilling their own aims. They know they must 
produce what others want, but this dependency is indifferent since it 
is an external and instrumental relation. Marx describes this process 
well in the Grundrisse chapter on money, in a mode that recalls us to 
Sirnrnel's analysis of exchange relations 
reciprocity interests him only in so far as it 
satisfies his interest to the exclusion of, without 
reference, to that of the other. That is the common 
interest which appears as the motive of the whole is 
recognised as a fact by both sides; but, as such, it is 
not the motive, but rather proceeds, as it were behind the 
back of these self-reflected particular interests, behind 
the back of one individual's interest in opposition to 
that of the other. (67) 
Marx takes this as the basis of the social order under capitalism and 
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clearly if it is to work efficiently definite, although limited, 
ideological conditions of existence are going to be in place. These 
are likely to give the social order a particular moral texture. 
Indeed, if we compare the above quotation of t·1arx with a. 
quotation from Macintyre (partly quoted earlier) we see this moral 
form in operation. 
Each of us is taught to see himself and herself as an 
autonomous moral agent, but each of us also becomes 
engaged by modes of practice, aesthetic or bureaucratic, 
which involve us in manipulative relationships with 
others. Seeking to protect the autonomy that we have 
learned to prize, we aspire ourselves not to be 
manipulated by others; seeking to incarnate our own 
principles and standpoint in the world of practice, we 
find no way open to us to do so, except by directing 
towards other, those very manipulative modes of 
relationship which each of us aspires to resist in our own 
case. ( 68) 
In view of what we know about Macintyre, such parallels between his 
analysis and Marx are not surprising. However, it is the next move in 
the schema that separates Marx off from Macintyre and most 
sociological analysis. For it is clear that the movement.> between 
stages are internally related. It is the relationship between 
pre-capitalist and capitalist society and their corresponding social 
typologies which allows us to think the stage of 'social 
individuality' and 'differential unity'. These expressions would be 
just intellectual slights of hand, unless they were grounded, by Marx, 
in real ontological categories at least possessing the potential of 
being realised historically. 
Gould argues that this historical process is to be seen in Hegelian 
terms as a negation of the negation. She argues: 
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Hegel sees this movement as a spiral where the third stage 
has some of the form and content of the first, but also 
takes up into itself the developments of the second stage. 
Therefore the third stage only has a superficial and 
partial resemblance to the first stage or, to put it 
differently, repeats it at a higher level of 
development. (69) 
However, Gould stresses that there is no pattern of logical necessity 
or laws of historical development but rather these changes are 
contingent, 'and that it follows from human choices and actions'. 70 
The next chapter considers recent work that presents a Hegelian 
Marxism in a way that repudiates contingency, but here I am concerned 
merely to stress the social implications of Marx's conception of 
historical change. For Marx's theory of change, and the goal of 
communism, seems to create much embarrassment among socialists today. 
We can now see that in the third stage Marx expects a community of 
social individuality, with clear concrete freedom but maintaining the 
universality and differentiation that capitalism introduces. 
Bearing in mind the cultural effects of capitalism in encouraging a 
particular form of self, and the practices of individual ism 
individuality and individuation, what clues are there in Marx's work 
that might give content to the notion of social individuality in a 
future community? 
Russell Keat shares Gould's interpreation of Marx. 71 He shows how 
the instrumental "sociality" (of capitalism), mediated 
through the exchange of commodities will be transformed in 
such a way that the "sociality" will become an intrinsic 
feature of production itself and of the motives and 
attitudes of those engaged in it. (72) 
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Keat then goes on to furnish us with a most interesting quotation from 
the Grundrisse, which gives us some idea of how Marx saw a socialist 
society. 
The communal character of production would make the 
product into a communal general production from the 
outset. The exchange which originally takes place in 
production which would not be an exchange of 
exchange-values but of activities, determined by communal 
needs and communal purposes - would from the outset 
include the participation of the individual in the 
communal world of products. On the basis of exchange 
value, labour is posited as general only through exchange. 
But on this foundation it would be posited as such before 
exchange, ie the exchange of products would in no way be 
the medium by which the participation of the individual is 
mediated. ( 7 3) 
Keat does not find this depiction satisfactory, for it gives no clear 
content to the phrase 'the communal character of production'. 
Nonetheless this quotation gives important clues to Marx's assumptions 
about socialism. Clearly, exchange-value would not exist in full 
socialism, as Marx clearly locates the origins of abstract labour in 
this process- 'labour is posited as general only through exchange' -
which would mean continued subordination to the division of labour by 
the working class. 
Keat in his discussion suggests that Marx in the Grundrisse, is basing 
his account of socialism on the concept of 'species being' , ie a 
concept of human essence present in his early writings. Keat writes: 
what he means by 'communal needs and purposes' are those 
which every individual can come to have in common by 
virtue of their (recognition of their) being members of 
the human species. That is the 'mutual indifference' of 
egoistic individuals will be replaced by a situation in 
which each individual pursues the (universal) species 
interest, and thus no longer regards the interests of 
others as a potential limitation or obstacle upon their 
own. (74) 
- 80 -
As we shall see in the next chapter, such a vision of the potential 
development of humanity seems very much to cut against the grain of 
much late 19th century and 20th century philosophy and political 
practice. We will exarnine a particularly strong presentation of what 
we can term the Hegelian Marx. But the question we address is 
inevitably a double one. Firstly, is Marx's conception true? secondly, 
whether true or false, are the cultural, political and intellectual 
forces, even of the left capable of accepting such a view? 
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Chapter Two 
Marxism: A Solution? 
True genesis is not at the beginning but at the end, and it starts to 
begin onLy when society and existence become radicaL, ie grasp their 
roots. But the root of history is the working creating human being who 
reshapes and overhauLs the given facts. Once he has grasped himseLf 
and estabLished what is his, without expropriation and aLienation, in 
reaL democracy, there arises in the worLd something which shines into 
the chiLdhood of aLL and in which no-one has yet been: homeLand. 
Ernst Bloch 
The Principle of Hope1 
- 87 -
Ernst Bloch writes a few pages earlier in this great utopian work, of 
the strange mixture of elements in Marxism: 
but Marxism, in all its analysis the coldest 
detective, takes the fairy tale seriously, takes the dream 
of a Golden Age practically. (2) 
Given the rise of the analytic attitude and a therapeutic culture, can 
these two aspects of Marxism be retained or must they fall apart? Is 
not Bloch a sure sign of this; his work is surely not that of a 
practically minded, revolutionary socialist. It is in 20th century 
theology that Bloch has been principally taken up, not by radical 
social science. 3 What is it about Marxism's situation and nature, that 
has, since Marx's death, split the 'fairytale' from the 'analysis'. We 
can not hope to do justice to this vast question in a few pages. We 
can only try to highlight a few themes, in order to attempt a very 
provisional conclusion as to whether Macintyre was correct to abandon 
Marx's resolution of the liberal dichotomy, via the conception of a 
teleology of the human essence. To do this we will examine some recent 
attempts to rehabilitate such a concept and the theory of history. 
I 
ADAP' AI \t~ AND DEFEAT 
To do this, we must briefly remind ourselves of the historical 
context that Marxism has had to exist within. There can be little 
doubt that the fate of the October Revolution in Russia, Stalin's rise 
and the millions of deaths that ensued, followed by the impact of the 
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Nazi Holocaust, have produced considerable scepticism about large 
scale societal transformation. The 'Butskelli te' consensus of the 
1950s was as much a response to this international dimension as to the 
new Welfare State. This scepticism has been confirmed by the western 
intelligentsia's 'discovery' of the horrors involved in the Chinese 
'Cultural Revolution', Cambodia under Pol Pot and post-war Vietnam. 
But problems with Marxist practice and theory, and scepticism about 
it, is not of recent origin. Even before the first world war, there 
(L(\.. 
were problems of both a sociological and ;\.intellectual nature with 
orthodox Marxist positions. 'Orthodox' - in this context, inevitably 
means the Marxism of the Second International - carrying as it did the 
powerful imprirnateur of Engels and then of his heir apparent, 'the 
Pope of Marxism', Karl Kautsky. The intellectual challenge will be 
dealt with below, but the two are not completely separate, the 
sociological context helped shape the theory. 
Undisputed leader of the Second International was the German Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), the largest mass Marxist Party in the world. 
Its leaders faced a situation largely unforeseen by the version of 
Marxism they inherited. Most of its intellectuals expected a severe 
crisis of capitalism that would result in a new socialist society. 
Instead they face a situation in which on the one hand, an industrial 
capitalism was enjoying an unprecedented phase of growth and 
prosperity, and on the other a powerful state based on an agressive 
aristocracy and well organised civil service bureaucracy. Salvadori is 
surely right when he refuses to blame Social Democratic evolutionist 
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theory for the integration of the working class into Germany society 
when he writes: 
the real "motor force" of integration was actually the 
trade union movement. German Social Democracy was the 
first great workers' party that was compelled to deal, 
squarely and bluntly with a capitalist system whose rapid 
end its theory had led it to expect, which instead 
exploded outwards in an imperialism that rallied wide mass 
support. (4) 
The German trade unions and more indirectly the SPD had to come to 
terms with the situation. As Barrington Moore has shown in his 
excellent study of the attitudes and conditions of the German working 
class, with its occupational divisions and geographical composition 
giving it a strong provincial outlook plus the economic room for 
manoeuvre and social attitudes of the workers, added up to a 
non-revolutionary working class. Moore concludes that: 
the SPD leadership, its cautionary policies and occasional 
outbursts of rhetorical anger at the propertied classes, 
appears reasonably representative. For the pre-war years 
at any rate it is difficult to imagine just what else they 
might have done. A revolutionary policy would have lacked 
a popular basis and would have been easily crushed. (5) 
This situation naturally imposed itself upon the leading Marxist 
theorists of the time, many of whom happened also to be leaders of the 
SPD. What seems to have happened is that Marxist theory was adapted to 
conform to the realities of the situation, as theorists like Kautsky 
saw them. Kolakowski has concisely summarised Kautsky's view as 
follows: 
Let us improve capitalism for the time being; socialism is 
guaranteed by the law of history in any case. It does not 
matter that we can not prove separately the moral 
superiority of socialism: it simply so happens that what 
is necessary is also what appears desirable to me and to 
other persons of good sense. (6) 
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From one perspective it is clearly possible to argue a strong case 
against Kautsky' s views - even if we allow that it is somewhat 
caricatured. It seems both to lack Marx's revolutionary urgency and to 
capitulate to evolutionar~l and positivistic forms thought, 
fashionable at the time. Nonetheless Kautsky's position is not without 
a degree of plausibility. Marx • s thought is a large and complex 
matter, it defies easy codification, we can recall Marx's own rebuke 
to some over - enthusiastic disciples that he for one, was not a 
Marxist. Marx also stressed the progressive as well as the negative 
features of capitalism and frequently proclaimed confidence that 
capitalism would be overthrown. But the question of textual fidelity 
is less important than the point that Russell Jacoby has made, that 
Marxism as a critique of bourgeois society, had lost its bite, he 
claims that: 
the distance between Marxism and bourgeois society 
narrowed, Marxists and their opponents shared the belief 
in science, progress and success. Revolution was not 
simply adjourned, rather the Marxists embraced the 
scientific and industrial rationality as their own. They 
saw themselves accelerating the advance of capitalism. (7} 
By the eve of the first World War, KautS<y argued strongly against the 
idea that the war would lead to a socialist revolution. He described 
it as: 
a sure method of anihilating capitalism, but also of 
rendering socialism impossible. (8} 
Salvadori goes on to argue that by 1914, Kaut~•s central theoretical 
premise was that: 
. . . democracy, understood as the "participation of the 
popular masses in state policy, in institutions, 
represented the necessary political reflection of the 
indispensable economic role of the proletariat in 
production, as an essential element of the modern 
capitalist system. (9) 
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Weber was able to say after visiting the SPD party congress in 1906. 
'These gentlemen no longer frighten anyone.' 10 
The process by which a revolutionary theory like Marxism was adapted 
into the tamed ideology of an electorally based reformist political 
party, is not too difficult to see. For in reality this process 
reflected a real tension within Marxist theory, resolvable in terms of 
Marx's own analysis, but not so easy for those working in everyday 
politics. We have noted that Marx was both positive and critical about 
capitalism; Marx denounced capitalsim for its evil exploitation but 
also praised it for at last creating the conditions, esepcially 
material conditions, upon which a truly human society could be built. 
In terms of dialectical theory these two elements can be held in 
tension, each given their specific weight, but in the demands of 
everyday politics these subtleties are bound to be lost. As Jacoby 
emphasises: 
The history of Marxism is the 
dialectical critique of 
irresistable temptation was 
movements of society into a 
Progress in cap:1J:alism was 
socialism. ( 11) 
history of the loss of the 
bourgeois society. The 
to cast the dialectical 
one-way and upward path. 
read as progress towards 
Nor is this process limited to the so-called reformist SPD. In Russia, 
the Marxists were fighting for support against revolutionary 
competitors, like the Populists and 'Socialist Revolutionaries' who 
looked to the peasants for revolution. This meant the Bolsheviks had 
strong reasons for emphasising capitalism as a bearer of progress -
this view was most deeply held, witness the corrunitrnent of Lenin to 
technology and work organisation, as relatively neutral as in the case 
of Taylorisrn. (12) 
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Clearly Marxism as a social and cultural current within capitalist 
society, is subject to that societ~1 ', pressure. Capitalism's likely 
impact upon Marxism is apparent if we remember Marx's comment on 
bourgeois culture: 
The bourgeois viewpoint has never advanced beyond the 
antithesis between itself and the romantic viewpoint, and 
the latter will accompany it as its legitimate antithesis 
up to its blessed end. (13) 
Marx was able to note this distinction and believe he had moved beyond 
it, ie transcending rationalistic individualism and organic naturalism 
in full communism. But if we recall Bloch's reference to 'the fairy 
tale' and the 'analysis' that w~ in the everyday practices of 
capitalist societies these 'bourgeois' antitheses are fully at horne 
within the heart of Marxism itself. Marxism can and has lent itself to 
both Romantic and bourgeois progressivist outlooks. Jacoby is not 
exaggerating when he writes: 
Every chapter in the history of Marxism has been rent by 
this dialectic or inconsistency: the denunciation of 
capitalism vied with its affirmation. (14) 
The Progressivist approach was thoroughly institutionalised but at the 
turn of the century, the romantic dimension of Marxism was harder to 
see. Nonetheless that perceptive social observer Georg Simrnel, 
writing at this time, could see it along with its utilitarian side. 
Throughout his great work The Philosophy of Money, Sirnmel makes it 
clear that in his view, modern Socialism ie the SPD aims at the 
rationalisation of life, by extending all those elements in capitalism 
that already move towards the generation of law-like regularities and 
that foster detached calculation in life, but he notes: 
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At the same time, socialism has affinities with the hollow 
communistic instincts that ... still lie in remote corners 
of the soul. Socialism's dual motivations have 
diametrically opposed psychic roots. On the one hand, 
socialism in the final developmental product of the 
rationalistic money economy, and on the other it is the 
embodiment of the most basic instincts and emotions. (15) 
Ironically it was one of Simmel's most brilliant pupils, Georg Lukacs 
who was to be one of the most powerful representatives of romantic 
Marxism. Lukacs took a romantically inspired Kulturkritik with him 
into Marxism. Indeed, it seems likely that he became a revolutionary 
Marxist, as a means of bringing about the 'dream of the whole man•. 16 
Walter Benjamin is clearly a similar case. The deep connection pe felt 
"·(:It--
with Jewish Messianism and the Neo-Romantic movements, makes ,,one of 
the two Marxists (Ernst Bloch being the other) who emphasised the 
17 
eschatological dimension of the tradition, in the 20th century. 
Nonetheless, these important intellectual movements had a very small 
impact on the large scale organisation of political parties and 
unions. The need to distinguish these bodies from apparently backward 
or 'restorationist' currents, meant that dialectics was pushed towards 
seeing science and capitalism on a one way journey towards socialism. 
The events following the O:tober Revolution, and their consequences 
for Marxism, East and West, are too well known to require more than 
sign posting. The failure of the 1917 Revolution to spread to the 
advanced capitalist world, especially the failure of the revolution in 
Germany, sealed the fate of Marxian socialism in Russia. Stalin and 
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Stalinism, with much prestige abroad, reduced Marxism in Russia to a 
state dogma, whilst at the same time literally killing or driving into 
exile, most creative Russian Marxists; Trotsky, Bukharin, 
18 Preobrazhensky: are only some of the more famous figures. 
The rise of Fascism in the west accomplished a similar feat, as most 
working class and socialist organisations were destroyed in the 1930s 
and early 1940s. Followed by the combined effects of a post-war 
economic boom and the cold war based, in part, on quite legitimate 
fears of western workers about Stalinism: this in effect has removed 
revolutionary politics from the western agenda, for the moment. No 
wonder Perry Anderson, after noting all these factors can comment that 
The hidden hallmark of western Marxism as a whole is thus 
that it is a product of defeat. (19) 
In the ten years that have passed since Anderson produced this 
judgement, little has happened to alter it. Since 1976 the west has 
gone through the most severe recession since the 1930s. But this, 
unlike the '30s, has produced no move to Fascism, but neither has it 
produced a radical working class response. Rather there seems to have 
been a strengthening of right-wing ideologies, and the emergence of a 
crisis of Marxism (in spite of its Indian summer in the late '60s and 
early '70s) which may have been latent within the movement, from the 
days of the Second International in the West. 
Anderson (described by Alex callinicos, as the Plekhanov of the 
British left) has recently returned to his earlier analysis, in his 
short book In the Tracks of Historical Materialism. 20 In this, he 
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attempts to put a brave face on recent events, by noting such things 
as the substantial numbers of empirical Marxist studies written in the 
English speaking world, he claims that: 
The traditional relationship between Britain and 
continental Europe appears for the moment to have been 
effectively reversed - Marxist culture in the UK for the 
moment proving more productive and original than of any 
mainland state. (21) 
This, however, cannot hide two essential and related facts: Firstly, 
to reiterate, there has been no radicalisation of the western working 
class, indeed in Britain its commitment to the post-war social 
democratic settlement although not broken, looks . 22 precar1ous; 
Secondly, the current capitalist crisis seems to have produced no 
movement to the left or decline in support for capitalism amongst the 
intelligentsia (unlike the '30s) indeed the movement has been 
virtually all the other way, with, for example, Paul Q. Hirst moving 
from Marxism to right-wing social democracy and Paul Johnson from 
right-wing social democracy to Thatcherisrn. 23 
Thus we have the briefest of historical sketches of Marxism's 
situation. The powerful optimism and confidence of Engels and the 
leaders of the Second International in the 19th century, seemed to 
many, after the short lived hope of 1917, to have been falsified. War, 
tyranny from left and right, the enormous power of the international 
capitalist economy, even as it falters, all have shaken the hopes of 
the Left. This has happened to a degree that for some radicals, the 
very idea of socialism has been put in question. I will end this 
section with two quotations from one of America's most perceptive 
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left-wing intellectuals, which lucidly captures this often 
unarticulated mood of many. The first expresses a pessimism about the 
fate of socialism as a concept, the second illustrates the sense of 
trappedness within the cage of modern capitalism. I quote them not 
becaue I agree with them, or because I have ready answers to them, but 
because they represent a form of thought within which no Marxism can 
survive: 
Originally conceived as the necessary culmination of a 
competitive capitalism gradually shifting towards a 
monopoly phase, socialism has long since lost its meaning 
to the point of surviving only as a political myth. As 
such, it can still attract disparate factions whose unity 
can be manufactured only by allowing a multitude of their 
contradictory subjective interpretations to co-exist as 
underdeveloped projections into an otherwise vague and 
undefined mythological 'socialism'. The original notion of 
socialism as the centrally planned socio-economic 
organisation of society has been discredited by the 
experiences of advanced and even not-so-advanced 
industrial societies where central planning has proved 
itself even more wasteful and counterproductive than the 
competitive capitalism it was meant t~ displace and 
rationalise. (24) 
The author soon follows up this obituary note, with an almost 
desperately gloomy commentary on the favourite panacea on the left, 
for economic centralism; 'self-management'. 
To the limit, successfully functioning self-management 
enterprises tend to split workers into two separate roles: 
that of Taylorised functionaries subject to the 
ineluctable logic of modern industrial discipline and 
division of labour, and that of owners only externally 
concerned with overall economic performance. As such, 
without what today is a practically impossible 
restructuring of science and technology, the self-
management strategy leads to the re-invention of 
capitalism, with workers essentially reduced to the role 
of minor individual entrepreneurs. (25) 
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II 
THE INTELLECTIJAL I CRISIS I 
Even if vve grant the prioritJ, of sociological factors in deciding ;..h~ L-1 JC. 
fate of .Marxism, we cannot neglect the role of intellectuals and 
ideas. For we know that intellectuals, at least in the west, have been 
crucial to the development of the Marxist tradition. 26 We should note, 
therefore, that long before political developments seemed to question 
Marxism, there was, by the end of the 19th century, a powerful weight 
of pessimism in European culture. As H. Stuart Hughes has shown, this 
pessimism took the form of a critique of the Enlightenment in general, 
and of Marxism in particular, focusing positively on concepts like the 
Freudian unconscious and Nietzsche's 'will to power'. As Stuart Hughes 
puts it: 
psychological process had replaced external reality as the 
most pressing topic of investigation. It was no longer 
what actually existed that seemed most important: it was 
what men thought existed. And what they felt on the 
unconscious level had become rather more interesting than 
what they had consciously rationalised. (27) 
Why this occurred is a large and complex question. It has been 
plausibly suggested by Stuart Hughes and others that it should be seen 
as part of the same process that produced various strands of Elite 
Theory as an alternative to Marxism. In other words part of those 
intellectual currents, strong in countries that still contained large 
hierarchically based landed classes, who feared both democracy and 
socialism. 28 But underlying much of this seems to be a highly vari-
gated resentment, hostility or mere irritation, with features of cap-
italist industrial society. This could take many forms, from Weber's 
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pessimistic but nationalistic liberalism to Lukac's romantic Leninism 
and even Sorel's social poetry. We have in Thomas Mann's novel The 
Magic Mountain a powerful evocation of this atmosphere, and in the 
character Zaphta, ua::;ed on Luk'Etcs I an unforgettable porLrait -C -VL a 
radical romantic rejecting capitalist modernity; a tyre that could 
move to either left or right. Naturally such rejection of capitalism 
frequently meant the rejection of a Marxism that seemed its mirror 
image, that of the Second International. 
The intellectual atmosphere of pessimism did not dissipate after World 
War I but forms a crucial background for the formation of the' next 
generation of Marxist intellectuals. With the relative decline of mass 
Marxist parties and the Stalinisation of the remainder, Marxism after 
1945 was to be increasingly the property of intellectuals. As Perry 
Anderson notes the political experiences of these intellectuals did 
not encourage a more optimistic outlook: Adorno and Horkheimer 
politically formed by Fascism, Sartre and Allthusser radicalised by 
the Spanish civil war, Della Volope and Colletti coming to Marxism in 
the late '40s and early '50s, respectively. All in a period of working 
class defeat or under the influence of Stalinised communist parties. 29 
These figures all turned to the most abstract questions of culture or 
philosophy and method. Their influence on the more empirically minded 
Marxists of the past twenty years has been considerable, with most 
Marxist scholars acknowledging one or more theorist as their guide. 30 
But more generally most Marxist researchers have in recent years, 
started out in the social sciences, which are both directly and 
- 99 -
indirectly shaped by elements of the broader philosophical culture. 
What are the currents here that oppose the ~ of what I term the 
19th century Marx. 
Firstly, we should note Anderson's observation that virtually all the 
western Marxists he surveys 
resort to earlier philosophical authority within European 
thought (31) 
to supplement Marx's work - Engel's work being generally considered 
unusable. Lukacs and Marcuse turned to Hegel, Sartre to Kierkegaardian 
existentialism (even after his turn to Marxism), Della Volpe and 
Colletti to Ka.N: and, in political theory, Rousseau, Althusser to 
Spinoza and the Freudianism of Lacan and finally Grarnsci, who turned 
to Machiavelli. 32 
If this need to turn behind Marx was felt by this virtually complete 
range of western Marxist theorists, then it seems likely the same need 
would reassert itself with the younger and more numerous generation of 
Marxists schooled in the social sciences. They too had to locate 
themselves within specific traditions, that of Marx but also that of 
their own subjects and their theoretical and philosophical 
underpinning. This has proved to be a problem; these theoretical 
assumptions are, for reasons we will examine, often profoundly, 
although perhaps obliquely hostile to Marxism as a whole. 
To illustrate why this is so, I intend to draw on a review essay by 
Richard .Rorty - a review of a work by Saul Kripke whose importance 
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will emerge later - which is valuable for the clarity with which it 
33 delineates the assumptions of modern philosophy. Rorty' s point is 
that since Kant, the majority of philosophers have operated with 
certain central Kant ian asswupLions. Basic a.11ong is the belief 
of philosophers that they have gone beyond the so-called naive realism 
of Aristotle and common sense. The old view involved the 
correspondence theory of truth, ie that there is a correct way to 
describe things that corresponds to how they actually are. 
Philosophers believed this common sense view to be inaccurate; in 
reality what people did, eg natural or social scientist, was in some 
way, constitute the objects via concepts of intuition or whatever. So 
Rorty states: 
This "condescending" view has been shared by people as far 
apart as Russell and Bergson, Whitehead and Husserl, James 
and Nietzsche, Carnap and cassirer. 
The basically Kantian view, is that we decide what will count as an 
'object' by putting ideas together 
we build a world, a world inside our minds, by tying 
concepts together so as to package sensations more 
conveniently. 
Russell and Frege develop this further. For Russell names are really 
just 
lists of the qualities which we have decided to use to 
identify occasions on which we shall use a name. 
In other words, they are a kind of short hand. This is based on 
Frege' s claim that meaning determines reference, a view which is 
uncontroversial if you believe that the Universe is undifferentiated 
and merely requires conceptual structuring. 
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But as Marxists and Neo-Thomists insist, , such a view 
smacks of idealism. It leads fairly quickly to the 
pragmatist view that science and human inquiry generally 
makes truth rather than finds it that we did not 
discover sub-atomic particles, but rather discovered that 
it was helpful to package the flux under such labels as 
"position". 
Rorty's reference to neo-Thomists and Marxists is significant because 
at least until the second Vatican Council and the liberalisation of 
western European communist parties, referred to as Euro-communism, 
both these philosophical positions had institutional bases in the 
Catholic Church and the Party, which explicitly - both in ideology and 
in institutional practice - stood outside the consensus of western 
liberalism. It seems likely that the survival of these positions in 
the 20th century, is connected with this institutional protection. 
Indeed it is probable that the shift in Marxism's base, from party to 
university, in the post war period is part indicator, part cause of 
its intellectual 'crisis'. 
Rorty's inclusion of Marxists as critics of Kantianism is also 
significant. Because Marxism is clearly the heir to the immediate 
post-Kantian philosophy of early 19th century Germany and, most 
particularly, Hegelianism. This grouping of philosophers stands out 
remarkably from the bulk of Kantian influenced 19th century and 20th 
century philosophers, for as Merquior has recently noted: 
the majority of post-Kantians had no qualms about 
reasserting speculative metaphysics. 
Fichte, Schelling and, above all, Hegel sought to respond to the 
severe limitations on knowledge, which is capable of forming only 
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strictly empirically-based concepts. They believed that 
to hold no adequate grasp of ultimate being (the famous 
'thing-in-itself) can be rationally warranted, come as an 
intellectual attitude, "lacking the courage of truth, the 
belief in the power of spirit". ( 34) 
- Hegel's words. Marx rejects Hegel's idealist metaphysics - to 
anticipate a little - but maintains the ambition of Hegel to grasp the 
real natures of things in order to understand their develor:mental 
tendencies. As we will see in more detail later, the most obvious 
point to be made, is that this view implies that things have necessary 
properties attaching to them as real objects, which give them their 
character, and that these properties are knowable by the human mind. 
From the middle of the 19th century in Germany, significantly after 
the failure of the 1848 revolution, the whole speculative tradition of 
philosophy - Hegel being its towering representative - became more and 
more suspect. A whole phalanx of anti-Hegelians emerged. Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Wilhelm Windelbrand, Heinrich Rickert, Ferdinand T~nnes, 
George Simrnel and Weber: out of this group emerged the philosophical 
basis of modern social science. As Jeffrey Bergner has shown, Kant was 
a fundamental influence on the founding of the social sciences. 
For it was Kant's general understanding that scientific 
(theoretical) knowledge cannot provide a natural, unified 
view of the world which has general validity. Kant 
proclaims the independence of moral and aesthetic 
judgements from the cannons of scientific knowledge ... 
and it is philosophies task to investigate and uncover 
them and their presuppositions. (35) 
In this revival, that went a good deal further than the ranks of the 
official Neo-Kantians36 we see not only a scepticism about history as 
unfolding progress (stable nation-states, powerful bureaucracy, 
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bureaucratical labour movements, etc) but also a growing doubt, about 
what Bergmen calls 
the very possibility of an adequate comprehension of the 
whole ... (37) 
Neo-Kantianism is quite sure that it is quite impossible to get at the 
essential nature of a thing, and was able to offer this as the central 
plank of its attack on philosophical history. Figures like Simmel, 
Weber and Tonnies all make use of history in their work in the social 
science, but they were all quite certain that they were not revealing 
in theory, the process that lies behind historical transformation. 
Rather they were abstracting from historical reality, classically in 
Weber's notion of ideal types but also in Tonnes own ideal type 
conceptions of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. There is no intrinsic 
meaning or purpose here, merely forms imposed upon history by the 
human mind. 
Such a view is, as we have seen, the necessary correlative of a 
philosophical culture that denied any necessary connections between 
the names of things and the things themselves. In this context it is 
hardly surprising that Marxism, when it aspires to be more than a 
social scientific description of reality, ie when it claims both 
authoritative knowledge of what will change, and how to change, runs 
up against acknowledged, or unacknowledged, scepticism amongst even 
its supporters in the social sciences. Naturally many have been aware 
of this problem: how to claim certain knowledge, alongside social 
scientific respectability. In the immediate post-1968 environment 
Althusser seemed to perform this function admirably, with a clear 
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argument for re-interpretating Marx along more congenial lines. 
Writers like E.P. Thompson and Simon Clarke have pointed to the role 
of a concept like theoretical practice as perfect ideology for the 
-" . k . -". l l" . l b. l. 38 i'll:i'l<.JPmH-: see 1ng rau1.<:a .. po 1t1ca respecta 1 1ty. 
Althusser fitted perfectly with both political needs and academic 
prejudices. In the first place no one could have been stronger in his 
denunciations of the apparently Hegelian metaphysical baggage in much 
of Marx's work; hence the need for the radical epistemological break 
between the pre-scientific Marx and the Marx of real science, for in 
the mature Marx 
There is 'no longer any original essence, only an ever 
pre-give~.t,J,'JJ however far knowledge delves into its past. 
There is no longer any simple unity, only a structural 
complex unity ... If this is the case, it is clear that 
the 'womb' of the Hegelian dialectic has been proscribed 
and that its organic categories, in so far as they are 
specific and positively determined cannot survive 
it ... (39) 
In the second place, as is clear in this quotation Althusser makes the 
move familiar to Neo-Kantians and positivists, of making a sharp 
divide - ultimately unbridgeable - between the real and the process by 
which we appropriate the real, for as Callinicos has put it: 
what he wants to do is to distinguish between reality and 
the process by which we come to know reality. The thought-
object is, if you like, the precondition of the latter 
process. It consists in the pre-existing concepts and 
theories which science sets about to transform in order to 
provide a more rigorous knowledge of the real. (40) 
This provided the basis for Althusser's famous epistemological 
machinery of Generalities I, II and III. Generalities I being not 
empirical reality, but the body of concepts which were to be 
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transformed by Generality II, which was the body of concepts that 
constituted the theory or problematic which in turn produced the 
1 h 1 d . th h . 1' 41 All resu t of t e so-ca le concrete-ln- oug t le Genera lty III. 
this must have seemed very sophisticated and up-to-date avoiding any 
.. 
of the dangers of a naive realism which as anybody with any 
philosophic sophistication knew was untenable. However, as is well 
known, the great emphasis on Althusserian theory as theory, led to an 
acute paralysis in intellectual work. The self-appointed guardians of 
42 this theory led much of the young left through agonised 
considerations as to whether this new pristine theory could have an 
authentic relationship with the extra-discursive reality. The upshot 
of all this was a journey within a few short years from high theory to 
a pragmatically orientated empiricism. 43 It did not, of course, escape 
the attention of Marxist social scientists that the dominant 
Althusserian trend of the late '70s was ultimately going to take an 
idealist path out of Marxism. This seems to have generated an interest 
in realist philosphies of science, 44 which are principally concerned 
with attempting to understand, the mode of operation of unobservable 
entities, that sustain the regularities of observable phenomena. In 
other words, it is concerned with fundamental or essential processes 
that underlie phenomena. Even a relatively cursory acquaintance with 
Marx's work would be enough to show the affinity of this approach with 
that of Marx. To take a most basic example - Marx's famous assertion 
in the Preface to a Critique of Political Economy: 
It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
~ing but, on the contrary, their social being that 
determines their consciousness. (45) 
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However, such work, itself, has suffered from the pressure of the 
prevailing philosophic climate, as, for example, we can see in the 
work of two authors who are sympathetic to Marxism, R. Keat and J. 
Orry's Social Theorv as Science. To escape Kantian criticism of the 
possibility of 'ultimate explanations' they argue that realism is 
agnostic 
as we have already suggested, this turns on the finitude 
of nature, and there is nothing in the realist position 
which counts for or against finiture 
(on the implication of this question see Gillian Rose's comments, note 
36 above). In dealing with the difficult question of essentialism, 
they begin with a definition of it being the 'essential properties, of 
things' so that: 
Scientific explanation requires the discovery of such 
essences and thus of correct definitions. 
They ascribe these views to Aristotle and further add that this 
assumes a world 
that is objectively divided into "natural kinds" to which 
correct definitions must correspond. 
This is, of course, precisely that view that Rorty has noted the 
philosophy consensus as being so opposed to. Unsurprisingly then, 
Keat and Urry argue that: 
the realist is not committed to this theory of definition, 
to the view that explanations can be discovered by 
definitions, or to a belief in natural kinds. (46) 
More recently Urry has expressed the fear that the realist view (he 
has clearly been influenced by Althusser) that: 
may lead to viewing such societies as characterised by an 
"expressive totality", that all aspects or elements of it 
are merely the phenomenal form of the inner essence, 
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and Urry also indicates that he is anxious to be able to understand 
the process by which individuals' subjectivities are constituted. 47 
The latest and at present the most academically respectable versions 
of Marxism, are associated with the names of Gerry Cohen, Jon Elster 
and John Roemer and are even more hostile to essentialism. They are 
also deeply rooted in the tradition of analytic philosophy. They can 
be seen as part of wider process in academic Marxism and in the social 
sciences that is moving away from structure towards the question of 
48 0 h 0 0 1 1 d 0 h h agency, 1n t lS part1cu ar case, most strong y connecte Wlt t e 
work of Jon Elster, on the question of collective 'class' action. 49 
However, it is fair to say that the foundation of this analytic 
Marxism was laid by Gerry Cohen in his book on Marx. 50 This book, 
appearing in 1978, was greeted with almost audible relief in many 
parts of the intellectual left. It could be said that this is when 
Anglo-Marxism carne into its own in terms of a theoretical rigour, 
equal to the continentals. In 1978 it was clear Althusserian Marxism 
was collapsing from within; in Britain many seemed to be deserting 
Marxism for more apparently radical French theorists like Foucault, 
Lacan and Derrida. Stuart Hall could write a year later, rather 
fearfully, of the 'Foucauldian deluges' about to be translated. 51 
Cohen's book seemed like the answer to a failing Marxism and Franco 
domination of radical culture. Written in the cool clarity of the 
English philosophic idiom; this in itself was a relief for those for 
whom Althusseriansim had become synonymous with pompous obfuscation, 
and intellectual and political arrogance. Cohen's book seemed to offer 
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a good defence of Marx to both older and younger generations of 
. 52 Marx1sts. 
However true to its roots in the Anglo Saxon analytic tradition of 
philosophy, Cohen's reconstruction and defence of Marxism, 
systematically stripped the theory of those phrases and assumptions 
that might be thought to link it to the speculative metaphysical and 
essentialist tradition. Cohen begins his book significantly with the 
major section of the 1859 Preface to a Critique of Political Economy, 
it is this that he bases his conception of Marx's theory of history. 
Thus, in effect, Cohen is able to define Marxism in clear 
propositional form, partly by reducing it to two central points, 
easily derivable from the 1859 Preface. These points are: 
1) that there is a tendency for the productive forces to expand: 
and 
2) that there is a tendency for the productive forces to determine 
the production relations, so that whatever institutions and 
relations the expanding productive forces require, do in fact 
'correspond' to them in reality. 
Absent from the account is any notion of dialectics, nor is the 
account held to be dependent on the labour theory of value. Clearly 
this work is a strong form of technological determinism and is based, 
as Cohen makes explicit on a form of functionalist explanation. 53 My 
concern, however, is not with the particular validity or coherence of 
this approach54 but rather with its revelation of underlying 
assumptions. 
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It would seem that Cohen's use of the 1859 Preface as the touchstone 
of orthodoxy reveals (in addition to whatever Stalinist connotations 
it may have), itself as a particularly crude form of Kantianism, with 
the sharp distinction between an abstractly presented method to be 
followed by application to its object. As the Hegelian Rose puts it: 
. . . for all "method", by definition, imposes a schema on 
its object, by making the assumptions that it is external 
to its object and not defining it. (55) 
This is why a Hegelian-Marxist like Scott Meikle is surely right in 
saying that: 
Cohen has taken Marx's programmatic remarks and summaries 
of how he sees things, and reconstructs Marx on that basis 
alone. The only intelligent thing to do is to study the 
finished form, capital; if done properly, that should show 
what the outline and swnmary really mean. To treat a 
finished form merely as a source of illustration of 
summary obiter dicta is a preposterous procedure. (56) 
In addition to this procedure there is also the way Cohen presents 
Marx's theory in terms of what he calls: 
those standards of clarity and rigour which distinguish 
20th century analytical philosophy. (57) 
It is, of course, a moot point as to whether the analytical tradition 
really is clearer and more rigorous than (the obviously implied point) 
'those waffling unsystematic types on the continent' one can imagine 
responses from that quarter, about it being easy to be clear about 
banalities. However, name calling about style and exposition, only 
goes to mask rather deeper points, about what it means to use 
analytical procedures on Marx's work. For, as sean Sayers has ably 
pointed out, Cohen's work is in fact analytical in a very traditional 
way: 
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like the philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries, 
Cohen relies on the method of analysis. He insists upon 
analysing the whole that he 1s considering into its 
component parts. He insists upon separating and isolating 
the different elements and aspects of the given concrete 
totality, and considering and defining these in isolation. 
The effect of this method is to produce a fragmented and 
atomised picture of reality. (58) 
In addition these elements are understood as quite distinct entities, 
and what these entities are, in themselves, is not defined or changed 
by the context, or the set of relationships, within which they are 
placed. sayers characterises these relations as external; in other 
words external to what constitutes the entities in themselves. It 
would seem that this approach underpins Cohen's anxiety to make sharp 
and clear distinctions between the different elements that make up the 
basis of the explanation, as in, say, his concern, derived it is true 
from the 1859 Preface, that the forces of pr~ion are to be sharply 
distinguished from the relations of production. 59 
but 
The economic structure (or 'real basis') is here said to 
be composed of production relations. Nothing else is said 
to participate in its composition (60) 
productive forces strongly determine the character of the 
economic structure, while forming no part of it. (61) 
In other words Cohen seeks to di~c/111~ .... causal functional relationships 
between distinct entities. 
Cohen has quite self-consciously turned his back on what we can call 
the dialectical tradition of explanation. No doubt he feels that the 
Dia-Mat tradition has so blackened the name of dialectics that 
professional seriousness demands establishing Marxism on analytical 
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principles. However, there is no doubt also that Marx was not an 
analytical philosopher, but an applier of dialectics, as he was able 
to write as late as 1873 in a post-face to Capital: 
The mystification which the dialectic suffers 1n Hegel's 
hands by no means prevents him from being the first to 
present its general forms of motion in a comprehensive and 
conscious manner (62) 
in the same place he applauds a reviewer's description of his approach 
and says, 'But what else is he depicting but the dialectical method?' 
III 
DIALECTICAL METHOD OR ESSENTIALISM REVIVED? 
What is the 'dialectical method' that Cohen is rejecting, as are the 
others of his group such as Roemer and Elster. One obvious example of 
this being the stated methodological individualism of Elster's recent 
work. 63 Following Sayers, we can immediately see that: 
For dialectics, concrete and particular things are always 
and essentially related, connected to and interacting with 
other things within a larger totality. This context of 
relations is internal and essential to the nature of 
things not external and accidental. (64) 
However valuable Sayers' critique of Cohen is, in pointing out in 
considerable detail, the disconnected and atomistic quality that 
Cohen's reconstruction of Marxist theory has, compared with the 
internally related accounts of entity to be found in both Hegel and 
Marx. He never seems to take us to the heart of the question of 
Dialectics; the question of internal contradictions and the process of 
change. By briefly touching on these questions we will be able to see 
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more clearly the centrality of the problem of essentialism, and the 
way in which a variety of positions taken up on this matter illustrate 
the conditions for and against, a successfully reconstructed 19th 
century Marxism. 
The whole question of Dialectics and contradiction has proved very 
difficult for Marxists, especially for those with philosophical 
training, to the degree that many have abandoned the ground of real 
contradictions entirely. 65 The matter is most complex and cannot be 
adequately broached here, but the difficulties are not hard to see. 
The 1970s saw a lively debate in Marxist circles over the nature and 
viability of dialectics, sparked off by the work of Lucis Colletti. In 
the debate over Colletti 1 s work it quite clearly emerges that the 
central aim of his work is to produce a positivistic Marxism based on 
Kant with a strong rejection of Hege1. 66 Following from this he takes 
the view that aialectical contradictions must be logical contradiction 
because non -logical contradictions, ie those that might exist in 
reality, are impossible. He takes this position for reasons Peter Dews 
explains: 
Established science . . . pays no attention whatever to 
dialectics. Indeed, science as we know it, or in any sense 
we could understand could not exist at all if the 
principle of non-contradiction were flouted, since this 
principcU merely expresses a condition of the continued 
existence of any object. 
Once more the villain of the piece is Hegel, for as Dews goes on: 
Colletti has made clear that Hegel 1 s suspension of 
this principle was intended precisely to dissolve the 
reality of the finite and the material. (67) 
So Colletti, to defend what he sees as the program of science denies 
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the validity of real contradiction and so must fall back on logical 
contradictions, but these breach the rules of formal logic so must be 
rejected, and so he famously embraces the notion of unreal 
contradiction in an unreal capitalist reality! This need not detain 
us, but is his opponent Roy Edgley's position more persuasive? Edgley 
attempts to get round the non-contradiction rule in formal logic by 
more or less inventing a logic of his own: 
if we are to make acceptable sense of the dialectic and 
its chief category, dialectical contradicition, we must 
shape a conception of logic different from that of formal 
logic . . . Basically what we need to do, following Hegel 
but without the idealising, is to break down the dichotomy 
between logic and reality and thus between logical and 
real opposition, which generates the bourgeois critique of 
dialectic as logic. Logic must become ontologie. (68) 
However, a powerful paper by Meikle has argued that Edgley has 
conceded too much to Colletti and left himself vulnerable over the 
matter of fusing ontology and logic. Edgely agrees with Colletti that 
dialectical contradicitions must be logical contradictions, but Meikle 
suggests it is foolish to deny the power of formal logic, or the 
notion that Marx somehow did not believe in it, or sought to 
contradict it: 'one is stuck with formal logic and dialectics' , he 
suggests. 69 
Now, if formal logic implies, 'logical necessity', in its operation, 
and, as Meikle asserts, logical contradictions are not dialectical 
contradictions; it seems that dialectical contradictions must, for 
him, have the character of 'real oppositions', in other words they 
follow the line of 'natural necessity'. Dialectical contradictions are 
therefore real contradictions within reality. Meikle illustrates this 
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via the contradiction most extensively analysed by Marx namely the 
contradiction in the commodity between use-value and exchange-value. 
The commodity is the unity of use-value and 
exchange-value, in-precisely the same way that water is 
H2 0, that light is a stream of photons, or that gold is 
the element with the atomic number 79. All these 
statements are necessarily true. They state truths that 
are true of necessity, not in virtue of any logical or 
'conceptual' connections, but in virtue of the essences or 
real natures of the entities in question. (70) 
Meikle goes on to show how Marx analyses the development of the 
commodity form; however for our purposes it is crucial to point out 
how his starting point is possible. It is clear that the position is 
an elaboration of the 'notion of necessary truth' and based upon that 
'given by its modern expositer s. Kripke' . 71 
We are now in a position to see the potential import of Kripke's work, 
as well as the motives for opposition to it. Basically, as Rorty has 
put it Kripke has shown 
that Aristotle as well as Kant can be successfully 
updated. (72) 
In the first place in regard to Marxism, it has legitimated Meikle's 
move back to Aristotle as a grounding for his reading of both Hegel 
and Marx, in terms of the realisation of potentialities present within 
real essences; once Aristotle's metaphysics no longer seemed 
completely anachronistic it was possible to build upon them again, but 
more on this later. We need first to think about the significance 
these moves in fairly archane levels of philosophy have in the wider 
context. 
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\r-Je are given some clues as to the potential significance of Kripke' s 
work if we think of it in relation to competing approaches. We have 
noticed already the basic relationship of continuity between Kantian 
ano Neo-Kantian philosophy ann the project of Anglo-American analytic 
philosophy: Kant attempted to analyse how perceptual order was 
attained by human beings out the profusions of impressions that are 
given to us in perception. It was achieved, he argued, by the 
imposition of a priori categories rooted in the subject, whilst in the 
post-Fregian analytic philosophy, the process of knowledge and 
perception is held to be structured by certain forms of linguistic 
prediction which are the fundamental guides to reference. Now the 
project of analytic linguistic philosophy par: 1llels another, namely 
that of structuralism, because for Saussure and his followers, 
language was a complete system that structured our relationship with 
reality, access to which was only available through the structure of 
linguistic conventions. 
No one has brought out more clearly the relationship between these two 
traditions of thougntthan Christopher Norris: 
there is a good deal in common between the 
structuralist and the logic - linguistic traditions. For 
Saussure as for Frege, "meaning determines reference" in 
the sense that there exists no self-sufficient act of 
naming outside the criteria which language provides for 
deciding how - or on what specific terms - such an act 
achieves its designated object. (73) 
Once this connection is established, then potentially much flows from 
it, for it seems likely that the analytic tradition will in turn be 
susceptible to the same fate as structuralism, ie of a post-
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structuralist deconstruction. Analytic philosophy attempts to cope 
with radical doubt by preserving some connection between meaning and 
logical necessity, but follow the Kantian tradition by ignoring the 
referential function of language, and using instead the structures of 
logic and semantics. This is why meaning precedes reference, to try 
and prevent a mass of variation. But to do this you have to be 
confident you have a way of distinguishing between necessary (or 
analytic) structures of meaning, that give accurate delineation, and 
those that do not. But this is a distinction that Norris claims can 
not hold, following Quine he says: 
supposedly a priori truths are themselves so linked to the 
total structure of knowledge that they may at any time be 
subject to reV1s10n, the field as a whole being 
"undetermined by its boundary conditions". This is 
effectively to collapse the distinction between synthetic 
and analytic judgments. (74) 
Norris in effect suggests that scepticism has a logic of its own, and 
shows this with some telling and for our purposes, highly relevant 
historical examples. Clearly Derrida did this with Saussure's 
structuralism by exploiting the arbitrary nature of the sign with its 
denial of a referential appeal to that which is signified. Derrida in 
effect deconstructs the notion of structure in Saussure' s system, 
seeing it as a metaphor that had been passed off as a scientific 
concept, he overcomes it and realises what Derrida sees as the endless 
d . . t . f 1 7 5 . th t . f . 1ssem1na 1ng power o anguage 1e e genera 1on o new mean1ng. 
But perhaps an even more pertinent example for us occurs at the end of 
the 19th century with the Neo-Kantians, who attempting to stabilise 
knowledge in the face of Cartesian doubt, came up against Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche asked the question, why should we accept the Kantian a 
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priori structures of knowledge as the final limit, was this not, as 
Nietzsche saw it, one more attempt by reason - logocentricism - to 
repress the irrational and continue its centuries long domination. 
It seems that Norris is suggesting that the apparently moderate moves 
made by the conventional thinkers of the modern age! from Kant to the 
Neo-Kantians, to Anglo-American linguistic philosophy, and 
structuralism have a radical instability about them, rooted in their 
common rejection of the directly referential function of language, 
this makes them prey to the radically sceptical and relativist moves 
of a Nietzsche and a Derrida. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly Norris suggests an alternative, based on the 
work of someone who reasserts the referential function of language, 
Saul Kripke. Kripke crucially asserts, against all the conventional 
wisdom, the priority of reference over meaning. Naming is for Kripke a 
matter of 'rigid designation' that is of using such terms as can 
properly be used, to pick out the referent in question. As Norris 
notes: 
the paradigm case is that of "fixing a reference" rather 
than (As Frege or Russell would argue) applying a set of 
descriptive attributes which enable one to verify the 
object referred to. (76) 
The Frege-Russell position runs into many difficulties, exploitable by 
radical relati visers, as in the classic Fregian example, of who is 
Aristotle; many statements can be made of Aristotle that are also true 
of others and this leads to numerous ambiguities in trying to fix him 
in space and time. But Kripkean 'rigid designations' only use 
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description to fix on to a referent, which, even when new descriptions 
appear or old ones are proved false, still leave the referent intact. 
As Rorty puts it, it all boils down to: 
we'll call t:nctc I X 1 rather than saying we'll c:a l1 
something 'X' if it meets the following criteria. . . ( 77) 
Clearly in natural science there are all sorts of technical 
redescription of entities, to use Norris's example, light can be for 
some purposes a particle for other a wave but as he states 
There has to subsist a certain referential grounding 
without which no such refinement of theory could retain 
its grasp on the phenomena concerned. (78) 
The implications of such a move are really quite enormous, indeed 
absolutely staggering for anyone educated within the dominant 
philoRphic tradition. Rorty has been eloquent on the shock that his 
colleagues felt or perhaps more accurately he felt, given his role as 
chief deconstructor of the western philosophic tradition. He claims: 
the whole idea of what it was to be an analytic 
philosopher, what it was to be sophisticated about the 
relation of thought to the world, began to totter. For a 
moment nobody could quite believe that a leading modal 
logician should seriously commend the Aristotelian way of 
looking at things. Perhaps it was merely affected 
Gothicising. (79) 
But he was doing nothing of the kind. Rather he was showing it was 
possible to see things as possessing properties that were absolutely 
necessary to them, to be those things, and most explosive of all, that 
essentialism and necessity would no longer be attributes relative to 
concepts. What is the relationship between this kind of philosophical 
thought and Marxism? Clearly Kripkean essentialism does not 
automatically lead to Marxism or the dialectical method. However, it 
does suggest a greater confidence in gaining a real understanding of 
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things, natural and social, urunediated by a priori categories. Kripke 
type approaches, seem to shift the ground of argument to escape the 
depths of radical doubt, and away from a preoccupation with the 
methods of gaining knowledge. Such a move would be necessary to see 
any collective purpose in a human enterprise going beyong mutual 
tolerance and self-interest. It should therefore come as no surprise 
that it is by no means just Marxism and left social science that has 
made use of the revival of 'naive realism', some Christian Theologians 
have been quick to see its potential in reviving metaphysics. 80 This 
as ide from reinforcing the view that at a deep theoretical level that 
there areconnections between speculative theology and Marxism (almost 
all the early 19th century German post-Kantians, Fichte, Schiller and 
Hegel etc had theological backgrounds) it also, I believe, reinforces 
the argument that there is a connection between relativistic forms of 
thought and capitalism (see Chapters Three and Four). 
IV 
BACK TO ARISTOI'LE? 
We have seen therefore something of the social and intellectual 
context that Marxism finds itself in: fifty years of political 
defeat, a century of much intellectual opposition and erosion by a 
mainstream intellectual culture that is most inhospitable to it. But, 
nonetheless, we have noted that even at the height of a fashionable 
radical idealism post-structuralism some elements of an 
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intellectual shift have occurred, that are more propitious for what I 
have called the 19th century Marx. I now want to look at what I take 
to be the boldest attempt to build upon these moves, Scott Meikle's 
For Meikle, Marx's theory has three elements: his theory of history, 
his theory of value and his dialectical form of analysis and 
presentation, these together form a single unified theory. To 
understand his analysis we must see how these elements connect up 
together. As we have already touched upon the way Meikle builds upon 
Kripkean essentialism to understand Marx's dialectical approach, we 
will begin with this element of the theory. 
As we have seen Meikle begins from the position that entities in the 
world both natural and social, are 'real referents', entities with 
real natures that are susceptible, with due care, to human 
understanding. Now from this Meikle makes his most fundamental move 
which is to argue that: 
the most fundamental choice that has to be made in thought 
and method is between atomism and essentialism. 
This applies in all philosophy and science, including of course the 
social sciences, it just can not be avoided because even those unaware 
of the explicit choice, 
are nonetheless committed in their intellectual operations 
to one or other ... since every method is a variety of one 
or other of this exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
pair. (82) 
The basic difference between these two approaches lies in their 
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respective ontologies, 
between those on the one hand, who think that there are 
organic wholes with real natures and necessities (the 
essentialism and organists), and those ... who think there 
are no (knowable?) essences (the atomists, empiricists, 
anti-essentialists). (83) 
Atomists work with simple ontologies, ie basic building blocks, 
complexities are reduced to simpler more basic elements, science 
consisting of understanding the combination and relationship of these 
simple elements. On the other hand essentialism, 
admits into its ontology entities or organic wholes with 
identity, complexity, and form. These are not considered 
reducable but irreducable to their parts. There are levels 
of complexity among entities from atom to nebula and from 
human individual to society. (84) 
From this fundamental opposition, flow according, to Meikle, quite 
distinct philosophies of science which affects all the categories of 
explanation such as for example, the concept of law. This means that 
for the atomists events are primary, normally based upon the 
regularity of events taking place (the Hurnean constant-conjunction of 
events); the basic problem of constructing laws on this basis is the 
necessity of placing exclusion clauses to explain why sometimes, 
something does not happen, hence the prominent role of statistics and 
probability theory in such accounts. But 
for the essentialist a law is not epistemic but either a 
statement of the real ontological line of development of 
an entity, specifying some necessary change or changes 
which things of the kind typically undergo or else a 
statement of some piece of characteristic activity or 
ergon. (85) 
Meikle claims that Marx's notion of law is of the essentialist kind, 
most centrally the law of value. 
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One central advantage of Meikle's approach is that it places Marx's in 
an explicable philosophical tradition. It makes no claim that Marx 
produced a theory that was absolutely new, on the contrary the 
conflict bet\·Jeen essentialism and atomism goes back to Greek thought, 
ie the conflict between the atomists and Aristotle, that Marx analysed 
in his Doctoral Dissertation. In the medieval world essentialism was 
dominant, but atomism became dominant in the modern period with 
Descarte~ Hume etc, with essentialism appearing again with Hegel and 
his followers including Marx. We note here that this history is 
important, for as we will see in later chapters that pick up and 
develop Macintyre's work, the fact that the modern period was born out 
of an attack by atomism on essentialist forms of thought, does not 
augar well for the reception of Marxism in the modern world. 
However by placing Marx in this essentialist lin~~a..Meikle is able to 
provide us with a relatively clear account of what Marx meant by 
Dialectics: 
the dialectical method is the seeking out of laws of the 
movement of society considered as a process of natural 
history, and that the most important among these are laws 
of develof1Tlent, that is, of transition in the entity 
(human society) from one form to another. (86) 
Marx comes by his categories in a study of principally Hegel and 
Aristotle, drawing on both and transforming both these essentialist 
thinkers' concepts in the process. 
Although not so well known as Marx's connection with Hegel, Meikle is 
by no means the first to see Marx as at least related to 
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Aristotelianism in his essentialist categories, for example the 
philosophers Allen Wood, whose work is a valuable complement to 
Meikle's, has written that Marx in 
both his dialectical method and his concept of humanity 
(is) based more or less openly on the Aristotelian notion 
that things have essences and that the task of science is 
to_ understand the properties and behaviour of things in 
terms of these essences. Marx's concept of alienation 
involves the further Aristotelian notion that a fulfilling 
life for men and women is one in which they exercise their 
distinctively human capacities. Marx's historical 
materialism employs teleological explanations apparently 
presupposing that such explanations are legitimate ... and 
applicable to social organisation. The dialectical method, 
by its intention to penetrate beneath the surface 
appearance of things and mirror their inner developmental 
structure, pretty clearly corrunits Marx to some form of 
scientific realism in opposition to most familiar forms of 
empiricism ... (87) 
However, this corrunent is tucked away at the end of his book, in the 
respectable 'The Arguments of the Philosophers' series. No one to my 
knowledge has foregrounded Marx's Aristotelism-Hegelian essentialism 
in quite Meikle's way, ie to drive home its theoretical and implicitly 
political conclusions or challenged so openly the dominant anti-
essentialist and anti-teleological consensus. 
In examining how Marx comes to dialectics, Meikle is able to point to 
the degree of Aristotelianism there is in Hegel. He locates three key 
Aristotelian moves: firstly starting from the position that entities 
have real natures and essences, he excludes chance as the basis for 
phenomena, this is to be found in Hegel introduction to The Philosophy 
of History. The second Aristotelian move 
is that he conceives the form of law in terms of the 
realisation of potentialities in a whole which has an 
essence in which those potentialities inhere. (88) 
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Whilst the third feature is that 
history arise(s) from a whole with an essence which 
undergoes transformation of form and has an end or telos. 
The essence of history for Hegel is that "freedom of 
spirit (which) is the very essence of man's nature" and 
that the telos of world histor..{ is "the actualisation of 
this freedom" which Hegel identified as "the final purpose 
of the world". (89) 
on Meikle's reading these basic Aristotelian categories are taken over 
by Marx, even though the content 'spirit' etc. is changed. But for Marx 
the most important advance Hegel makes on Aristotle is the contrast he 
makes between natural change and historical change that is 
the manner in which organic categories apply in the 
history of human society and in organic nature. (90) 
The difference for Hegel, lies in the differences in the natures of 
the two processes. The organic one being simpler, at least in the 
sense that its line of necessary development can be more easily 
traced. But in the process of history, development is internally more 
complex. This is because the relationship between its components can 
hinder development in unforeseen ways which are not the product of 
'extraneous accidents' (as in nature) 
. . . this is an aspect of its nature as a dialectical 
process the line of necessity in the development is not 
immediate and frustratable only by external, material 
accident. It is mediated: "The transition of its 
potentiality into actuality is mediated through 
consciousness and will". (91) 
The crucial difference between the natural and the historical is that 
in the first you have the development of an unchanging essence or 
nature via, eg Biological evolution, ie random genetic mutation and 
selective environmental pressure. Whereas in history we do not have 
the development of the same nature, but quite new forms of nature so 
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there is, in effect, space for conflict in the essence of history 
which accounts for the apparent regressions in human development. 
The historical process . . . does not preserve a nature 
through successive generations; it develops a nature 
through successive forms. (92) 
Stripped of Hegel's difficult language and his emphasis on spirit, 
Hegel argues that there are conflicts within the form or essence, as 
Meikle puts it: 
The basis of the instability here, the contradiction, is 
between what exists and what is in the process of 
coming-to-be. (93) 
There are many difficulties with Hegel's account, including his use of 
almost wilfully obscure language 1 and we have no need to pursue him 
further. The key to Meikle's account is what he believes Marx does 
with the form of the Hegelianism he inherits. Basically, his claim is 
the rather startling one that he, Marx, keeps the general theoretical 
structure but rejigs the whole system at the level of ontology, by 
making real natures the starting point. In other words for Marx, the 
real problem with Hegel's system, is that he ignores the real natures 
of the parts that make up the whole, so fails to examine their 
specific line of development, but instead, imposes an external system 
derived from a system of logic (this is his idealism)., on the real 
pattern of development which had to be studied to be understood. This 
is what Marx is getting at in Critique of Hegel Doctrine of State when 
he says: 
The crux of the matter is that Hegel everywhere makes the 
idea into the subject while the genuine real subject 
is turned into the predicate. (94) 
This is what is meant by Marx putting Hegel on his feet, ie he bases 
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Hegel's categories on Aristotelian 'real natures' in which the real 
developments take place. Having thus traced Marx's relation with 
Hegel, Meikle now sets out to define what exactly Marx's essentialist 
materialism is. He does this by explaining what Marx means by the 
very Hegelian sounding expression that 'the universal as the real 
essence of the finite real'. This means: 
a) that there are real natures or essences which are not 
"reducable" to "simples"; b) that coming to identify them 
and know them involves tracking down what is general, 
universal or essential in the phenomena or "finite real"; 
and c) that that has to begin with an investigation of the 
facts of the finite real itself in order to discover (it 
cannot be knO\vn a giari) what is truly the general within 
it, so that d) the finite real, the reality itself, can 
then finally be comprehended in the light of the general 
the uni versa! or the essence, that the empirical 
investigation turned up. (95) 
From this starting point Marx's clear objective must be to track down 
what the 'concrete universal' or essence of human society and history 
is. In The Critique of Hegel Doctrine of State he speaks of 
'socialised man' but by the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts this 
has been identified as human labour: 
which passes through a series of specific forms (which he 
comes to identify as organic social wholes in which a 
particular form of supply of human labour is predominent) 
each having specific laws or realisable potentially of 
develop-ment, and culminating in the attainment of 
socialism where the fullest potential of the essence is 
realised in a form of society adapted by man to himself. 
(96) 
Clearly then, it follows that the Labour Theory of value, flows 
naturally from this conceptual framework, for if there are only social 
forms that have people's labour as their essence, the real content of 
value, whether in the money-form, price-form or capital-form, must be 
labour. On Meikle's terms only atomistic Marxists could want a 
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technical problem to solve, rather than the deeper question of the 
essence/appearance distinction, which underlies all debate over value. 
firstly it is important to draw out from this framework, what Meikle 
believes Marx regarded as the historical basis of communism. Given 
what we have written above, it is obviously rooted in the 
teleologically governed realisation of a real essence - a realisation 
that is, as in all essential development, potentially frustratable. In 
regard to communism, however, it consists of: 
the identity between the twin teleologies of the 
historical process of the coming-to-be of human society 
itself and the realisation of man's nature in it. (97) 
What this means is that, for Marx, history is the way human society 
develops through particular forms to realise its fullest potential, a 
teleological process leading towards communism, the content of which 
is largely unknowable. But in addition to this Marx also views man as 
a natural kind, ie a 
species of rnarrunalian order, whose essence is 
differentiated from others of that and other orders by the 
essential properties of being conscious and social (a 
highly Aristotelian view. P.M.). (98) 
These two elements are only analytically distinct, because the 
individual is the social being, and 
the realised human society is a society of realised 
humans (99) 
The detailed use of Marx's applied philosophical categories is, of 
course, in Capital, and a full understanding of the content of 
Meikle's rescuing of the dialectical method can only come from seeing 
it in its full application; this takes up the greater part of his 
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book. Nonetheless I have presented enough of his groundwork to see 
what can be built from essentialist foundations, ie once an ontology 
and epistemology of real natures and real reference is accepted. But 
what can we today make of it, if not only Aristotle but Hegel and Marx 
can be successfully updated; is our reaction bound to be, 'this is all 
metaphysical madness' . The problem is basically that which Rorty 
locates with Kripke, - although perhaps less obvious than with Meikle-
Kripke's philosophy of real reference is powerful, but as Rorty puts 
it: 
the Russell-Kripke issue is probably a stand-off. one can 
play it either way, and develop a system from either 
starting point with equal completeness and elegance. 
If this is true, then our choice will not be commanded by logic but by 
preference, and this strengthens a wider point of Rorty' s when he 
says: 
it is very doubtful indeed that the Kantian ideas which 
are taken for granted in our culture are going to be 
refuted by anything that philosophy professors do. (100) 
A teleological Marxism of real natures. will be judged not by 
standards of internal logic or rigour, but by the sense it makes to 
people of real histories and experience. 101 
The question remains, however, after our move through Marxism's crisis 
and an attempted philosophic restatement of its traditional form, why 
does Macintyre not seek his resolution of modernity here? Why does he 
seek in After Virtue, to restore teleological conceptions to our 
culture via the narrative features of human life102 rather than 
through the development of real natures or essences? At one level the 
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answer is clear enough, he simply does not believe in Aristotle's 
naturalistic teleology or what he calls Aristotle's 'metaphysical 
biology' . 103 He gives no argument as to why he does not accept it, so 
we can only speculate. It may well be, that he is simply unconvinced 
by realist and essentialist philosophic argument. But it is possible 
that he chooses a narrative, rather than a naturalistic version of 
Aristotelian teleology, for ultimately, political reasons. 
It is, to a recent essay, by Cornelius castoriadis that we must turn 
to furnish the grounds for this suspicion of political motives on 
Macintyre's part. Castoriadis in his essay From Marx to Aristotle, 
from Aristotle to us has, like Meikle, noted the importance of 
Aristotle as well as Hegel for Marx, but with very different 
conclusions. The basis of his argument is this: Marx's concepts and 
categories are at heart Aristotelian as, for example, in the case of 
the concept of labour 
in a formula of the purest Aristotelian casting, 
rnaterialises "the faculties that originally lie sleeping 
in productive man" and only the through and through 
transformation of man into "producer" completely awakens 
the dormant faculties, actualizes the telos of man; (104) 
This is basically Meikle • s point; but he claims at the heart of 
Aristotle is a tension which is not resolved and reproduces itself in 
Marx's work. 
castoriadis argues that the question raised at the start of 
the Nichomachean Ethics as to whether the supreme human good is 
either nature (physis) or law (nomo) is not finally resolved by 
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Aristotle, in any of his work. Castoriadis argues that it is this 
ambiguity that ultimately haunts Marx's work also, as he puts it in 
relation to Marx: 
do the "equality" of hurnan beings and the commensurability 
of their labours depend on the physics of man ("natural" 
or "social") or on nomos, the law, the social-historical 
institution of a particular society, capitalist society -
in other words, is there a physis of history that requires 
that a particular nomos must be realised at a particular 
moment? (105) 
This, then, is the tension within Aristotle, for Castoriadis, physis 
and nomos, nature and law. This is the tension between man as a 
natural kind species and man as socially constituted being. As 
Castoriadis puts it: 
Every being is in as much as a being it actualises what it 
was to be (to ti en einai) in as much as it accomplishes 
its destination (106) 
But in human beings this is in some sense broken. But why? Because 
virtue is the telos of man, his "natural ends" but it is 
not "natural" in the sense that men arrive there "more 
often than not" and spontaneously. Almost all horses ... 
accomplish the end of a horse; almost no man really 
accomplishes virtue, and strictly no city accomplishes its 
telos. And of course, virtue has not this "power" to be 
accomplished in the case of man, because virtue ought to 
be created by paideia, that is to say, by the fundamental 
institutions of the city. (107) 
This, then, is the problem, how can the physis and telos of man, ie 
the natural kind purpose of being human, be fulfilled, except by the 
nomos or law and institutions of the city. But since Aristotle knows 
most people do not become completely virtuous and most cities do not 
embody it, to socialise their inhabitants. tiow is this gap between the 
natural end and the social form to be overcome. 
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For Castoriadis, Aristotle's greatness lies in the fact that he does 
108 t.L 
not simply collapse the one into the other t n= does not produce a 
false resolution, as does Plato, who 
presupposes that virtue is already effectively creat-.Pd as 
the goal of total justice capable of realising itself in 
the form of an instance that institutes - whether "the 
legislation or the people". (109) 
Here then, is the basis for Castoriadis's condemnation of the 
Aristotelian Marx, for he does collapse nomos into physis, the social 
into a natural kind teleology,as he puts it: 
Does not Marx want to show that a certain physis of man 
and of history must lead them to their "goal" to their 
predetermined telos communism? Does he not try to find in 
the proletariat the legislation, which by its own proper 
historical nature as a universal class does not have 
particular interests and would therefore vindicate the 
hwnan essence/nature of man, such as will be undoubtedly 
manifested when "labour will become the prime need of 
life?" ( llO) 
Is this the real political problem that lies behind a move back to an 
essentialist teleology, Aristotelian or Marxist? Whether this is so, 
or not, it is likely to be a powerful consideration for theorists 
immersed in a liberal culture, and perhaps provide them with strong 
motives to resist a fully updated Aristotelian-Hegelian Marx. 
Macintyre has shown himself aware of this problem and the likely 
consequences these cultural resistances would have for Marxism. In 
1968 in his book Marxism and Christianity he echoes the picture of 
Marxism's fate made earlier in the chapter when he states: 
Marxism was overcome by and assimilated itself to the 
modes of thought of the very society of which it sought to 
.be a critique. (111) 
This happens he argues because implicitly, Marxism's chief 
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representatives shed those elements; that made it more than a set of 
private opinions, ie: 
Marxism's Hegelian inheritance and with it the loss of 
that particular view of human nature upon which Marx's own 
moral critique had depended. (1121 
This is the dissipation of a view of human nature and process, which 
as we have seen, had made theory an explicit political and moral view, 
that would guide social transformation. 
Macintyre argues that by the end of the 19th century, as is clear from 
the Bernstein controversy, most European Marxists accepted bourgeois 
moral formalism - Bernstein falling back on to Kantian moral 
imperatives and Kautsky, 
nothing other than one more version of utilitarianism 
(113) 
In effect Macintyre argues that the same privatisation pr~ that has 
happened to religion in the 19th and 20th centuries has happened to 
Marxism,. He writes: 
secularisation has not resulted ... (in us) ... acquiring 
a new and more rational set of beliefs about the nature of 
man and the world. Rather, men have been deprived of any 
overall view and to this extent have been deprived of one 
possible source of understanding and of action . . . the 
conditions which are inimical to religion seem to be 
inimical to Marxism too. (114) 
In these conditions Marxism all too easily becomes a matter of 
personal intellectual conviction• )f that is so, as Macintyre is 
clearly painfully aware, it becomes trivial and in a sense not Marxism 
at all. 
Macintyre's resolution of liberalism, is to start where the culture 
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actually is. He, in castoriadis' s terms, is firmly in the camp of 
nomos. His narrative conception of human life and community, focus on 
the 0uest of defining the good life, as being the good life itself; 
there are no claims to any definitive end to history, Narratives are 
constructed from human lives, as they exist; purposes are the product 
of hum~n interpretation, but with the need for such interpretation a 
permanent part of being human. Teleology reconnects morality with the 
realm of facts, but in a form that refuses an essentialist grounding. 
The 'moral critic' is placed back in history, the history of a 
particular life, with an inherited identity and into an inherited 
community - we explore some consequences of this in the final chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
Markets and Morals: Triumph and Fragmentation 
There are few ways ~n which a man can be more innocentLy empLoyed than 
in getting money. 
Dr Johnson 
Where the market is aLLowed to foLLow its own autonomous tendencies, 
its participants do not Look towards the person, of each other, but 
onLy towards the commodity; there are no obLigations of brotherLiness 
or reverence, and none of those spontaneous human reLations that are 
sustained by personaL unions. 
Max Weber 
. . . the attack on private property has been abandoned (by the Left J 
and the case for the market economy, as the onLy adequate basis for 
distribution is now wideLy acknowLedged. The market is even 
incorporated by ALec Nove in his recipe for a "feasibLe sociaLism", 
aLthough what he means by "sociaLism" is perhaps better described as 
CapitaLism with a human face. 
Roger Scruton writing in 
New Socialist, December 1985 
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We can now turn to examine the roots of our contemporary cultural and 
political situation. I shall attempt to make good the promise of the 
introduction, to explicate by supplementing and expanding, the account 
that is partly assumed and partly present in iviacintyre' s analysis in 
After Virtue. I am therefore going to attempt the complex task of 
illustrating, in inevitably sketched form, some of the connections and 
determinations involved, between the account of the economic and 
social 'Great Transformation', narrated principally, but not solely by 
Karl Polanyi, and the philosophic and cultural transformation, 
presented by Macintyre - stressing the congruence of their approaches. 
This will, first of all, involve us in paying some attention to the 
actual historical process of transformation, to see its scope and 
limitations. This will then be clarified by the use of certain 
'representative' figures (not in the statistical sense) ie Edmund 
Burke and George Fitzhugh, who in the clarity and self-awareness of 
their lives and work, seem to incarnate some of the tensions and 
contradictions found in the particular social systems they inhabited. 
These figures help us think through, if only by example, the vexed 
question of the effects of social relations upon intellectual thought 
and culture. The underlying similarities of method and objectives 
between Macintyre and Polanyi will be explored. Finally, these 
approaches will be supplemented by philosophical/sociological 
considerations concerning notions of the self and the individual, in 
relation to the actual workings of a market economy. Here I draw 
especially on the work of George Sirnmel. 
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I 
HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION? 
It is vital to recall at the outset that Macintyre's philosophical and 
sociological theory, presupposes a particular history. It is rooted in 
a sense of the development of a capitalist market order out of a 
feudal society. In this context this means being rooted in a sense of 
the possibilities of life being lived in very different ways; with 
purposes and meanings attached to practices and institutions that 
order life quite differently from the way we live now. For Macintyre 
feudal society, whatever its distinctive features, shared enough in 
corrnnon with other non-capitalist, pre-industrial cultures ( eg the 
classical world or the Arab Empire) to make the emergence of a 
capitalist market society, a quite qualitatively distinct type of 
social order. In other words, Macintyre's entire account is based upon 
the idea that some version of this radical transition, or what 
following Polanyi, we might call 'The Great Transformation' thesis, 
has been vindicated. 1 
Recently, however, the reality of this Great Transformation has been 
challenged, most notably in Alan MacFarlane's The Origins of English 
Individualism. 2 MacFarlane makes large claims for his work. He states 
that: 
What is absolutely clear is that one of the major theories 
of economic anthropology is incorrect, namely the idea 
that we witness in England between the 16th century and 
19th century the "Great Transformation" from a non-market 
peasant society where economics is "embedded" in social 
relations, to a modern market, capitalist, system where 
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economy and society have been split apart. This view is 
most clearly expressed in the work of Karl Polanyi. (3) 
MacFarlane is quite clear about the sociological and cultural 
consequences of his work. He states: 
Yet if the present thesis is correct, individualism in 
economic and social life is much older than this in 
England (post 1500). In fact, within the recorded period 
covered by our documents, it is not possible to find a 
time when an Englishman did not stand alone, symbolised 
and shaped by his ego-centred kinship system, he stood in 
the centre of his world. (4) 
In certain respects it would not be unfair to say that MacFarlane's 
work could seem to be part of a sophisticated Liberal/Conservative 
move to eternalise the market, or at least push its origins so far 
back in history, that it can appear a relatively permanent feature of 
the social landscape. This view would see the market as an 
'institution' compatible with a variety of political, cultural and 
religious arrangements, the origins and specific character of which 
would have to be looked for elsewhere. In effect, he defends Adam 
Smith as he says: 
Adam Smith founded classical economics on the premise of 
the rational "economic" man believing he was describing a 
universal and long evident type ... According to Polanyi, 
such a man had only just emerged, stripped of his ritual, 
political and social needs. The implication of the present 
arguments, however, is that it was Smith who was right and 
Polanyi who was wrong, at least in relation to England. 
Homo econornicus and the market society had been present in 
England for centuries before Smith wrote. (5) 
But whatever Macfarlane's political intention others have not been 
slow to pick up the implications of his point. The popular 
Conservative journalist Ferdinand Mount, has used MacFarlane's book as 
an historical basis for saying that collective control is profoundly 
unEnglish. He states: 
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If MacFarlane is right - and the battle is still raging -
the English were always individualists and never enmeshed 
in, or aspiring towards tribal collective ways of life. In 
that case, why should we not be allowed to cultivate our 
heritage? Is it not our destiny to be home-owning, self 
employed capital acquiring, two-car nuclear fa'11ilies? (6) 
It is clear, however, that MacFarlane's view, were it to be accepted, 
would dangerously undermine the necessarily totalistic element of 
Macintyre's account, which is dependent upon connecting, albeit in a 
relatively loose manner, economic, political and cultural changes 
together. As Macintyre puts it: 
my preference for Polanyi's type of narrative is that 
it avoids the methodological mistakes which all three 
(make, Marxist, Neo Marxist, Weberian) most notably the 
error of supposing that we can identify economic or social 
factors independently from ideological or theoretical 
factors in such a way as to produce causal explanations of 
a cogent kind. My thesis is not that we cannot distinguish 
economic or social items from ideological or theoretical 
items; there is indeed more than one way of marking such a 
distinction. But when we try to understand the narratives 
of historical change in terms of any one of these sets of 
distinctions, the causal explanations which they yield are 
generally implausible. It is only when we understand and 
categorise the social and economic phenomena in such a way 
as to recognise that agents' and participants' under-
standing of social and economic activity is integral to 
and partially constitutive of the characteristics of such 
activities that we provide characterisations which enable 
us to write rationally defensible explanatory narratives. 
Karl Polanyi's was just such a narration. (7) 
It is open to question as to how fair this characterisation of Marxist 
explanation is, but it can leave us in no doubt as to the integral 
connectness of economic and social, cultural and theoretical phenomena 
in Macintyre's thought. It follows therefore that the presence of 
widespread economically individualistic attitudes in 13th century 
England, would be very damaging to his conception of the 
transformation of social and moral thought and practice occurring at a 
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later stage. For Macintyre's account is built around a notion of the 
triumph or at least predominance, both intellectually and materially, 
of versions of liberal individualism, which became established in the 
period from the 16th century to the 19th century< He is quite clear 
that his account depends on there being: 
a sharp contrast between the self-aggrandising drive for 
power and money in the European corrununities of the 12th 
century and even 13th century and that drive in the 16th 
and 17th century, a contrast signalled by the different 
ways in which the relationship of the self to what it 
possesses is conceptualised. (9) 
So how far, if at all, is MacFarlane correct in his claim that the 
forms of life that Polanyi and numerous other historians and social 
scientists, believed to have emerged in the 16th century, were in fact 
present from at least the 13th century? I shall attempt to show that 
his account is deeply flawed. To do so we must examine his account 
more closely. 
The core of Macfarlane's argument is as follows: the claim that 
medieval England was a peasant society is wrong because truly peasant 
societies have very definite characteristics, the principal ones of 
which are missing from England in the period from 1250 to 1750. It 
follows from this that Macfarlane challenges the view that England was 
radically transformed between the 15th century and the 18th century, 
as it made a move from a medieval peasant society to an agarian 
capitalist society, with a corresponding development of ideas of 
autonomy and individual political rights. He claims that as early as 
the 13th century, the basic marks of a capitalist economy can be seen 
to have been present within the country. 
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Macfarlane is attacking the view, widely accepted, that England came 
to differ from the rest of Europe because its capitalist trans-
formation occurred between the 15th century and the 18th century. But 
rather he claims that this change lay in a much earlier development of 
capitalism in England in the 13th century, while the rest of Europe 
remaining largely peasant societies, for many more centuries. So, for 
Macfarlane the origins of English individualism are pushed right back, 
possibly, before we have adequate records and documents, to the early 
Anglo- Saxon Germanic settlements. 
Macfarlane's thesis depends upon him making a key conceptual move, in 
order to challenge the claims of most medieval historians that England 
at the dawn of the 16th century was a peasant society. This involves 
him in constructing a model of • peasant society • , and arguing that 
certain key features of such a society are missing from England, in 
the three centuries leading up to 1500. 10 
So what is Macfarlane's definition of a peasant society? He has five 
criteria. The first two are taken from Daniel Thorner and are that 
• half the population must be agricultural' and 'more than half the 
working population must be engaged in agriculture • .11 The next two 
criteria are: 
that a peasantry can exist only where there is a state, in 
other words, a ruling hierarchy, an external political 
power sovereign over the particular corranunity of 
'peasants' .. The second is that there are almost inevitably 
towns with markets the culture of which is quite different 
·from that of the countryside. (12) 
The final criteri~s that: 
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the family farm is the basic unit of peasant ownership, 
production consumption and social life. The indi vi,dual, 
the family and the farm, appears as an indivisible 
whole. (13) 
From this Macfarlane proceeds to point out that there is a very rich 
literature on the peasantry from almost all over the world. He 
suggests that to put together a general picture from all these sources 
would 'produce an unsatisfactory rag bag• 14 and instead he decides to 
concentrate on just one area for his model. This area is Eastern 
Europe. He does this because it has been subject to so much scholarly 
attention and also because it is just about the right distance from 
England, not part of the general area of western Europe (the area that 
Macfarlane is trying to distinguish England from), but part of general 
European culture and permeated by Christianity. His final reason is 
that such important English medieval historians as E.A. Kosminsky, Sir 
Paul Vinogradoff and M.M. Pos~, were themselves Eastern Europeans, 
and as such, he claims that: 
It is clear from their writings that they were consciously 
comparing medieval England with traditional Russia. (15) 
Hilton provides a compendious surranary of what, for MacFarlane, a 
peasant society would really look like, allowing for the fact that 
MacFarlane astonishingly has almost nothing to say about the 
concentration of land ownership among landlords and the nobility: 
the family, not the individual, owns the holding, the 
family on the holding is multi-generational; its emotions 
are identified with specific pieces of land; women had 
few, if any, rights; there is no wage labour; there is no 
social differentiation; there is hardly any production for 
the market; therefore there are virtually no markets; 
also, consequentially, there is no market for land. (16) 
We can see now that the chief problem with MacFarlane's work lies in 
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his construction of a model of what a medieval non-capitalist 
peasantry should look like. In the first place this allows him to 
ignore or disguise the fact that many of his supposed opponents 
amongst medieval historians eg, Rodney Hilton have a quite 
significantly different notion of what a peasant society is, which 
allows them to deal with much of what MacFarlane sees as hostile 
evidence in a different way. 17 The second fundamental feature of his 
model is the family household, which is the basic unit of ownership, 
production and consumption. From this it follows that individual 
ownership cannot exist. White and Vann point out that many historians 
and anthropolgists do not adopt this criteri~.They note that: 
even anthropologists who stress that the peasant household 
is the main unit of production and consumption do not 
necessarily insist that it is always the primary unit of 
ownership. (18) 
In part this emphasis seems to derive from the work of\~- Shanin 
and as Keith Tribe - a noted critic of Shanin - has argued: 
MacFarlane 1 s use of Shanin 1 s work produces an extreme 
"peasantist" version of the Russian peasantry against 
which the alleged English peasantry are measured. (19) 
This question of ownership is central. It allows MacFarlane to move to 
the question of a market in both land and labour, the existence of 
which is crucial to his claim that capitalism existed in England in 
the 13th century. It is, I believe, in this area that MacFarlane 
becomes most seriously unstuck - partly because of confusion over 
definition and partly because of the nature of the evidence on peasant 
society in Russia. To begin with on page 13 MacFarlane concedes that 
to distinguish tribal society from peasant ones, there normally has to 
exist markets and a state, with the clear implication that there is 
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peasant production for the market, yet on page 152 he points to the 
existence of markets in medieval England as providing positive 
evidence that England was a capitalist society and not a peasant one. 
However, as both Tribe and Hilton point out, markets existed in Russia 
in both medieval and modern (ie 19th century) times. Hilton states: 
Peasants in medieval Russia produced for the market, 
bought and sold land (women as well as men), gave dowries 
to their daughters and redistributed their land through 
partible inheritance. (20) 
He goes on to point out that there is no evidence that they lived in 
multi-generational rather than nuclear families. Hilton feels that the 
real difference between the Russian peasantry and those of the west 
lay in the fact there was a great deal of land available to be 
colonised in Russia, which made for the easy creation of new 
households. As for the significance of the existence of a land market 
in pre-Revolutionary Russia, Tribe makes the important point that: 
... private and state serfs bought and sold land in early 
19th century Russia and while the form of land transfer 
was nowhere as significant as that shown by Smith (in 
MacFarlane) this does not indicate that serfs were 
individualistic. 
Tribe goes on to make the general point, certainly entirely compatible 
with .Macintyre's theoretical principles, that what MacFarlane 
neglects: 
is the simple principle that "individuality" is 
divergently constituted in law, economy, politics and so 
forth. (21) 
We have noted that there is some confusion in MacFarlane's account of 
the role of markets in peasant societies and as a result, his views as 
to what constitutes capitalism are also confused. At various points he 
refers to the existence of markets (eg p.l73-4, p.l55) to the 
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existence of cash or money and the existence of wage labour and 
servanthood (p.l51-155) complex division of labour (p.78-9): all seen 
as clear signs of the presence of a capitalist economy. There are many 
problems with this: firstly if we t.ake Marx as our theorist of 
capitalism, then Marx never took the simple existence of commodity 
' ~r&duction as definitive of capitalism; he recognised that probably for 
all but the most primitive social fonnations some fonn of commodity 
production would exist. It was rather the dominant fonn of surplus 
extraction that, for Marx, was definitive of the nature of a 
particular social f . 22 ormation. However, even if we leave aside 
attempts at theoretical coherent definitions, as White and vann point 
out no qistorian has ever imagined that an entirely 'natural economy' 
existed in England in the 13th century. 23 But as they argue 'markets', 
'money', 'local exchange', 'production for market', 'hired labour' etc 
can: 
... individually and in various combinations ... be found 
in unambiguously pre-capitalist societies. So can a 
variety of family and kinship relations . . . there were 
nuclear families in Carolingian society and in many other 
parts of the pre- or non-capitalists' world. (24) 
However, there is a deeper problem with MacFarlane's work, which makes 
him potentially far less damaging to Macintyre than he otherwise might 
be. This lies in his refusal (a refusal which he seems to make a 
virtue of) to investigate the feeling, sentiments and mentalities of 
the people he is writing about. As White and Vann put it, he: 
fails to pierce the veil of legal texts to see how 
villagers actually managed their lands and to identify the 
sentiments or attitudes that such practices may 
reflect. (25) 
This makes him critically vulnerable to Macintyre's point quoted above 
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concerning the difference between the drive for power and money in the 
12th and 13th centuries and the 16th and 17th centuries. The point 
being that if it is the case that economic relations are in fact 
embedded in social or customary relations, whatever the apparent 
1 letter of the law 1 may say, then the whole force of MacFarlane 1 s 
polemic against Polanyi and others who think like him is lost. 
MacFarlane argues that what matters is who owned the land. He claims 
to be going deeper than mere (statistical tendencies 126 of what was 
normally done with it, ie land - normally being passed on through the 
family. MacFarlane is surely wrong in taking this strategy, for it can 
only be misleading. For example, he relies a great deal on the 
official legal doctrines of the 13th century as presented in Bracton1s 
On the Laws and customs of England. It is highly unlikely that they 
were even known to any of the villages that MacFarlane is concerned 
with, and the idea that they shared Bracton's assumptions is based on 
no evidence. His refusal to examine the social and moral context of 
interpretation and his narrow concentration on the family, leads him 
to miss the fact that these so-called English individualists were, in 
fact, members of village communities who often acted together to 
restrict the way land might be used in particular cases, eg abuse of 
access to common land. If we also recall that all those peasants 
discussed by MacFarlane were either serfs or freeholders, both 
categories of which would have obligations, of various kinds, to their 
Lords, which may well have severely limited what they could do with 
their property. MacFarlane's neglect of customs and sentiments 
- 156 -
prevents him from realising the problematic nature of the concept of 
property that he so freely uses. White and Vann point out: 
. . . the tenements of villages were generally comprised 
party of various use-rights in communal resources such as 
pasture, wastes, forests and water. He (MacFarlane) seems 
not to see how difficult it would have been for 'rampant 
individualists' to have carried on the complex system of 
village agriculture and husbandry which many medieval 
social and economic historians have described. (27) 
It is clear, therefore, that MacFarlane's account of an essentially 
individualistic capitalist culture in medieval England, designed to 
vitiate the notion of a Great Transformation, cannot be sustained. 
II 
THE SELF AND HISTORY 
Macintyre makes clear that his historical narrative concerning the 
transformation of conceptions of self and human nature is critically 
determined by a particular kind of social context. He points out that 
we tend to think of the Enlightenment as being French, ie 'the 
philosophes', but in reality they looked to England as an example of a 
just and 'modern' society, but England in turn was overshadowed 
culturally by the achievements of the German (Kant, Mozart) and 
Scottish Enlightenment (Hurne, Smith, Ferguson). 28 
He points out that what the French lacked was a secularised Protestant 
background with an educated reading public, in effect although he does 
not greatly elaborate the point, Macintyre seems to be laying emphasis 
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on what Jur9€.n Habennas has described as the existence of a 'Public 
Sphere•. 29 This involved the disintegration of feudal authorities such 
as church, princes and nobility, which in the 18th century broke into 
private and public elements, The Church, of course, cant inues in 
existence although religion becomes increasingly a private matter, 30 
with the Church becoming one public and legal body amongst others. 
Whilst the emergence of public authority is marked by the separation 
of the private household expenses of a ruler from the public budget. 
As the old feudal estates changed and the nobility's power shifted to 
bodies of public authority, merchants, traders and the professions via 
their corporations and territorial bodies, developed a sphere of 
society that stood apart from the state (see Chapter 4 for more 
detail) as a genuine sphere of private autonomy. Macintyre places 
special emphasis on the existence of: 
an educated class which linked the servants of government, 
the clergy and lay thinkers in a single reading 
public. ( 31) 
This is the world of, in England, Dr Johnson and the coffee houses -
linked with universities like Kant's Koenigsberg and Hume's Edinburgh. 
This, then, briefly is the context in which a series of first rate 
theorists, by any standards, Hume, Kant, Smith, Diderot and later 
Kirkegaard attempted to produce for this connected reading public 
valid arguments which moved from conceptions as to what human nature 
is, to conclusions about the authority of moral rules. In effect, 
Macintyre claims that they failed, but interestingly he sees this as 
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no intellectual failure, but rather as a failure inherent in the 
historical situation from which they emerged. 
Macintyre argues that these early modern philosophers inherited a 
moral schema from medieval Europe which contained both Classical and 
Christian elements, but that its basic structure is that which is 
found in Aristotle's Nicornachean Ethics. 32 Now this scheme is 
fundamentally teleological involving a fundamental contrast between: 
man-as-he-happens-to-be and roan-as-he-could-be-if-he-
realised- his-essential-nature 
(the very clumsiness of the language here is an accurate indication of 
our conceptual unfamiliarity with such concepts as we have no precise 
terms for them). As he goes on to argue: 
Ethics is the science which is to enable men to understand 
how they make the transition from the former state to the 
latter. Ethics therefore on this view presupposes some 
account of potentiality and act, some account of the 
essence of man as a rational animal and above all some 
account of the human telos. The precepts which enjoin the 
various virtues and prohibit the vices which are their 
counterparts, instructs us how to move from potentiality 
to act, how to realise our true nature and to reach our 
true end. (33) 
This framework, then, contains three central components, all three of 
which only make sense in relationship to one another: a concept of a 
basic or 'untutored' human nature, a set of rationally groundable 
ethics and a notion of 'human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realised its 
telos' . The ethical precepts are what allows you to pass from one 
state of human nature to the completed state, the final one being, of 
course, potentially present within the original. This meant that 
within medieval Europe and the classically influenced Islamic world, 
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moral claims had something of the quality of facts (for us). For to 
say what someone should do, was to say as a matter of fact what would 
lead them to their true end, as ordained by God and comprehended by 
reason. 
However, with the Protestant Reformation alongside the rise of 
Jansenist influenced Catholic theology, and the scientific and 
philosophical rejections of Aristotelianism; the whole basis of this 
system was fragmented. The Protestants and Jansenists denied the power 
of human reason to understand man's true end, this being lost with the 
Fall (Aristotelanism was deeply suspect to the reformers, because of 
its association with the medieval Catholic Church, Luther regarded The 
Nicomachean Ethics as the worst book ever written). Emerging 17th 
century science was also hostile and here the crucial linking thinker 
between science and theology is Pascal. His role in developing the new 
science of probability meant that he carefully limited the role of 
reason in both theology and science. 34 As Macintyre puts it: 
Reason is calculative, it can assess truths of fact and 
mathematical relations but nothing more. (35) 
No question here of understanding essences or potentials and 
transitions. The options then become faith or scepticism or as in 
Pascal's case, a rather fraught mixture of both. 
This process effectively eliminated the possibility of any concept of 
'man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos'. What this left was an 
apparently unbridgeable gap between the two remaining elements in the 
moral scheme: on the one hand was a definite content of morality, 
which almost everyone in this period (atheists as well as theists) 
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believed was important; on the other, a certain notion of human nature 
in its basic unreformed state. This was a major problem because the 
form of these ethical demands were after all designed to develop and 
educate the notion of human nature as it naturally existed, they were 
clearly not of a form, or of kind, that could be derived from an 
appeal to the reality of human nature. 
The injunctions of morality, thus understood, are likely 
to be ones that human nature, thus understood, has strong 
tendencies to disobey. Hence the 18th century moral 
philosophers engaged in what was an inevitably 
unsuccessful project; for they did indeed attempt to find 
a rational basis for their moral beliefs in a particular 
understanding of human nature, while inheriting a set of 
moral injunctions on one hand and a conception of human 
nature on the other which had been expressly designed to 
be discrepant with each other. (36) 
The upshot of their efforts was that in their negative arguments with 
opponents they moved closer and closer to the view that no moral 
argument could move from factual premises to moral and evaluative 
conclusions (the consequences of which in another context are examined 
in Chapter Four). This is unsurprising since the intellectual material 
for such a move had been removed. 
Now, if we continually bear in mind, that the picture I have all too 
briefly sketched is not an abstract intellectual history, but rather 
an element that partly presupposes and partly contributes to a change 
in social and political relations. But the question must be clearly 
posed as to why the fragmentation of this medieval moral frameworks is 
important for an analysis of the rise of a capitalist market culture. 
What is it that is implicit in this narrative that may cast new light 
on this process? 
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However, before directly answering this it is important to be 
absolutely clear about the status of such arguments. Thinkers, 
philosophers and philosophies in no sense caused the rise of 
capitalism, no spirit of the age is being invoked as 21. causal factor. 
In some measures philosophers may be indicators of changes in social 
relations, although given their role as theorists at this time, and 
normally dependent upon courts, patrons, universities and journals 
they are most directly affected by institutional changes, that would 
in turn have to be placed in a larger setting. But they are not just 
indicators of social change; they inherit forms of thought from the 
past, forms deeply implicated in prior social relations, in Macintyre 
sense of helping to constitute those relations. These fo~s cannot be 
simply ignored, argument itself makes demands upon those who use it 
and live by it. 
We should also note though that ideas and values have a reality in 
quite another sense, in that they are produced and reproduced not 
merely by word of mouth or words on the page but via what has been 
termed the 'emotional economy of the family'. Psychoanalysis- whether 
fully accepted or not - points out to us the importance of family 
structures as productive of personalities, identities and ideals. 37 It 
is not insignificant then, that both Kant and Kierkegaard had Lutheran 
family backgrounds. David Hurne, a Calvinist one, and John Locke a 
Puritan. The case of Locke is most instructive for our purposes. There 
is no doubt that he was perhaps the greatest of the British liberal 
empiricist~ and that his theory of rights was a part of the 
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underpinning of the capitalist market and liberal individualism, but 
it is important to avoid economic reductionism. In the case of Locke, 
C.B. Macpherson's analysis in his book The Political Theory of 
Possessive Individualism38 is a favourite target for this accusation. 
The distinguished Locke scholar John Dunn has been very critical of 
Macpherson, he has written: 
Living when he did and as he did, Locke was by necessity 
in part a bourgeois political theorist. But in so far as 
he was a Liberal, he was certainly not such because of his 
moral credulity in the market. Nor is there a shred of 
evidence that any of his major conunitments - tolerance, 
rationality, individual rights and a modest degree of 
empiricism - had anything directly to do with the specific 
institution of capitalism at all ... what Locke trusted in 
was the Christian God and his own intelligence and when it 
came to the crunch and the two parted company what he 
proved to trust in more deeply was the God and not the 
intelligence. (39) 
Yet we can also point out Dunn's further comments in another place on 
the motives for Locke's theory of property and Macpherson's argument: 
The boldest answer to this question, advanced most 
strongly by C.B. Macpherson is that Locke intended his 
theory as an exploration of the moral legitimacy of 
capitalist production. There is little case for taking 
this seriously as an assessment of Locke's intention in 
building his theory. But it is a more interesting question 
how far this suggestion may capture if in mildly 
anachronistic terms, Locke's sense of his own achievement 
in having constructed his theory. (40) 
The fact that many of his contemporaries and later liberals of the 
18th and 19th centuries understood Locke in the light of this 
achievement, makes Macpherson's point rather more than anachronistic. 
Once more we need to take full account of Macintyre's argument 
concerning conceptual change: 
... It was a matter of many different changes gradually 
acquiring a cumulative effect, so that the nature of those 
changes only became apparent retrospectively. Indeed, it 
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is only because the outcome was what it was that those 
changes have the nature we now ascribe to them. (41) 
As we shall see more clearly the emergence of capitalism in all its 
comr:kxity, both material and ideological, had more than a trace of 
Hegel;s ;cunning of reason' or if you prefer, the unintended 
consequences of social action. 
In what then lay the future importance of this fragmentation of a 
teleological moral framework? Here it is necessary to deepen and 
extend Macintyre's narrative, to draw on the work of Albert Hirschman, 
in particular his book The Passions and the Interests: Political 
Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph. 42 Hirschman's narrative 
is in effect one in which a whole intellectual and moral framework was 
fashioned in which reason, prudence and good sense all seemed to 
demand the construction of, or rather intellectual and moral support 
for, a social order based upon the pursuit of economic self-interest 
and individualism, rather than in buttressing values and institutions 
encouraging to communality, altruism and the pursuit of shared values 
and collective endeavours. In this process we will be able to grasp 
why it is implicit in Macintyre's narrative that the capitalist market 
economy is perhaps the paradigm case of a system that favours external 
over internal goods. As we shall see this is precisely what the early 
advocates of the capitalist system (before its triumph) believed it 
would achieve. This will therefore enable us to highlight precisely 
what it is about the market mechanism that makes it so inappropriate 
for the achievement of, as Paul Piccone has put it, a 
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social individuality where ethics and politics are 
continuous with each other. (43) 
What then is the substance of Hirschman's argument? His starting 
point is the emergence in the 16th century of a sense of crisis and 
disarray, the intellectual origins of which we have already referred 
to and will have little difficulty in recognising. As Hirschman 
states: 
A feeling arose in the Renaissance and became a firm 
conviction during the 17th century that moralising 
philosophy and religious precept could no longer be 
trusted with restraining the destructive passions of men. 
New ways had to be found, which meant a detailed and 
candid dissection of human nature. (44) 
Here we are on the familiar ground of the crisis of authority in late 
medieval and early modern Europe as the old institutional forms and 
intellectual defences of medieval Europe were forced to come to terms 
with the new social forces; powerful independent states supported by 
45 
new economic power. But what possible response was there to this 
situation? Clearly the newly powerful rulers and states could 
themselves be appealed to to provide the necessary coercion and 
repression. 46 However, such an appeal lacked a certain intellectual 
cohe~ence, for given the pessimistic views of human nature that were 
increasingly dominant, appeals to monarchs or rulers to act always 
wisely with reason and justice seemed to be asking of them what 
seemed to be impossible for ordinary people. 47 
A second option that seemed to be rather more promising, lay in the 
notion of harnessing the potentially destructive passions; using the 
state and society as a transformer, to use 1 human nature 1 for the 
---------
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greater good of all. This notion was clearly set out by Bernard 
Mandeville and followed later by Adam Smith. 48 In Mandeville 1 s The 
Fable of the Bees skilful politicians were to manipulate the human 
vice or passion of luxury for the good of society. As is well known 
Smith developed this notion in The Wealth of Nations celebrating the 
invisible hand, operating through individual self-interest. But as 
Hirschman points out, Smith made an absolutely crucial semantic move: 
Smith was able to take a further giant step in the 
direction of making the proposition palatable and 
persuasive: he blunted the edge of Mandeville 1 s shocking 
paradox by substituting for "passion" and "vice" such 
bland terms as "advantage" or "interest". (49) 
We will examine this type of movement more closely in a moment. But we 
must note, a third option, really a subtle variant of the second, but 
of great importance for understanding the triumph of external over 
internal goods. This third option can be called following Hirschmann 
'the principle of the countervailing passion'. Here it was suggested, 
assuming the awesome power of human passions, why not use a relatively 
innocuous passion as a means of limiting or restraining other more 
dangerous ones. But then the question arises what is to be thought 
relatively innocent and what potentially politically destructive. 
The key to the problem lies in the way in which certain passions or 
vices become detached from others, all of which were traditionally 
condemned, and were connected with and disguised by a word like 
'interest'. The passions that had all been lumped together for 
condemnation included ambition, lust for power, greed, sexual lust, 
avarice etc. Interestingly, Hirschmann notes that in the many tracts 
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on the passions that appeared in the 17th century: 
no change whatsoever can be found in the assessment of 
avarice as the "foulest of them all". (50) 
This was the position it had achieved towards the end of the Middle 
51 Ages. 
It was ideologically necessary, in order for certain passions to 
triumph, for them to be redefined and in effect renamed, under the 
rubric of the increasingly fashionable notion of ' interest' . In the 
16th century the term 'interest' began to be used in common parlance 
in a way that shifted its meaning away from its traditional legal 
52 b . . d . . b sense to ecome a not1on express1ng concerns an asp1rat1ons y no 
means limited to material aspects of a person's welfare. But it always 
carried with it an element of reflection and calculation on how this 
welfare was to be achieved. In particular this was the sense others 
emphasised such as Machiavelli in regard to state craft, although he 
does not use the term. 53 
However, by the middle of the 17th century we can note the semantic 
drift in the meaning of interest towards material and economic 
aspects. In this respect it parallels the development of other words 
about this time, like 'corruption' , which Machiavelli had used to 
describe a decline in the quality of government, but by the 18th 
century this word, especially in Britain, had become so tied to 
bribery that it drives out the other more inconclusive meaning. Much 
the same thing happened with the word fortune, with its older use 
again in Machiavelli (fortuna) covering most aspects of human 
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endeavour, but reduced gradually to the gaining of wealth in 'seek 
your fortune' . Here also the work of Benjamin Nelson is pertinent, 
obviously his well known work on changing attitudes to Usury parallels 
'""-ll"V'" 
VU.J. but lesser known essay on the changing 
conceptions of friendship highlights changing notions of self and its 
relationship with money, which in turn parallels changing notions of 
friendship between states in international law, in the period from the 
16th century to the 18th century. This reveals a similar drift from 
wider to more narrow notions of interest. Nelson argues that Antonio's 
surety for Bassario in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice represented 
medieval ideals: 
In the history of the ideal of Friendship, Shakespeare 
stands at the parting of the ways. The ancient and 
Renaissance ideals of friendship, as well as the medieval 
ideal of sworn brotherhood was ambivalent and 
inviduous friends and sworn brothers are supposed to share 
all goods, services and sentiments including hatred of one 
another's enemies. By Shakespeare' s day the wordly-wise 
were already denying the usefulness of 'exaggerated' 
manifestations of friendship. (56) 
Shakespeare seems to defend the friendship- surety motif in the play. 
Nelson argues that many Elizabethans shared Sir Walter Raleigh's 
views: 
suffer not thy self to be wounded for other men's 
faults, and scouraged for other men's offences, which is 
surety for another; for thereby millions of men have been 
beggared and destroyed paying the reckoning of other men's 
riot and the change of other men's folly and prodigality 
if thou smart, smart for thine own sins. (57) 
In the sphere of international relations, Nelson argues that from the 
16th century onwards there is a systematic movement away from the 
'utopian' ideal of the medieval and classical world. In accordance 
with the emergence of generally universalistic concepts of relations, 
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which seem to parallel Kantian notions of personal morality, 
friendship between nations becorres more and more to be something 
defined negatively rather than positively, as Nelson puts it: 
All nations not formally allies or enemies seem to be 
reckoned as friends. It is held to be natural, desirable 
and mutually profitable for all men and all nations to be 
friends. However, little more seems to be meant by this 
proposition than that nations and individuals alike, are 
obliged to do their best - not to make others hostile to 
themselves. (58) 
To sum up then by the 18th century, one set of passions formally 
described as greed, avarice, etc were seen as capable of being used to 
restrain other passions such as ambition, power lust, and sexual lust. 
As Hirschman puts it: 
. . . once money-making wore the label of "interest" and 
re-entered in this disguise the competition with the other 
passions, it was suddenly acclaimed and even given the 
task of holding back those passions that had long been 
thought to be much less reprehensible. (59) 
Hirschman's explanation of this takes us right back to the core of 
Macintyre's argument, for he suggests that: 
the term "interests" actually carried - and therefore 
bestowed on money making a positive and curative 
connotation deriving from its recent close association 
with the idea of a more enlightened way of conducting 
human affairs, private as well as public. (60) 
For "interest" as a concept caused so much excitement because it 
seemed to provide a realistic basis upon which the social order could 
be founded, based upon the principles of 'predictability' and 
'constancy' for as Sir James Stewart put it: 
were miracles wrought every day, the laws of nature would 
no longer be laws: and were everyone to act for the 
public, and neglect himself, the statesman would be 
bewildered ... (61) 
Clearly then the pursuit of economic self-interest could now be seen 
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as a valuable instrument of social coordination as well as leading to 
national material pro.speri ty, But most crucially for Macintyre's 
account the pursuit of economic interest with its 'predictability' and 
'constancy' was a natural part of, and complement to, the new 
philosophies of the natural sciences and human nature, with, as we 
have noted above, their increasing emphasis on the Fact-Value split. 
We will see in the next chapter the way managerial power derived its 
value-neutrality and its claims to manipulative authority from the 
17th and 18th century philosophies, so that Macintyre can argue: 
twentieth century social life turns out in key part to be 
the concrete and dramatic re-enactment of 18th century 
philosophy. (62) 
But the other side of this triumph of 'bureaucratic individualism' is 
the expectation of a constant and predictable element in the newly 
individuated persons of this social order, tied to no imposed moral 
framework, but inherent within, and spontaneously springing from, 
human nature itself. It is with Adam Smith that this movement attains 
its apogee as 'interests' and 'passion' are searnlessly merged. In 
Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments he states: 
For what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world? 
What is the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of 
wealth, of power, and pre-eminence? . . . From whence ... 
arises the emulation which runs through all the different 
ranks of men and what are the advantages which we propose 
by that great purpose of human life which we call 
bettering our condition? To be observed to be attended to, 
to be taken notice of with sympathy compla. ·-::ency and 
appreciation are all the advantages which we can propose 
to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease or the 
pleasure, which interests us. (63) 
Here, as Hirschman notes, is the 'final reductionist step turning two 
into one' . 64 Here, economic interest is no longer separate from or 
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restraining other desires, but rather seen as a means for their 
achievement. Non-economic desires are still seen as very powerful but 
they smoothly fit into and reinforce the drive for economic interest. 
We can make the move that Hirschman fails to. For we can see that Adam 
Smith is. describing and responding to a society in which the pursuit 
of external goods has triumphed over internal ones, in which the 
fateful transition to a capitalist market economy, has been more or 
less accomplished. 
The collapse of the passions and the interests together under the 
general rubric of interest is, of course, a move of great 
consequence 1 It is not only the basis of the famous ' invisible hand' 
in which persons 'private interests and passions' are the instrument 
for the betterment of society, but also the positivistic Marxist 
interpr~tion of class interest as well as the enormous literature in 
the social sciences on 'rational choice theory', 'economic theories of 
democracy' and methodological individual ism in general. 65 Most of 
these theories including some version of Marxism take rational 
calculable and predictable aspects of human nature for granted and 
like Smith assume they can be used for the purposes of explaining 
human behaviour or as a means towards social and political 
integration. Claus Offe makes the point from within Marxism cum 
systems theory: 
The ownership of the means of production, market 
competition and the private use of capital are 
institutional means that serve to separate the problem of 
system integration from the process of will formation, 
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collective action and societal control. For an essential 
feature of markets is that they neutralise meaning as a 
criterion of production and distribution. (66) 
It is this that reveals the deep connection between the triumph of 
bureaucractic managerial ism and thaL o[ the market. for the market 
like the manager is premised on the fact and value split. Just as the 
capitalist market cannot operate without the manager (for very 
specific reasons see Chapter Four) neither can the manager, as a 
pervasive authority figure, exist without the social and cultural 
triumph of particular conceptions of self and self interest - over the 
older conception of both passions and virtues. It is in this context 
then, peculiarly important that Adam Smith is both the author of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, for he along 
with his contemporary Scottish Enlightenment intellectuals, like Adam 
Fergerson and John Millar, mark) the shift from a philosophical moral 
discourse to political economy and social science. A shift which is 
both partly constitutive of, and partly a register, of the so-called 
'Great Transformation'. 
We have therefore, in a manner that both strengthens and develops 
Macintyre's position, unravelled a little of the specific intellectual 
process by which the market-dimension (implicit but underdeveloped in 
Macintyre) of the culture of 'bureaucratic individualism' , became 
triumphant. That is in short, how the intellectual and institutional 
fragmentation of the medieval synthesis created conditions which 
allowed key critical intellectuals to bestow upon emerging capitalist 
market relationships a benign aura; viewing them at the very least as 
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innocent, clean, gentle, passions and at the strongest - seeing in 
them a new regulative principle of society that might preserve peace 
and harmony. It is this view, unfamiliar though it is to most modern 
political thought of both Right and T r,F!-.U'-.L'-f 
the affinity between the market, and the criterialess self of 
modernity. But more on this later. 
III 
THE MARKET AND THE VIRTUES 
Karl Polanyi in virtually all his writings is at pains to oppose 
ideas, popular with some economists and economic and historical 
anthropologists, that wished to construct an overall unified economic 
theory which could cover all human societies past and present. 
Polanyi' s contention is that those who have attempted to uncover an 
overall economic science, have in fact imposed concepts derived from 
their understanding of market economies on to non-market ones. In 
this process, he maintains that they have done, precisely what we 
noted in the work of Alan MacFarlane: seeing past societies as filled 
with acquis,U:. i ve individualists and thereby supporting the theory of 
human nature held by Adam Smith and his followers, ie the idea of 
some '1..-~ propensity 'to truck and barter'. 
Polanyi sets out his basic theoretical orientation both in The Great 
Transformation and in a lengthy essay The Economy as Instituted 
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67 Process. Here, he makes the very Weberian distinction between 
'substantive' and 'formal' economies - a point, as we shall see, of 
considerable importance for his relationship with Macintyre's work. 
Pola.nyi argues that~ 
the substantive meaning of economic derives from man's 
dependence for his living, upon nature and his fellows. It 
refers to the interchange with his natural and social 
environment, in so far as this results in supplying him 
with the means of material want - satisfaction. 
In essence this definition is alike to what Marx means by the concept 
of 'use value'. Whilst 
the formal meaning of economic derives from the logical 
character of the means - ends relationship as apparent in 
such words as "economical" or "economising". It refers to 
a definite situation of choice, namely that between the 
different uses of means induced by an insufficiency of 
those means. (68) 
Clearly Polanyi's notion of formal economies, also owes a great deal 
to Weber's notion of 'rationalisation' , and we shall have cause to 
return to an analysis of the formal notion of the market economy 
later. For the moment it is enough to note that Polanyi believes the 
formal definition is readily applicable to the capitalist industrial 
societies of the west, and that to apply its terms of reference to 
earlier pre-market societies can only cause grave distortion. Indeed, 
he goes so far as to argue that: 
The two root meanings of economic, the substantive and the 
formal have nothing in corrunon. The latter derives from 
logic, the former from fact. The formal meaning implies a 
set of rules referring to choice between the alternative 
uses of insufficient means. The substantive meaning 
implies neither choice nor insufficiency of means: man • s 
livelihood may or may not involve the necessity of choice 
and, if choice there be, it need not be induced by the 
limiting effect of a "scarcity" of the means; indeed some 
the most important physical and social conditions of 
livelihood such as the availability of air and water or a 
loving mother's devotion to her infant are not as a rule, 
so limiting. (69) 
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Now it is clear from Polanyi' s comments that what he terms the 
empirical or substantive economy must in some sense exist everywhere. 
The crucial difference between market and non or pre-market societies 
is that in these latter societies the ecunofny is 'embedded' within 
the overall society, whilst in the former it is not. What does this 
embeddedness consist of? Principally Polanyi is referring to a wide 
range of non-economic institutions such as those of kinship, 
religion, political/state forms, that provide the context within which 
economic functions proper are performed. The consequence is that the 
goals or ends of economic activity are to a considerable degree 
shaped by these non-economic institutions and values, and it is almost 
never left simply to small groups or individuals to pursue their own 
material self-interest. This is a very important point, for it 
connects with the manner in which Adam Smith (as noted above) was able 
to make the move of subsuming a whole gamut of human desires and 
aspirations within the one moment of economic self-interest. But as 
must be obvious now, such a move requires very specific material and 
intellectual conditions, for it to be possible. And whatever followers 
of Smith may think of this kina of analysis, it has in its favour the 
fact that it is not based (unlike Smith) upon a static view of human 
nature. For Polanyi argues, in a whole variety of societies, tribal 
ones, small hunting or fishing communities, and even in great empires 
such as those societies at one time referred to as 'oriental 
despotisms' : 
Neither the process of production nor that of distribution 
is linked to specific economic interests attached to the 
possession of goods, but every single step in that process 
is geared to a number of social interests which eventually 
ensure that the required step be taken. (70) 
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How is this so? Are such views based on romantic notions of 
primativism and altruism? No. For, as Polanyi argues in the case of a 
tribal society it is unlikely that most of the time an individual's 
absolute interPst in survival will be put in question, because the 
community keeps all of its members from starving, unless there is a 
disaster that threatens all of them. However, for this support to 
operate the maintenance of social ties is quite crucial: 
Firstly because by disregarding the accepted code of 
honour, or generosity, the individual cuts himself off 
from the community ... second because in the long run, all 
social obligations are reciprocal, and their fulfilment 
serves also the individuals give-and-take interests best. 
Polanyi goes on to suggest that the nature of these social 
relationships may be such that there is pressure 
on the individual to eliminate economic self-interest from 
his consciousness to the point of making him unable, in 
many cases (but by no means all}, even to comprehend the 
implications of his own actions in terms of such an 
interest. 
This, of course, raises the whole question of individuation (see 
Chapter One} and the processes that produces it, this will be touched 
on later. The crucial point is Polanyi' s view that in non-market 
societies the human economy is enmeshed firmly in a variety of 
institutions both economic and non-economic,as he puts it: 
religion and government may be as important 
structure and functioning of the economy as 
institutions or the availability of tools and 
themselves that lighten the toil of labour. (71} 
for the 
monetary 
machines 
Crucially, therefore, an analysis of the changes of the role of the 
economy in society turns out to be: 
no other than the study of the manner in which the 
economic process is instituted at different times and 
places. ( 72} 
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Clearly then at the abstract level, the corollary of this notion of 
non-market societies being enmeshed economies within other dominating 
frameworks, is that in market societies the economy with a capital 'E' 
is no longer so embedded. The market means that there is in some 
sense, a differentiation of economic activity into a separate 
institutional sphere, no longer regulated by norms that have their 
origin elsewhere. The individual economic agent is free then to pursue 
economic self-interest, without 'non-economic' hinderance. 
One commentator on Polanyi, Joel Whitebrook, has argued that this 
concept of a disernbeddedness of the economy requires modification~~ 
states that: 
While it is true that economic activity becomes 
disernbedded in market society in so far as economic 
activity is not thoroughly merged with other activities 
and attains a realm of its own, nonetheless the economy, 
this independent realm as a whole, is itself embedded in 
an institutional and normative matrix without which it 
could not exist, The notion of the disembeddedness of the 
economy is therefore somewhat misleading. It would be less 
misleading to speak of the emancipation of economic 
activity . . . what ought to be understood is that the 
denormatisation of economic activity does not preclude the 
existence of a new normative structure (73) 
Although the main drift of this point is largely correct and 
unexceptionable, it is rather unfair to Polanyi. The reference to 
'denormatisation' is critical and it is used by Whitebrook without 
citation or reference to Polanyi's works. Neither in The Great 
Transformation or in Polanyi's essays, is there an explicit or 
implicit argument claiming market societies possess no norms or that 
in some sense they have not generated a new normative structure. In 
fact, the very opposite view seems to be implied in the following: 
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For once the economic system is organised in separate 
institutions, based on specific motives and conferring a 
special status, society must be shaped in such a manner as 
to allow that system to function according to its own 
laws. (74) 
However, having cleared Polanyi of the charge of naivety, it is 
important to add that the whole question of the relationship of the 
capitalist market CO the strictly bourgeois realm of values and 
motivations is a complex one. Habermas, for example, has argued that 
capitalist societies have always been dependent on pre-capitaHrJ: ( ie 
pre-market) norms and cultural traditions: 
Motivational structures necessary for bourgeois society 
are only incompletely reflected in bourgeois ideologies. 
Capitalist societies were always dependent on cultural 
boundary conditions that they could not themselves 
reproduce; they fed parasitically on the remains of 
tradition. 
He goes on to point tf.ot out,.. many of the traits we have rather 
unthinkingly associated with capitalist modernity are themselves based 
upon the past: 
The "Protestant ethic" with its empha.sis on self-
discipline, secularist vocational ethos, i''tnd renunciation 
of immediate gratification, is no l(~ss based upon 
tradition than its traditionalistic counterpart of 
uncoerced obedience, fatalism, and orientation to 
immediate gratification. These traditions cannot be 
renewed on the basis of bourgeois socif:ty alone. (75) 
The reasons Habermas gives for these asser'~ions are important and in 
the final chapter we will turn to dincuss the nature and the 
importance of tradition as a necessary mJde of being. For the moment 
it is enough to note the radically disdnctive nature, of bourgeois 
capitalist societies from any other. 
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It is this point that seems to be fundamental for Polanyi and 
Macintyre, and is ultimately the reason why Macintyre grounds his 
analysis on Polanyi's work. Polanyi is at pains to stress the radical 
novelty of the market order of 19th century capitalism compared with 
any other society from virtually any period: 
Whether we turn to ancient city-state, despotic empire, 
feudalism, thirteenth century urban life, sixteenth-
century mercantile regime or eighteenth-century 
regulationism - invariably economic system is found to be 
merged in the social. Incentives spring from a large 
variety of sources, such as custom and tradition, public 
duty and private commitment, religious observance and 
political allegiance, judicial obligation and 
administrative regulation as established by prince, 
municipality or guild. (76) 
It is worth noting that Polanyi does not deny that markets existed in 
many of these societies, rather his main contention is that isolated 
markets did not link up into an economy that made the rest of society, 
a kind of appendage to it. 
I have noted above Macintyre's stated dependence on Polanyi~historical 
account for After Virtue, an account he believes vindicated because it 
avoids common methodological errors, but yet treats the transformation 
as a total process. I have given reasons in the introduction for 
suspecting that Macintyre's preference for Polanyi' s account runs 
deeper than this. In essence this is because Polanyi's account carries 
., 
·r 
a moral change, which emphasises the novelty and immorality of the 
transformation of human labour and the natural world into 
commodities. As is characteristic of Polanyi 's analysis it is the 
similarities between pre-modern societies that is emphasised, in 
contrast to that of the modern, as in the last quotation. We can 
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compare this with the following from Macintyre: 
the modern world 1n everything that makes it 
peculiarly modern is a society of strangers, that is, a 
society where the bonds of mutual utility and of appeals 
to rights have replaced older conceptions of friendship 
which pre-suppose an allegiance to the virtues ... (77} 
Both Macintyre and Polanyi are involved in locating what is 
specifically new within modern western societies. In Polanyi • s case 
he does not for a moment deny the enormous variety of institutional 
and economic forms present within the very different types of society 
that he lists, but he does insist, that for all their differences 
there are some core elements of similarity, ie the embeddedness of the 
economic within the social. This is precisely the structure of 
argument employed by Macintyre. In order to be able to locate and 
illustrate the unique aspects of the modern; Macintyre must be able 
to extract, for purposes of comparison, elements of similarity from 
beneath the apparent diversity of moral concepts. in pre-modern 
societies. His task is perhaps more difficult than Polanyi's, but they 
possess a unity of purpose. nonetheless. 
Macintyre examines the role of the virtues in Homer, Aristotle, the 
New Testament and then for further comparison two more recent figures, 
Benjamin Franklin and Jane Austen. They would appear, at least at 
first, to have very different notions of the virtues, suggesting 
perhaps, that they differ as much amongst the~selves as they do from 
our culture, especially when one considers the enormous variety of 
social and cultural contexts that they inhabited. It is quite 
explicable in cultural terms that Homer saw the warrior as the model 
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of human excellence and achievement, whilst Aristotle in the changed 
context of a fairly stable Athenian city-state, saw goodness and 
virtue embodied in the Athenian gentleman. 
Macintyre points out that in the case of Aristotle: 
certain virtues are only available to those of great 
riches and high social status, there are virtues which are 
unavailable to the poor man, even if he is a free man. And 
those virtues are on Aristotle's view ones central to 
human life; magnanimity- ... (78) 
No greater contrast could be found than in the New Testament, for here 
are virtues that find no place in Aristotle's thought such as faith 
and hope, but there is also praise for something Aristotle would 
probably have seen as a vice, humility - the corresponding vice to his 
virtue of magnanimity, as he understood it. Aristotle's social 
priorities are reversed in the New Testament, as slaves seem to have 
more chance of achieving virtue than rich men. 
Nor is the situation easier when we move to later figures like Jane 
Austen and Benjamin Franklin. For Macintyre argues that in Austen we 
find an immediate contrast with Aristotle, for where he sees a virtue 
in 'agreeableness' she sees only the artificial simulation of a 
genuine virtue she calls 'amiability'. The difference lies in the 
latter's Christianity, as she attaches importance to the need for 
some real feeling to be involved. The case of Franklin is different 
again: 
Franklin includes virtues which are new to our 
consideration such as cleanliness, silence and industry; 
he clearly considers the drive to acquire, itself a part 
of virtue, whereas for most ancient Greeks this is the 
vice of pleonexia. (79) 
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Franklin is a complicating case for Macintyre, as we' 11 see below, 
because of his relation to, and proximity with the modern market 
order. He is, nonetheless, important because there are few clearer 
examples the systematic redefining and reordering 
. f h . t 80 of older concept1ons o t e v1r ues. 
The differences, therefore, are numerous, and there seems little 
common ground. However, so far we've looked at particular virtues and 
changed definitions, but what of the underlying structure of argument 
in the placing of virtues in their various social contexts. We will 
see that at this deeper level similarities emerge. 
To elucidate the underlying structure of the placing of virtues, we 
can follow Macintyre's definitions of his five cases. In Horner, a 
virtue is a quality which enables someone to do exactly what it is 
that their social role requires of them. So that: 
the concept of what anyone filling such-and-such a role 
ought to do is prior to the concept of a virtue; the 
latter concept has application only via the former. (81) 
In Aristotle, despite some virtues only being possible for certain 
kinds of people, his basic notion of human virtue follows his general 
understanding of metaphysics, virtue attaches to the nature of man's 
being as such. (Aristotle's metaphysics are briefly examined in 
relation to Marx in Chapter Two.) It is the telos of humanity as a 
natural kind species which decides what behaviour counts as a virtue. 
But in the New Testament, although its virtues are different from 
Aristotle's, nonetheless, as Macintyre argues: 
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l\ virtue is, as with Aristotle a quality, the 
which leads to the achievement of the human 
good for man is, of course, a supernatural and 
natural, but supernature redeems and 
nature. ( 82) 
exercise of 
telos. The 
not only a 
completes 
We can add to this, that for Macintyre's argument there is another 
extremely important similarity between the Christian and Aristotelian 
conception of the virtues; that is that for both, the relationship 
between means and ends is an internal one, and not external. What is 
meant by this, is that the means by which the end is achieved are 
inseparably connected, so that the very process of movement and 
development, partly constitutes what it is to achieve the end itself. 
(I return to the question of internal and external goods in the final 
chapter.) It is, of course, precisely this internal relationship 
between means and ends, that Polanyi describes in his location of the 
role of the economy in pre-modern societies. 
Naturally, it is this deep parallel between the role of virtues in 
Aristotle and in the New Testament, that allows Aquinas to make his 
famous synthesis between the two. But Macintyre argues for a deeper 
parallel between these two and the type of outlook represented by 
Homer. For both Aristotle and the New Testament, the concept of 'good 
life for man' comes prior to any particular virtue or hierarchy of 
virtues, so in Homer the concept of a person's social role was prior 
to any notion of a virtue. 
In regard to Austen, Macintyre (echoing C.S. Lewis and Gilbert Ryle) 
is able to subsume her also within the Christian and Aristotelian 
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traditions, the latter she probably gained from reading Shaftsbury, he 
83 
suggests. The case of Franklin is more complex but interesting. 
Macintyre 1 s account is too brief here and requires supplementing. 
Franklin, in his understanding of the virtues, shares P..ristotle 1 s 
teleology, but his reasons are utilitarian ones. For Macintyre this 
means ,that his conception of means-ends relationships are external 
rather than internal, ie governed by utility: 
The end to which the cultivation of the virtues ministers 
is happiness, but happiness understood as success, 
prosperity in Philadelphia and ultimately in Heaven. The 
virtues are to be useful and Franklin 1 s account 
continuously stresses utility as a criterion in individual 
cases: "make no expense but to do good to others or 
yourself. Avoid trifling conversation". (84) 
These are typical of Franklin 1 s ideas of the virtues along with 
punctuality, industry, frugality plus many others, but always for 
utilitarian ends. 
On the face of it, Franklin's utilitarianism may seem to pose problems 
for the argument so far developed. For utilitarianism features in 
After Virtue, and in much else of Macintyre's work, as a paradigm 
viewpoint of modernity, which prioritV~b the pursuit of external goods 
and is hence, ideally compatible with a rationalistic market order of 
society. For such a viewpoint the simulation of virtues would be quite 
sufficient to get what one wants eg a hard working reputation, for 
credit worthiness. But if this is true. how can it be that Franklin 
has a teleological vision of the virtues? 
The answer to this lies in Franklin 1 s location as a transitional 
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figure between two radically different cultures. His apparently 
pragmatic utilitarianism is in fact sustained by something far more 
fundamental, for as Weber puts it after noting the potential hypocrisy 
of Franklin's position: 
The circumstances that he ascribes his recognition of the 
utility of virtue to a divine revelation which was 
intended to lead him in the path of righteousness, shows 
that something more than mere garnishing for purely 
egocentric motives is involved. (85) 
In effect, Franklin illustrates well the point we drew from Haberrnas 
concerning the dependence of capitalist societies on cultural boundary 
conditions that cannot be renewed by thernsel ves. Franklin's 
teleological view of the virtues is therefore sustained by a key 
element in the tradition which saw the virtues as a system of internal 
goods leading to determinate ends, to which behaviour was 
subordinated. As is well known later utilitarians such as Mill, were 
to remove this underpinning from their theory. 
In summary, Macintyre argues that we have three conceptions of the 
virtues here: Firstly, that a virtue is what enables an individual to 
carry out his/her role, this is the view present in Horner; secondly, a 
virtue is a human quality that allows an individual to move towards 
achieving a specific human telos, which can be supernatural or 
natural, the position of Aristotle, the New Testament authors, Aquinas 
and Jane Austen; thirdly, a virtue is a quality which has 'utility' in 
achieving earthly~ heavenly success, held by Benjamin Franklin. 
Is there, then, within these three forms, some core concept or shared 
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conception of the virtues? We can only attempt an adequate analysis of 
Macintyre's conclusions in the final chapter. But there is enough here 
for us to notice that one aspect of the virtues has emerged with some 
clarity, It seems to be the case that for the concept of virtues to 
operate at all in a society: 
. ·~. it always requires for its application the acceptance 
of some prior account of certain features of social and 
moral life, in terms of which it (virtue) has to be 
defined and explained. (86) 
This means that in Homer virtue is secondary to and dependent upon a 
clear concept of social role. In Aristotle and related accounts, it 
depends on what the 'good life for man as the telos of human action' 
is defined as. In Franklin it is dependent upon some specified notion 
of utility. For each of these writers prior agreement on crucial 
aspects of social and moral life cannot be merely theoretical, it must 
have some material embodiment for their conceptions to have any 
purchase at all. The obvious examples are the role of the Polis in 
Aristotle's thought - perhaps we should say more accurately that the 
Polis makes Aristotle's thought possible - the role of the Church for 
New Testament writers. 
This is the heart of the matter. The very diversity of these writers 
and the cultures they in part represent all, nevertheless, imply and 
demand some definite institutionalisation for their conception of the 
virtues to operate. Jane Austen requires a type of~\arian capitalism 
- a country house and a certain form of the institution of marriage, 
for her Christian Aristotelianisrn. This is the deep structure of 
similarity that unites these writers even in their diversity and most 
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importantly what distinguishes them most profoundly from modern 
liberal individualistic thought. It can make no assumption about 
social context, except to say no way of life must have institutional 
precedence over others. 
The parallel and connection with Polanyi is clear: for just as the 
wide diversity of pre-market economic forms_ all require embedding 
within some wider set of social relations to avoid economics being a 
narrow means - ends relationship of self-interest; so with Macintyre's 
account, for in order for virtue to be exercised, or even understood, 
there must be criteria embodied in some shared account of our own 
context. When that shared account collapses, then the moral self is as 
disembedded as economic relations are in the market place. 
IV 
THE RISE OF MARKET SOCIETIES 
Both Macintyre and Polanyi, from within their respective disciplines, 
stress both the novelty of, and the consequences that ensue, of basing 
the operation of society upon the needs and demands of the market. It 
is well known, of course, that petty commodity production for the 
market has been present in many societies and not least medieval 
Europe. However, Polanyi makes some useful distinctions between 
different types of market that will enable us to see more clearly the 
distinctiveness of capitalist market society. In the process of which, 
Polanyi makes it quite clear that smaller markets do not have a built 
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in propensity to become bigger and bigger until they engulf the whole 
of society. In this, as we shall see, he is at one with Marx. 
However, the process by which small pockets of market relations are 
transformed into, or supplanted by, the capitalist market economy, is 
vital for our narrative. This is the process that Polanyi understands 
as the transformation of regulated markets into what he calls a self 
regulating market, with all the flows from that. Clearly such a 
discussion touches on the complex matter of the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism; however, it is not identical to this vast 
question. We are here more concerned with the political and cultural 
consequences of the dominance of the axial principle of the market, 
rather than the dynamic relations of class conflict through which the 
dominance of one mode of production, is replaced by another. Hence we 
will keep reference to this debate to the necessary minimum. 
Markets then have grown up in a variety of places and times. They are 
not therefore, in themselves, intrinsically part of only capitalist 
society. Why is this? Polanyi's answer is fairly straightforward: 
Markets are not institutions functioning mainly within an 
economy, but without. They are meeting places of long 
distance trade. (87) 
In pre-capitalist society long distance markets occur principally 
because of the geographical distribution of goods, the most famous of 
these are the age old spice routes that stretched across almost all of 
Asia, from China and India to Europe. The point that Polanyi is at 
pains to emphasise, is that neither the long distance markets based 
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around geographical specialisation~or local markets dealing in goods 
that were heavy, bulky or perishable - largely the necessities of life 
- had any necessary tendency to expand or compete. As they were 
dealing with very different goods, either specialised for particular 
destinations, or local basics like food, which would face no 
out-of-area competition. There is, Polanyi argues, no particular 
reason in this context for competition to arise: 
such trade need not imply competition, and if competition 
would tend to disorganise trade, there is no contradiction 
in eliminating it. (88) 
In almost all of Polanyi 1 s work he points to pre-modern cultures to 
illustrate the elaborate efforts people have gone to, to limit the 
space for the potentially disruptive elements of greed and self 
interest in trading relationship, eg the Kula ring with its principles 
of 1 reciprocity and redistribution 1 as Polanyi terms them as they 
regulate their system of exchange round the archipelago: 
a systematic and organised give-and-take of valuable 
objects transported over long distances is justly 
described as trade. Yet this complex whole is exclusively 
run on lines of reciprocity. (89) 
Whatever the particular truth of the Kula ring, it seems likely that 
Polanyi 1 s general point can be sustained, many cultures have as he 
suggests, gone to great lengths to surround the actual practice of 
trade with ceremonies and ritual. 
The peace of the market was settled at the price of 
rituals and ceremonies which restricted its scope while 
ensuring its ability to function within given limits. (90) 
If, then, in themselves neither local markets nor long distance market 
practices create pressure for a growing market, then what practice 
does] Here Polanyi introduces a contrast between the above two forms 
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and what he sees as the newer internal market. Here he seems to be 
referring to something like a national market that exists behind a 
particular state's boundaries. It is, of course, different from even a 
network of local market.)because it introduces many exchanges from a 
multiple of sources for the same item, which inevitably come into 
competition with one another. 
The contrast that Polanyi makes between differentr kinds of trading 
relation should be well taken. For they interestingly parallel Marx's 
own views of merchant capitalism, as by no means leading directly to 
~~arian and industrial capitalism. Polanyi and Marx are at one in 
seeing much of the trade of the late medieval period as being between 
towns (or as we shall see, a particular relation between town and 
country): 
Right up to the time of the commercial revolution what may 
appear to us as national trade was not national, but 
municipal. The Hanse were not German merchants; they were 
a corporation of trading oligarchs, hailing from a number 
of North Sea and Baltic towns. (9\) 
The trading and merchant cities of the Mediterranean, such as Venice, 
amply bears this claim out as well. As the work of John Merrington has 
shown, Marx did not see the merchant capitalism evolving in towns as 
possessing a dynamic that led to the greater and greater 
commodification of feudal society. Merrington argues: 
the "capital" and "markets" on which feudal urban growth 
was based were in no sense the linear ancestors of the 
capitalist world market. It is wrong to interpret the 
"freedom" of the medieval towns in a one-sided unilateral 
sense outside the feudal context which both determined the 
externality of this freedom of merchant capital and 
defined its limits. (92) 
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The basic point being made by Merrington is that the municipal based 
nature of merchant capitalism was in no sense opposed to the feudal 
system, but in reality a fundamental element within it. Merchant 
capital is, as Polanyi knew, based upon the difference in prices 
between markets and areas of production that are separated and are 
kept separated. 
Its externality, vis a vis production, is the very 
condition of its existence, since it interposes itself as 
"middleman" between extremes which it does not control and 
between premises which it does not create. (93) 
On this view feudalism is the first social order that actually creates 
a specific place for towns within the system of production, based on 
the overall system of the parcellisation of sovereignty, which allowed 
the 'free' enclosures of the towns to exist. 
It follows, therefore, for both Marx and Polanyi that the 
characteristic attitude of those involved in markets of a local or a 
long distance kind, would be to encourage exclusiveness and 
monopolies, not extended market relations and free competition. As 
Merrington says: 
The market was a restricted prize and the "capture" of it 
entailed the enforcement of a productive and trading 
monopoly against the countryside and against the 
encroachment of ri v.·al towns. ( 94 ) 
There will be no pressure here necessarily flowing from the structure 
of economic relations pushing for social transformation. But then 
where does, what Polanyi calls the internal market or national unified 
market, .come from? What are the forces at work that achieve it? 
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Marx is clear: 
what new mode of production will replace the old, does not 
depend on commerce, but on the character of the old mode 
of production. (95) 
In other words, on the outcome of the class struggle within the social 
relations of production of feudalism. 96 This is not, of course, the 
immediate cause of the creation of internal markets, especially from 
the 18th century onwards. Polanyi turns directly to the intervention 
of the state for an explanation. In doing this, he is by no means 
wrong, although he may lack Marx' s depth and analytic power, for it 
was indeed the state that was the main instrument in the creation of 
unified national markets. Why the state? The work of Perry Anderson 
97 see~s to provide valuable answers. 
The importance of the state, especially the absolutist ones, have 
always been seen as crucial for laying the foundations for modern 
capitalist societies, but their natures have always seemed difficult 
to grasp, on one hand 'progressive' in some aspects of behaviour, yet 
on the other, seeming to have a deeply 'reactionary' form to them. 
Anderson's powerful work cuts through the confusion and explains their 
class basis in a way that illuminates their promotion of unified 
national markets - the divergent path of England will be picked up 
shortly. 
The core of Anderson's argument is as follows. The transformation of 
the dues of labour services,that peasants owed their lords, into rents 
threat~ned the crucial nexus of power in a feudal society. This nexus 
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was the unity of economics and politics achieved by parcelling 
sovereignty down to the local level, so that serfdom allowed economic 
exploitation by the lord through politico-legal means. The severence 
of these the class 
power of the feudal lords: 
The result was a displacement of politico-legal coercion 
upwards towards a centralised militarised swnmit - the 
absolutist state. Diluted at village level, it became 
concentrated at 'national' level. The result was a 
reinforced apparatus of royal power, whose permanent 
political function was the repression of the peasant and 
plebian masses at the foot of the social hierarchy. (98) 
However, Anderson argues that the disappearance of serfdom does not 
mean the disappearance of feudal relations itself. While the surplus 
is no longer extracted via labour services or deliveries in kind, but 
rather by rent it does not follow that 
private extra-economic coercion, personal dependence, and 
combination of the immediate producers with the 
instruments of production 
disappear. In fact: 
so long as aristocratic I).'}J.rrian property blocked a free 
market in land and factual-mobility of manpower- in other 
words as long as labour was not separated from the social 
conditions of its existence to become labour power - rural 
relations of production remained feudal. (99) 
It would seem then that we have something of a paradox. on this 
defintion, the absolutist states of Europe - some lasting right into 
the 19th century and in the case of Russia the 20th century - are 
feudal formations. How is it then, that they could find themselves 
sponsoring unified internal, ie competitive markets? The explanation 
of this lies partly in the novelty of these large scale state machines 
themselves. For although they in effect were the form that the class 
rule of the landed nobility took in this phase of development, this 
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inevitably meant that the state was capable of far reaching power in 
relation to particular groups within the nobility, and the urban 
capitalist class. As a system of state power in the final stage of 
feudalism, absolutist state structures reflected .i.l.s ·-----.. ...J-..w.~ --..1 tJCU QUV.IU.L'QJ.. 
position, possession of land was still the heart of the system and 
land can only be adequately controlled by some physical presence; 
these states then were war machines of necessity, competing for 
material possessions amongst themselves. This inevitably meant an 
~grandizernent of the state, which not only meant military but also an 
economic strengthening of it. 
Mercantilism was the economic theory of this situation~JGst as war was 
a zero-sum game, based upon gaining or losing land, so trade was seen 
as a fixed quantity belonging to a nation to be taken and then held by 
force, ie economic protectionism. Hecksher, the historian of 
mercantilism claimed: 
The state was both the subject and the object of 
mercantilist economic policy. (100) 
To strengthen its material base, the state broke down barriers to 
trade within the nation, with the aim of creating a unified domestic 
market. The state intervened into the economy to strengthen the 
commercial sectors, in order to strengthen itself, in its competition 
for power with other states. It is clear from this, however, that 
there is no notion of an economy separate from politics. As Anderson 
notes, it is: 
the indistinction of economy and polity in the 
transitional epoch which produced mercantilist theories. 
Disputes as to whether either of the two had "primacy" 
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over the other is an anachronism, because there was no 
such rigid separation of them in practice until the advent 
of laissez faire. (101) 
Absolutism then protected the interests and privileges of the land 
owning aristocracy whilst at the same time being able to protect the 
relatively small urban mercantile and manufacturing classes. It could 
do thi$, as Anderson says, because: 
neither (of the latter) rested in the mass production 
characteristic of machine industry proper, neither 
demanded a radical rupture with the feudal ~,..,;L-arian order, 
which still enclosed the vast majority of the population 
(the future wage labourers and consumer market of 
industrial capitalism). (102) 
This, however, reveals the limits of these capitalist markets and the 
potential conflicts between such state forms and a future nascent 
industrial bourgeois. It also reveals the crucial importance of the 
so-called English route of an agrarian capitalism for the separation 
out of economy and society. 
The above discussion is sufficient to vindicate the basic outline of 
Polanyi's summary of the role of the mercantile system: 
In external politics, the setting up of sovereign power 
was the need of the day; accordingly, mercantilist 
statecraft involved the marshalling of the resources of 
the whole national territory to the puposes of power in 
foreign affairs. In internal politics, unification of the 
countries fragmented by feudal and municipal particularism 
was the necessary by-product of such an endeavour. 
Economically, the instrument of unification was capital ie 
private resources available in the form of money hoards 
and thus peculiarly suitable for the development of 
commerce. Finally, the administrative technique underlying 
the economic policy of the central government was supplied 
by the extension of the traditional municipal system to 
the larger territory of the state. (103) 
The Absolutist states whilst fundamentally based upon the feudal 
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landowning class carried out what might be termed key elements of 
'primitive capitalist accumulation' in the form of unified capitalist 
markets. At the same time within the shell of absolutism the 
ideological accumulation that we have noted above (Kant in Germany, 
Voltaire and Rousseau in France) were also being made. To fully come 
into their own both elements, material and ideological, would require 
the formalisation of bourgeois revolution from below (France) or above 
(Germany and Italy) for whilst the aristocracy still controlled land 
they had the power to inhibit, economic, political and ideological 
104 developnent. 
It is quite clear therefore, that Polanyi was correct to draw his line 
between market and pre-market societies (in the widest cultural and 
political as well as economic sense) after mercantilism 
whether we turn to ancient city states ... or eighteenth 
century regulationism - invariably the economic system is 
found to be merged in the social. (105) 
It is therefore unsurprising that the bulk of The Great Transformation 
is devoted to the process of capitalist development in England, with 
the nature of land ownership acting as a crucial variable. 
For Polanyi the market economy means an economic system that is 
regulated by markets alone which means that production and 
distribution are dependent upon the pricing mechanism to act as a self 
regulating system. 
Self-regulation implies that all production is for sale on 
the market and that all incomes derive from such sales. 
Accordingly, there are markets for all elements of 
industry, not only for goods (always including services) 
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but also for labour, land, and money, their prices being 
called respectively commodity prices, wages, rent and 
interest. (106) 
Market and industrial capitalist triumphed first in England and so 
inevitably forced the pace of developmenL HI other European countries. 
My concern here is only partly with how this process happened. More 
important is the matter of what this process teaches us about its 
political and cultural consequences. For a market society to operate 
efficiently nothing must stop the formation of markets. Polanyi is 
clear that there must be markets for every element in industry, which 
naturally means there must be markets for land, labour and money. 
However, here is the rub 
labour, land and money are obviously not commodities, the 
postulate that anything that is bought and sold must have 
been produced for sale is emphatically untrue in regard to 
them. ( 107) 
If we take a commodity as something produced for sale then clearly 
none of these are in any direct sense commodities viewed from the 
moral vantage point Polanyi has in effect adopted, ie pre-market 
society. Labour is just human activity, part and parcel of human life 
anywhere, and certainly not something produced for the market and 
production. The same point applies to land which, as he, Polanyi, 
points out, is only another name for nature, certainly not produced by 
man; it is a pre-existing form, merely appropriated by the species. 
Finally, money is by definition not a commodity, it is 1 a token of 
purchasing power 1 , normally produced by the state or the banking 
system, but not for sale. Now these naturalistic points may seem banal 
or obvious, but they do help draw attention to the very artificial 
quality of the market as an institution, they are in effect fictions 
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upon which the market depends, but as we will see in the case of land 
108 
and labour, these fictions have profound consequences. For: 
... they are being actually bought and sold on the market; 
their demand and supply are real magnitudes, and any 
measure or policies tbaL would inhibit the forma.tion of 
such markets would ipso facto endanger the self-regulation 
of the system. (109) 
I have so far tended to emphasise land amongst the three factors, 
because it seems to offer us the key to the English transition to a 
market society. In essence, this is because the English landed classes 
converted themselves from feudal landowners into agrarian capitalists 
earlier than any other European ruling class; this fateful move 
explains the inner logic of those other changes in English society 
that led to an industrialised market society. 
Already by the 14th century Anderson can speak of a 'monetarised 
feudalism', ie feudal dues transformed into money rents. 110 In England 
Christopher Hill tells us that 'the Reformation threw monastic and 
chantry lands on the market' so that between the years 1558 to 1640 
£2~ million of monastic and crown lands were sold. This meant that: 
there was relatively cheap land to be bought by anyone who 
had capital to invest and social aspirations to satisfy. 
Such a radical move to a market in land meant that by the 1630s one 
observer could complain: 
the making of a parity between gentlemen and yeomen and 
those which before were labouring men; the begetting of 
pride and stubbornness in them, and by this means to 
become refractions to the government of the country. (111) 
The consensus of historians on English agricultural development is 
well summarised by R.J. Holton: 
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By 1750 English landed society had already experienced a 
transition from peasant to capitalist agriculture ... For 
several centuries, but especially from the sixteenth 
century onwards, a number of elements of "improvement" are 
detectable. These included the enclosure of communal or 
hitherto waste land, the gradual dispossession of small 
peasant producers and the consolidation of holdings into 
larger units meanwhile technical improvements are 
evident in both arable crop rotation and animal 
husbandry. ( ll2) 
The heart of the so-called 'English system• was the successful tenant 
farmer, according to Roy Porter: 
by 1790 about three quarters of England's soil was 
cultivated by tenants. (113) 
It seems likely that this reflected an essentially commercial attitude 
towards land on the part of landowners, that tenants with their profit 
maximising incentive would produce the best return on land. For in 
the 18th century landowners were: 
clear as to what was a good estate. It was one tenanted by 
large farmers holding over 200 acres or more, paying their 
rents regularly and keeping their holding in repair ... 
improvement in this period were all devices to this end -
consolidation of holdings, enclosure, and the replacing of 
leases for life by leasers for a term of years. (114) 
By the 18th century England had been lifted clear by the 
commercialisation of agriculture from the fear of famine that still 
afflicted most of Europe. The nobility formed a tight ring of 
privileged landowners to become from 1700 for the next two centuries 
what Porter describes as 
easily the most confident powerful and resilient 
aristocracy in Europe. (115) 
They became involved in a wider range of activities including the 
development of minerals such as coal and iron ore and in setting 
various forms of rural manufacturing along with the rural 
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infrastructure of roads and later canals. The nobility were also 
heavily involved in urban redevelopment, and in particular made large 
profits from the development of what were to be the most fashionable 
1 1 h parts of London.~~v 
Although Britain was clearly ruled by a landowning class in the 18th 
century we have clear signs, most pertinent for our analysis, that we 
are dealing with an order quite distinct from that in the rest of 
Europe. Here there was no absolutely rigid divide either by law or 
hereditary principle between different kinds of people or different 
types of activity, eg between trade and land, or between commoner and 
noble, or even between clergy and laity. Thus to a degree that Porter 
can claim that: 
what it took to be reckoned a gentleman was 
negotiable, for by long tradition, gentility in England 
was but ancient riches. (117) 
Once a merchant or a tradesman had made some money, he seemed able to 
style himself a 'Gentleman'. Getting into the upper classes and even 
the nobility was rather more difficult, but by no means impossible. 
The sons of the less well-to-do gentry would marry the daughters of 
rich merchants, but getting a peerage meant owning a good deal of land 
and cultivating the well connected, so with patience one could come 
your way, or your heirs' . There seems little reason then for not 
endorsing the famous Barringtom Moore thesis as to why there was no 
violent Bourgeois Revolution in the 18th or 19th centuries in England: 
Despite a good many expressions of contrary sentiment from 
their own members, it is fair to say that the most 
·influential sector of the landed upper classes acted as a 
political advance guard for commercial and industrial 
capitalism. (118) 
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v 
THE MARKET AND THE CRISIS OF PATERNALISM 
we are now in a posiLion to approu.ch some of the complexitiPs and 
paradoxes of this still landed and monarchi,:.;:~l society, for purposes of 
illustrating our theme, as it gradually turned itself into the first 
market society. Important elements of this process have been caught by 
Harold Perkin, in ways congruent with our argument. He describes 18th 
century England as based upon 'property and paternalism' (or 
patronage). Whilst not necessarily endorsing his notion of a one class 
society, his emphasis on what we shall see as the contradictory 
. f d t 1' . f . f 1 119 Wh conJuncture o property an pa erna ~sm ~s ru~t u . y? Because 
England, unlike most European countries, was a society in which feudal 
relations in the countryside had gone, but this meant that the English 
landed class held its land via the notion of 'absolute property' . 
Whereas medieval notions of property were 
contingent, conditional, circumscribed and subject to the 
specific claims of God, the Church, the King the inferior 
tenants and the poor 
by the 18th century the concept of property was absolute 'categorical, 
unconditional', argued from either natural rights (Locke, Blackstone, 
Adam Smith) or utility (Hume, Paley, Bentham) it was safe against all 
threats. 120 
It followed naturally from this that the English landed classes were 
in an almost reverse situation to those on the continent. In Europe 
attempts were being made to follow through feudal theory that property 
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followed from status - hence the numerous examples of the creation of 
'tables of rank' -with only certain people, because of who they were, 
able to do certain things eg, knights who used to perform military 
service, held certain offices. But in Britain, as we have seen, status 
clearly followed from property and wealth. 
By the eighteenth century only a handful of English peers 
could claim continuity in the male line from a medievel 
feudal grant: all the rest ow ed their status to their 
property. (121) 
The only legal privilege the English gentry possessed was an official 
coat of arms, which could be bought anyway. 
From property of course flowed power, political and social power. The 
landed class had effective control of both houses of Parliament, which 
seemed to many to have become private clubs for the pursuit of gain 
and the convenience of their members. Numerous private land enclosure 
bills were passed and numerous 'place men' found very lucrative state 
positions. Thompson indeed, insists that the concept 'Old Corruption' 
was a serious piece of political analysis, because he feels political 
power in the 18th century should be seen not as a direct organ of any 
class or interest, but as a secondary political formation, a 
purchasing point from which other kinds of economic and social power 
were gained or enhanced. This power in its primary functions was 
costly, grossly inefficient, and it survived the century only because 
it did not seriously inhibit the actions of those with de facto 
122 
economic or (local) political power. We should add that whatever 
inefficiency of operation, this system seems to have served well 
enough, because for most of the century the landed class became richer 
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and richer, with the nobility and the grandees in 1800 owning 20-25% 
of England's landed wealth compared with 15-20% in 1700. 123 
But it wcts the de facto economic and local political power that was at 
the heart of the second element of 'property and paternalism'. 
Paternalism was in effect property as social power, and through that 
the dominant class in England exercised its hege\\'/J'\'.j Every kind of 
property had its 'legitimate influence'. Whatever feelings the great 
landowners and smaller gentry may have engendered in the ordinary 
people, they were a central part of life, their houses were in effect 
local forms of the state: 
its estate office the exchange for farm tenancies, mining 
and building leases, and a bank for small savings and 
investments ... its law-room; if the landowner was on the 
bench (many were) the first bulwark of law and order 
its dining-room the fulcrum of local politics. (124) 
In addition to this was the deep and complex network of relations 
between clients and patrons, that we know as patronage - not all of 
which were as in Johnson's wonderful definition of a patron as 
one who looks with unconcern on a man struggling for life 
in the water, and when he has reached the ground, 
encumbers him with help (125) 
In a period before the introduction of the impersonal criteria of 
exams , tests , etc, almost all posts were in the personal gift of 
someone, with little distinction between public and private positions. 
Someone with wealth or power would be expected to provide positions 
for nearest relations as well as the wider family, one's tenants and 
villagers, political supporters and indeed anyone who had done you a 
service or seemed to show merit. 
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It is these complex elements that allow Perkin to say that although 
class was 
latent in the politics, industrial relations and religion 
of the old society, it was overlain by powerful bonds and 
loyalties 
h . h 1' • d I h t 1 f b d' • I 126 h w 1c meant 1V1ng un er t e grea aw o su or 1nat1on . T ompson 
would wish to amend this: 
I find the notion of gentry - crowd reciprocity, of the 
'paternalism-deference equilibrium' in which both parties 
to the equation were, in some degree, the prisoners of 
each other, more helpful than the notion of a 'one-class 
society' or of consensus 
he sees gentry-pleb relations as a 'field of force' tightly 
constrained but conflictua1. 127 Both historians are grappling with a 
complex situation, where power relations are bound together 
inextricably in their constraining and enabling forms, in a way that 
reminds one of Foucault's 'micro physics of power'. However, I think 
Thompson would have little difficulty accepting the point I wish to 
emphasise in Perkin, namely that 
patronage was the middle term between feudal homage and 
capitalist cash nexus. (128) 
For the truth is that given both the assumptions and the material 
bases of paternalism and patronage (they have clearly more than an 
etymological connection), the situation in the long term was 
chronically unstable, for at root they were based on land as capital -
absolute property - but capital that was not going to remain solely in 
land. 
Bauman makes the useful distinction between two forms of power 
relationship, 'control-through-space' and 'control through time'. The 
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basis for the difference between the two forms is 
symbolised by the prevalence of land propert¥ over fluid, 
mobile, space-independent capital which was to become 
dominant later. (129) 
Landed capital is the fundamental condi t-_ ion for 'control-through-
space' it. can only work 
in so far as locality remained the seat of comprehensive 
obligations and equally comprehensive and also realistic, 
rights ... The web of place- tied obligations and rights 
could be, indeed, so complete that it might allow the 
owner of the land, the holder of power, not to be 
concerned with control of time. (130) 
Porter tells us that even this land based paternalism in England was 
'wearing thin', its veneer was •corroded by the brutality with which 
great landowners emparked, enclosed, exploited the game laws, and rode 
roughshod over customary tenant and village rights • in pursuit of 
l t f . l3l Th 1 d f p easure or grea er pro 1t. ere was a so a stea y movement rom 
the land from the middle of the century towards the new manufacturing 
districts of the Midlands and the North, not however, generally as a 
direct result of enclosure, but up to at least 1780 they seemed to 
offer better employment prospects. 132 It seems likely that the 
political and social conflictSof the 1790s, inspired by French 
radicalism, were made possible both by the deterioration of 
paternalist relations in the countryside and by the concentration of 
workers and artisans in the Northern and Midlands towns. Here 
paternalist relations were weak in any case,as has often been noted 
there are similarities between Luddism or machine breaking and 
Agrarian protests like rick burning, perhaps responses to two faces of 
the same situation. 
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The process Polanyi commented upon, of turning nature into landed 
capital was completely in place throughout the 18th century, although 
its consequences are only clear with hindsight. However, it is only in 
the latter part of the cent-ury that the other crucial component, the 
turning of human activity into labour as a market commodity, was 
achieved as we shall see in a moment. Nonetheless, we have seen 
enough so far, to understand the paradoxical position and attitude of 
England's 'Old Society• to the market order they helped create. This 
is caught in a telling observation by Macintyre: 
Burkeans, who, faithful to Burke • s own allegiance 
tried to combine adherence in politics to a conception of 
tradition that would vindicate the oligarchial revolution 
of property of 1688 and adherence in economics to the 
doctrine and institutions of the free market. The 
theoretical incoherence of this mismatch did not deprive 
it of ideological usefulness. But the outcome has been 
that modern conservatives are for the most part engaged in 
conserving only older rather than later versions of 
liberal individualism. Their own core doctrine is as 
liberal and as indiviudalist as that of self-avowed 
liberals. ( 133) 
There is a great deal that can be unpacked from this quotation, in 
some respects it provides a summary of the argument of the past few 
pages. The emphasis on tradition is important, for it marks a way of 
viewing oneself, one's class and one's nation's history, in a way that 
denies fundamental ruptures in life, even as in this case, they had 
happened and were happening. It should perhaps be seen in the light of 
a probing remark by J.A.G. Pocock: 
Nothing could be more misleading than to picture the 
vehement assertion of the antiquity of English law and 
liberties as an inert acceptance of •traditional society•. 
It was rather traditionalist than traditional an 
assertion of conservatism; and conservation is a mode of 
action. (134) 
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The question of English 'traditionalism' is, of course, vast and too 
complex to really develop adequately here, but clearly the fact that 
in the 18th century the most advanced and successful European society 
could emphasize its continuity with its past is remarkable enough ln 
itself. The assertion of the distinctiveness of England is present in 
both Radical and Conservative traditions with the concept of the 
Norman Yoke on one side,and 'Great English oaks' slowly maturing and 
the slowly evolving common law, on the other. 135 Clearly in Pocock's 
terms the powerful, innovative and successful landed class, towards 
the end of the 18th century, sought through an ideologue like Burke, 
to stabilise its dominance through 'tradition' as a mode of action, to 
in part 'repair', the consequences of its own success. 
Burke is a most interesting figure, for he attempted to provide some 
intellectual coherence for a landed class, comfortable and prosperous 
though it was,half way between feudalism and the cash-nexus. Burke is 
widely known as the fierce opponent of the French Revolution, defender 
of rank, distrusting of reason, and as an icon of 20th century 
Conservative European thought. His traditionalism is perhaps best 
caught in his definition of society - from his Reflections on the 
Revolution in France - as 
a partnership not only between those who are living but 
between those who are living, those who are dead and those 
who are to be born. (136) 
However, the key issue from our point of view is that registered by 
Macintyre, namely that Burke was also a staunch upholder and defender 
of the free market and capitalist property. He had long been 
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interested in political economy and communicated with Adam Smith, who 
is reputed to have said of him: 
that he was the only man who without communication, 
thought on those topics exactly as he did. (137) 
c. B. Macpherson has been at some pains to defend the intellectual 
coherence of Burke, on the basis that capitalist property rights had 
been ratified in the 1689 settlement, to which Burke was loyal, so 
that capitalist relations had become the 'traditional society' by his 
time. 138 such a view is highly questionable, not so much as a matter 
of intellectual coherence, but because Burke's commitment both to some 
p:;:ternalist relationships and to a free market political economy (he 
no doubt had a much firmer grip of this, than most contemporaries) 
reflects a real tension in social relations and most particularly the 
mode of domination. These two commitments are in some part mutually 
exclusive, for paternalism, as historians as different as Perkin and 
Thompson insist, has to be something more than a show to disguise 
profit making. It demands not just subordination to rank, but some 
degree of reciprocity or mutual obligation for this 'field of force', 
as Thompson puts it, to exist. 
In the end Burke could only come down on that side of paternalism that 
demanded subordination ' 
, 
the whole of agriculture is in a natural and just order; 
the beast is as an informing principle to the plough and 
cart; the labourer is as reason to the beast; and the 
fanner is as a thinking and presiding principle to the 
labourer. An attempt to break this chain of subordination 
in any part is equally absurd (139) 
He also realised that this would demand great restraint upon or great 
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self restraint by, the worker or labourer, seeing the apparent 
injustice in the relationship: 
They must labour to obtain what by labour can be obtained; 
and when they find as they commonly do, the success 
disproportioned to the endeavour, they must be taught 
their consolation in the final proportions of eternal 
justice. Of this consolation whoever deprived them deadens 
their industry, and strikes at the root of all acquisition 
and all conservation. (140) 
He would not, however, take the final step which might make the 
paternalist hierarchy materially bearable, he would not allow 
interference with the labour market, he completely opposed the 
Speenhamland system. 
The last five years of the 18th century saw very bad harvests and 
severe shortages and dislocation due to the French war, farm labourers 
wages in several regions dropped beneath subsistence. Price rises in 
the period outstripped wages, but Burke's response was a product of 
his belief in the sanctity of the market: 
Patience, labour, sobriety, frugality and religion should 
be recommended to them: all the rest is downright 
fraud. ( 141) 
A response strongly reminiscent in our own day for its implacable 
'realism', of Enoch Powell on, say Third World aid. However, across 
the low wage counties of southern England JPs used a variety of 
measures such as subsidizing food or topping up low wages, the 
alternative was hardship and even starvation. It is, of course, a moot 
point concerning who is being most faithful to the ' tradi tiona! 
order' (Pace Macpherson), triumphant property from the 'Old Whig' 
Burke· or the Tory Paternalist JPs of Speenhamland. But as the 
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historian of social policy, Derek Fraser has argued: 
social policy is an expression of social philosphy and a 
generation which resorted so quickly to allowances in aid 
of wages was clearly one which did not regard poverty or 
poor relief as degrading. Poor relief did not have the 
social stigma of debasement it was later to acquire. (142) 
Nonetheless, Burke's position confirms Macintyre as to what notion of 
tradition Burke is defending, namely what we have termed the 'absolute 
rights of property'. The logic of this position for all its wrappings 
in rank, must pull it apart from the Tory paternalists with their real 
grasp of what 'control-through-space' would mean as a system of 
hege~~~ It was significant that what became the Speenhamland pystem 
was really no more than a set of local initiatives, Parliament would 
do nothing. Pitt sununed up the consensus in a debate on a Bill 
proposed to regulate wages in the dire and perhaps exceptional 
circumstances of the 1790s: 
It was indeed the most absurd bigotry, in asserting the 
general principle to exclude the exception, but trade, 
industry and barter would always find their own level, and 
be impeded by regulations which violated their natural 
operation, and deranged their proper effect. (143) 
This was the wave of the future, it revealed that most 'advanced' 
opinion in the landowning class, accepted the logic of free market 
economics, although paternalism died hard at the local level, amongst 
Tory traditionalists. This now was the era of the Combinations Acts, 
the steady deregulation of labour and the freeing of the labour market 
which culminated in the Poor Law of 1834. This was what Carlyle 
referred to in his study of Chartisrn as the 'abdication on the part of 
the governors'. Perkin has summarised well the ultimate consequences 
of the contradictory social position that Burke so powerfully 
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articulated: 
Emancipation (from paternalism) was counterbalanced, and 
indeed provoked, by a rejection on the part of the higher 
ranks not of the whole relationship - for they insisted on 
paternal discipline and filial obedience, long after they 
were willing to pay the price for them - but of that part 
which alone justified it by the light and reason of the 
old society: paternal protection and responsibility•. 
(144) 
We can learn most about the ambiguities that the capitalist market 
generates, in the position of the Burkean conservative by contrasting 
it with the position of another conservative theorist, almost a 
contemporary but locked into a very different set of social relations: 
George Fitzhugh the defender of the slave based society of the 
American South in the early 19th century. 145 Fitzhugh was probably the 
most sophisticated defender of slavery in the American South. Eugene 
Genovese has taken him as important because of this sophistication and 
self consciousness, and sees in him more than an apologist for slavery 
but rather the emergence of a spokesman, and a relatively coherent 
theorist, for an entire class and social order. The Marxist Genovese 
pays Fitzhugh and his society a powerful tribute: 
. . . they did, nonetheless, stand for a world different 
from our own, that is worthy of our sympathetic attention. 
The questions they asked are still with us; the inhumanity 
they condemned must still be condemned; and the values for 
which they fought still have something to offer. (146) 
He and his society are important for the argument in this thesis in 
that the southern slave state of America had a market economy, but 
they did not have what Polanyi or Gevonese would describe as a market 
society. All George Fitzhugh•s work was designed to make sure it did 
not get one. No market society existed for reasons that must now be 
fairly clear, there were areas of life in which markets could not 
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form, principally there was no labour market. The relationship between 
master and slave is described by Genovese as 1 organic 1 , so although 
slave owners faced each other in the market place, labour existed in 
another realm. 
The existence of exchange relations, external to labour did not 
necessarily undermine the organic relationship between master and 
slave within. From 1808 onwards there were no new slaves coming from 
Africa, because of the British and later European ban. This meant that 
the Americans had to raise their own slaves, which inevitably required 
certain minimum standards of treatment. Genovese argues that any 
understanding of the southern slaveholders 
must begin with an essential fact about their slaves: the 
slaves of the Old south constituted the only plantation 
slave class in the New World that successfully reproduced 
itself. ( 147) 
This reveals more clearly than anything else could, the paternalist 
quality of the master, and the fairly good treatment of the slaves. 
This material basis reveals a sustainable social order, at least in 
its internal relations. The plantation was the key institution, it was 
presided over by a resident planter who saw it as his horne and the 
entire population of the plantation as a kind of extended family. 
Clearly the need to reproduce the absolutely crucial workforce 
provided a powerful motive for the paternalist ethos of the plantation 
to develop, but Genovese warns again any easy separation between 
economic interests and morals: 
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once extended over a generation or two, the appropriate 
standards of treatment became internalised and part of the 
accepted standard of decency for the ruling class. (148) 
The American War of Independence freed the south from British 
interference and allowed the slave owners to become a regional power. 
Given the social relations of production, Genovese argues that it is 
quite plausible to see the slave owning class, taking its cultural 
model from the Old Virginian aristocracy, as on the way to becoming a 
landed aristocracy complete with an articulated set of anti-bourgeois 
149 
values. 
George Fitzhugh was not in any sense typical of the South; no theorist 
is really typical since most people do not spend their time shaping 
their beliefs into a coherent logical form, but this is what he set 
out to do. He saw that the immanent logic of the plantation ideology 
led ultimately to a rejection of almost all bourgeois liberalism. He 
took the logical step of moving from the common belief amongst whites 
in the south, that negro slaves were often better off than many 'free' 
workers and peasants in the western world, to arguing that slavery was 
the best system for every society and that ultimately capitalism was 
incompatible with Christian morality. Property was no absolute right, 
for him, it exists for the public good. 
Slave property, like all other carries with it the duty of 
public leadership and a sense of responsibility towards 
the propertyless. Society ultimately retains control of 
property; individual property owners c~e the trusted 
agents of society. (150) 
Fitzhugh acknowledged sympathy for socialism's arguments in his 
critique of capitalism. Indeed he saw the rise of socialism in Europe 
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as a sign that capitalism there could not last. He accepted the need 
to overcome the alienation of capitalism but did not believe equality 
was possible and so was able to turn socialist arguments for the 
association of labour on their head. 
The association of labour like all associations (he 
claimed) requires a head or ruler and that head or ruler 
will become a cheat and a tyrant unless his interests are 
identified with the interests of the labourer. (151) 
Socialism was impossible he believed it could lead only to the re-
establishment of slavery. He was bitterly opposed to capitalism and 
the free market, for basically moral reasons; capitalism produced 
greed and ultimately destroyed all finer feeling and all bonds of 
domestic affection. His model of the relation between master and slave 
was familial, because the master is used to treating the slave as part 
of his family, so his sense of family is massively extended further 
than it ever could be under capitalism. 
Therefore Fitzhugh's view according to Genovese is that: 
Capitalism' stc~ds condemned as an enemy of the human race 
because it produces economic exploitation, degradation ... 
wherever capitalism has triumphed, the family has been 
undermined and all community has perished. (150) 
It was above all the world market that carried the bourg~~·~to their 
position and it was the relentless external pressure of the forces of 
the market, that Fitzhugh saw threatening the south. He knew slavery 
could only flourish free of the corrupting influence of the world 
market. He pinned his hopes on the collapse of European capitalism. He 
was no doubt very foolish in his hope, but as Genovese says: 
What else could he have thought? His wisdom led him to see 
what few others could. Slavery could not exist much longer 
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as a social system in contradistinction to and as an 
occasional or peripheral labour system, in a bourgeois 
world. ( 153) 
Fitzhugh has never been taken up by modern Conservat · 'ism and we 
hardly need Genovese to tF> ll us why, for the answer is clear from 
Macintyre's account. Most modern Conservatives are committed to 
capitalist property relations and older forms of liberal individualism 
that help constitute those relations. The archaic George Fitzhugh 
standing outside those relations could articulate a genuine 
alternative, free of the one-sided obfuscations of an Edmund Burke. 
Fitzhugh's message for us is clear, and is, to quote Genovese one last 
time: 
If you will the world to be thus, then you must will the 
social relations that alone can make it thus 
Fitzhugh's message carne to one simple point that few if 
any conservatives still want to hear: To have a world 
without market place values you must have a world without 
a market-place at its centre. Go backward or go forward, 
but if you are in earnest, then go. (154) 
VI 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF MARKET RELATIONS 
It is clear that Polanyi's 'Great Transformation' was completed by the 
late 18th century, Burke and the type of landed class that he in part 
represents, were firmly in place. Economy was separated from society, 
the formation of markets was now a sacrasanct process, including the 
formation of Labour markets. This process had hollowed out the 
substance of Burkean paternalism; morals and markets were separate. 
Burke's rhetoric stood to sanctify 'old' capitalist property relations 
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as they followed into whatever profitable avenues were available. The 
market makes its own demands on the 1 i ves and minds of peoples, 
including theorists. We have seen that to defy its logic, you must 
step outside its foundations. 
The propertied class were, as we've noted and despite their own 
separation of norms and markets, to continue to insist upon moralising 
the economic behaviour of their subordinates and employees for some 
time to come. For as Bauman has noted the campaign for the creation of 
a work ethic amongst early industrial workers seems to be an attempt 
'to exempt the workers from the rule of market rationality', ie 
greatest gain for least cost: 
rather than, as common interpretations would like us to 
believe, to train the crude, pre-industrial labour force 
in the art of life guided by commercial reason. (155) 
Once again we see capitalism's dependence on what we have seen 
Habermas refer to as pre-capitalist ' boundary conditions' , for its 
continuation. Bauman argues that these capitalists attempted to 
recreate 
the commi trnent to task performance which came to the 
cr~ftsman naturally when he himself was in control of his 
time and work rhythm. (156) 
These attempts are, of course, eroded by the workings of the market 
economy, as the 'rational' route to material well-being becomes quite 
clear to generations of workers. 
The reasons for this process (chapter 1 is relevant here) are given by 
Simmel and Weber - the latter very much influenced by Simmel. 157 
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Simmel' s account in particular reveals him as the sociologist of the 
triumph of 'external' over 'internal' goods. His Philosophy of Money 
is preoccupied with the ever lengthening 'teleological' chain of 
connections that spin out from the money economy, for the achievement 
of any given end. Money and the market principle, as we saw with Adam 
Smith's fateful reduction of human aims and aspirations to an economic 
drive, the 
absolute means which is elevated to the psychological 
significance of an absolute purpose. 
This as he (Sirnmel) goes on to acutely observe, is because there is no 
reason to 
fear (it) being dissolved into something relative, a 
prospect that makes it impossible for many substantial 
values to maintain the claim to be absolute. (158) 
In other words, as he puts it later: 
As a tangible item, money is the most ephemeral thing in 
the external-practical world, yet in its content it is the 
most stable, since it stands at the point of indifference 
and balance between all other phenomena in the world. 
(159) 
This seems very much what Macintyre means by a society that can only 
recognise external goods (internal ones being goods that cannot be 
understood independently of the end, purpose or good of the practice 
which they are part) . External goods are those which can be most 
easily subsumed, in the manner of Adam Smith (see above), within 
economic interest. Macintyre adds: 
And in any society which recognised only external goods 
competitiveness would be the dominant and exclusive 
feature. (160) 
This would be so for the reasons Weber gives when he states that: 
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Within the market community every act of exchange ... is 
not directed in isolation by the action of the individual 
partners in the transaction but the more rationally 
considered the more it is directed by the actions of all 
parties potentially interested in the exchange (a 
patentially almost infinite external series PM). The 
market community as such is the most impersonal 
relationship of practical life into which a human being 
can enter ... (161) 
It is the centrepiece of Simmel's works to focus on the consequences 
for a society, of itsbeing dominated by the impersonal nature of these 
exchange relationships and the connection between this and the 
subjective and objective aspects of contemporary human experience. 
Simmel is certain that the dominance of the market principle makes for 
greater freedom for the individual in his or her relationship with 
others, but at the same time increases the subjection of people to the 
process of measurement and bureaucratic regulation. As Turner puts it 
in his paper on Simmel: 
Money is thus consistent both with indiviudality and 
individuation. (162) 
Simmel, in effect, tells the story of 'The Great Transformation' 
principally from the subjective side. The consequences of the presence 
or absence of money relations in European history at its most 
abstract, are put into three parts: the first stage is one in which: 
the feudal lord's rights are extended to the whole of 
the obligated person who had to forfeit his most 
fundamental possession or rather his being. This would 
have been the price at which the lord would have granted 
(for example) his female subjects the right to marry. The 
next stage is that he granted this right - which he can 
deny at any time - in exchange for a sum of money; the 
third stage is that the lord's veto as such is abolished 
and the subject is now free to marry if he or she pays the 
lord of the manor a fixed sum: bride-wealth, marriage 
money, bridal money etc. 
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He goes on to point out that money is obviously connected with 
personal liberation but not completely at the second stage because the 
lord can reject payment: 
The relationship is completely depersonalised only when no 
factors other than money payrnent are involved 1n the 
decision. (163) 
What then is the relationship between this process of de-
personalisation and 'freedom'? To understand this, Simmel attempts to 
examine the specifics that continuing relations of dependence possess. 
'The money economy' he argues 
makes possible not only a solution (to dependence) but a 
specific kind of mutual dependence which, at the same 
time, affords for a maximum of liberty. (164) 
In the first place this happens because a massive range of quite 
unknown obligations develop. For many reasons, including the 
diversified technical division of labour and the growth of banking and 
finance houses, which lend the funds of small and large savers and 
investors to anonymous others. Naturally these myriads of connections 
produce anonymous dependence. 
For these people gain their significance for the 
individual concerned solely as representatives of those 
functions such as owners of capital and suppliers of 
working materials. What kind of people they are in other 
respects plays no role here. (165) 
So money, when it achieves dominance, ie when a society is based on 
capital accumulation and commodity exchange (he can be criticised, and 
was by Weber, for not being specific enough about capitalism as a 
system), it makes possible, because of its flexibility and 
divisibility, a great range of economic relations, whilst at the same 
time removing the personal element from them by its objective and 
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completely indifferent character: 
we are compensated for the great quantity of our 
dependencies by the indifference towards the respective 
persons and by our liberty to change them at will. (166) 
Compared with all non-market societies with 'embedded' economies, we 
are extraordinarily independent of particular members of society 
because their relationship with us has been transformed into an 
objective quality, which can be effectively done by numerous others. 
Sirnmel observes that: 
this is the most favourable situation for bringing about 
inner independence, the feeling of individual self-
sufficiency (167) 
but this is by no means simply to be understood as an absence of 
relationships, because 'freedom' is not simply a state of inner being 
of an isolated subject, such a state exists rather when 
extensive relations to others exist (but) all genuinely 
individual elements have been removed from them 
so that influences are anonymous. 
The cause as well as the effect of such objective 
dependencies, where the subject as such remains free rests 
upon the interchangeability of persons: the change of 
human subjects - voluntarily or effected by the structure 
of the relationships - discloses that indifference to 
subjective elements of dependence that characterises the 
experience of freedom. (168) 
The narrative of the stripping away of the relations of personal 
dependence and authority, can as we have seen with George Fitzhugh, be 
viewed in a different light, which exposes the ambiguity of freedom. 
It can be seen as in Macintyre's view, as 
having suffered a deprivation a 
qualities that were once believed 
self (169) 
stripping away 
to belong to 
of 
the 
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ie, notions of personal identity founded upon sets of personal 
relations with others. Simmel, politically and ideologically a 
liberal, was well aware of the dark side of this, although clearly 
coHuu.i.Lted to the process. He saw in the situation of the industrial 
worker the problem clearly illustrated: compared with a slave, who 
could not change his master under any circumstances, a worker has a 
formal freedom to do so. Viewed in one light then the worker is on the 
way to personal freedom despite his present poor state: 
for here, as in other spheres, there is no necessary 
connection between liberty and increased well-being. 
This is because 
the freedom of the worker is matched by the freedom of the 
employer which did not exist in a society of bonded 
labour. The slave owner as well as the lord of the manor 
had a personal interest in keeping his slaves and his 
serfs in a good and efficient condition. 
Freedom for the labourer is in effect paid for 
by the emancipation of the employer that is by the loss of 
welfare that the bonded labourer enjoyed. {170) 
This takes us close to the heart of liberal market freedom and reveals 
more clearly the relationship between a particular sense of self and a 
particular economy, for freedom to engage in a market order means a 
change 
from one of stability and invariability to one of 
liability and interchangeability of person. 
Therefore, 
the relationship of individual persons to others simply 
duplicates the relationship that they have to objects as a 
result of money. {171) 
This, then, shows us the dilemma facing both Burkean Conservatives and 
market socialists. For standing inside the pale of the market they 
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must follow its logic and its cultural consequences. What then, 
happens to them? A leading liberal theorist, Ronald owork in in a 
recent attack on the New Right, has provided some pointers. He argues 
that modern western politics is fundamentally about two issues: 
How to improve production and how to distribute it more 
fairly. (172) 
He points out that: 
arguments about privatisation for example, are not about 
the metaphysics of exploitation or the validity of Marx's 
labour theory of value, but about whether public or 
private ownership is more efficient ... (my emphasis) 
He further claims that behind the old left-right divide what we really 
have are two different and conflicting distributive theories, which 
both emerge from 19th century liberalism not Marxian socialism. The 
first of these theories is 
an informal, statistic-based 
The present government aims 
efficiency because it assumes 
community prosperous over all, 
long run. 
version of utilitarianism. 
(successfully or not) at 
government should make the 
for most people and in the 
The second theory is based on the notion that government should treat 
all individuals with equal concern. Rawls is its most sophisticated 
theorist: 
serious economic inequalities are justifiable only if they 
work for the benefit of those at the bottom 
and this may lead to less than the overall maximum prosperity. 
Naturally this position has nothing to do with what he calls the 
'ancestral' left of Marxism and class consciousness, rather he calls 
it 'Fabian'. Naturally this requires a degree of benign state 
intervention to carry out the redistribution of non-functional 
inequality and therefore to assess the position and needs of the 
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individual. 
IMorkin is an authentic voice of modernity, the two versions of 
liberalism he outlines fight it out under the rubric of individualism 
versus collectivism. The first version to which Burkean conservatives 
are prone to in practice, demands the classical bourgeois self of 
'possessive individualism' ie the proprietor of his own person, the 
ability to enter contracts freely, contracts being the model of all 
human relationships. The second version of liberalism requires a self 
who owes something to the Lockean possessive individual tradition, but 
is also the ghostly inheritor of the moral philosophy and 
institutional changes, that began in the 18th century, an abstract but 
unique self as moral agent, on a par with all other such agents. 
This second version, it might be called social democratic liberalism, 
inheriting such a notion of self, must inevitably separate any notion 
of right from any particular conception of the human good, each 
individual must develop as they supposedly abstractly choose. No one 
can claim a privileged conception of the human good. No government, 
state, or historical corranunity' s views can be binding on the whole 
society. All that can be demanded of the state in terms of values is 
its claim to protect freedom embodied in positive law. 
Sirranel in the course of his analysis of the multiple but anonymous 
dependencies generated by the proliferating possibilities of exchange 
in the market, examined this abstracting process at work. The 
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particularity of real personalities were removed: 
such a personality is almost completely destroyed (by) ... 
a money economy. The delivery man, the money lender, the 
worker . . . do not operate as personalities because they 
enter into a relationship only by virtue of a single 
activity . , , 'T'hP general tendency ... undoubtedly moves in 
the direction of making the individual more and more 
dependent upon the achievements of people, but less and 
less dependent upon the personalities that lie behind them 
were this tendency to continue he argues, it would 
exhibit a profound affinity to socialism ... for socialism 
is concerned primarily with transforming to an extreme 
degree every action of social importance into an objective 
function. 
Interestingly he compares this with the role of the official whose 
position is objectively pre-formed so only limited aspects of his 
personality can emerge. So Sirnrnel claims: 
fully fledged state socialism would er~ect above the world 
of personalities a world of objective forms 
so eventually it could be that the official 
no longer individually differentiated simply passes 
through the function without being able or allowed to put 
their whole personality into these rigidly circumscribed 
individual demands. The personality as a mere holder of a 
function or posit ion is just as irrelevant as that of a 
guest in a hotel room (173) 
Sirnrnel saw socialism as did the SPD as a rationalisation of 
capitalism, emerging from capitalism's own tendencies and ideologies. 
This conception is that of abstract liberalism and has been well 
summed up by Brian Barry in his critique of Rawls: 
The essence of liberalism as I am defining it here _ the 
vision of society as made up of independent autonomous 
units who co-operate only when the terms of co-operation 
are such as to make it further the ends of each of the 
parties. Market relations are the pa~igm of such 
co-operation. (174) 
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Such a view may be a realistic vision of modern society as 
nothing but a collection of strangers each pursuing his or 
her own intere0\~with minimal constraint. (175) 
Can such a view of society and its concomitant concept of self be 
sustained, or are the;-,__, elements in the cultural boundary conditions 
that capitalism is dependent upon, which provide a potential space 
from which a contrary view of self and society can be generated? 
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Chapter Four 
Managerialism, Class Conflict 
and the Culture of Bureaucratic Individualism 
The CiviL Servant has as his nineteenth-century counterpart and 
opposite the sociaL reformer; Saint Simonians, Comtians, utiLitarians, 
EngLish ameLiorists such as CharLes Booth, the earLy Fabian sociaList. 
Their characteristic Lament is: if only government could learn to be 
scientific! And the long-term response of government is to cLaim that 
it has indeed become scientific in just the sense that the reformers 
required. 
Alasdair Macintyre 
After Virtue, p.82 
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I 
PROLOGUE: THE !1ARKET, THE STATE AND ITS RE-EMBEDDING? 
Polanyi believed that the market's victory was going to be relatively 
short lived, he believed its fundamental institutions, the Gold 
Standard and Free trade had broken down. for ever in the 1920s and 
30s, to be replaced by something new. He wrote that 
Out of the ruins of the Old World, corner stones of the 
New can be seen to emerge: economic collaboration of 
governments and the liberty to organise national life at 
will. (l) 
This, written in 1944, seems a prescient observation on the Post War 
World of Bretton Woods; a few years ago it would probably have met 
with almost universal agreement. The view from 1986, allows no such 
comfortable conclusions, for we have seen the Keynesian con:::enSJs come 
apart due to profound economic crisis and the popularity of free 
market ideologies on a scale not seen since at least the 1920s, and 
possibly the 19th century itself. There is now widespread agreement 
today, on both Right and Left,that the fundamental reality that both 
national politics and the national economy have to cope with is that 
of the world market and that the bottom line for economic survival is 
international competitiveness. 2 
Some have been prepared to see these recent developments as little 
more than a triumph for right wing ideologies over a weary Post -War 
Social Democracy. However, most now agree that the economic crisis is 
real enough. It is not my intention to examine in detail the roots of 
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this crisis. However, I wish to make use of one recent survey of 
current economic thought that seems to reflect our situation. The 
author G.A.E. Smit'h_- a Marxist - has been prepared to take the New 
Right monetarists explanations of crisis seriously and has noted the 
similarities between them and Marxist economic theory. 3 He argues that 
some modern monetarists have in effect readopted the Flea-classical 
theory concerning unemplo~nent, ie that it is due to interference with 
the market, either by Trade Unions or Firms with excessive market 
power, but at the same time they implicitly 
reject the conclusion that market forces will tend to push 
the economic system towards full employment. (4) 
This is because they believe that in the 1950s and 1960s there was a 
fall in the :cate of profit so that employers were not able to employ 
profitably the labour force. This led to an increase in the so called 
1 natural 1 rate of unemployment, but this was hidden by the relatively 
favourable tenns of trade between the West and the developing World. 
Some monetarists explain the decline in profit by increasing trade 
union power, but many reject this because it does not explain the 
decline in countries with weak unions. The alternative is that 
the fall in the rate of profit is an inherent tendency 
within the Capitalist system itself. (5) 
The reasons for this fall need not detain us long, it is basically due 
to the Capital: Labour ratio. On one hand there is a given level of 
technology and a given stock of labour. As more capital is combined 
with labour, the increase in output due to employment of more capital 
will at a certain point decline. 
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Thus after a certain point, as the ratio of capital to 
labour increases the rate at which output increases begins 
to decline, so bringing about a fall in the rate of 
increase in output per unit labour. Eventually the point 
is reached where an increase in the Capital: Labour ratio 
does not result in i'l s11fficient increase in productivity 
to maintain the rate of profit which begins to 
decline. ( 6) 
The truth or otherwise of this argwnent is not in my competence to 
judge, but it does seem to reflect a return by orthodox economists to 
an analysis of the fundamental nature of the Capitalist system -
something Marxist economists have long called for. It seems that this 
in turn reflects the depth of the problems facing the Capitalist 
system and a major retreat from the beliefs popular in the long 
Post-War boom, that fundamental 'system' questions could be put aside. 
As Smith concludes: 
It is the recognition by an influential group of conven-
tional economists that the inherent features of the 
capitalist economic system give rise to and make necessary 
a pennanent 'reserve army of labour'. For this reason it 
is profoundly mistaken to describe the analysis of this 
group of monetarists as simply a 'reactionary' revival of 
neo-classical thinking. Is is in fact, a 'revolutionary' 
development in conventional economic thinking (7) 
The upshot of all this is that the state cannot act without respecting 
the behaviour of labour markets, ie wages and commodity markets ie, 
prices. 
It seems not unreasonable then to argue that far from being 
reintegrated or re-embedded within society, the economy in the form of 
its various markets continues to be fundamentally dominant. In reality 
it seems that Polanyi, along with many other socialists, fundamentally 
misread the Post-War situation. Economic co-operation between 
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govermnents and the concept of state intervention in specific national 
economies in no way amounted to an over coming of the market as the 
main regulative principle of society. A strong case can be made out 
that Post-war policies were by no means an attempt to re-embed the 
economy within the social fabric. Rather it was an attempt to keep the 
market economy but without its terrible social consequences. It was an 
attempt (which worked almost miraculously for about 30 years), to 
steer between 19th century laissez-faire and the new central command 
economies of the East. It was a centrist st.categy, which in Britain 
was to gain all party support, and was like most British policy the 
creation of Establishment figures like Keynes, Macmillan, Beveridge 
8 
etc. 
Fred Hirsch in his important book The Social Limits of Growth, has 
pointed to the real purposes of the so called 'mixed economy' , and to 
its problems. He sees it thus: 
The essence of this strategy is to impose the necessary 
minimum of central control and guidance on an economy 
whose operating units remain motivated by individualistic 
aims and horizons and are guided by these individualistic 
aims in everyday behaviour. (9) 
Essentially Keynesianism is an economic strategy to correct the 
systematic dangers within laissez-faire for liberal culture. In this 
respect it becomes important to note with Macintyre, that it was 
Keynes who wrote, on reading G.E. Moore's presentation of emotivist 
ethics: 
it was exciting, exhilarating, the beginning of a 
renaissance, the opening of a new heaven on a new 
earth. ( 10) 
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For Keynes; as Hirsch has pointed out, the role of the state as a 
guide for the market economy, was really a culmination of secular 
liberalism. It attempts to provide economic prosperity, along with 
market preference and maximising individual freedom: Keynes was 
attempting the ultimate in privatization - the addition of 
Inorality to the sphere of individual choice. (11) 
This reworked liberalism for the 20th century, meant that the managed 
market was still to be the market, and as such did what liberals 
wanted of it, ie to be neutral, for morality was what individuals 
would choose. 
Hirsch, therefore, is aware of the critical relationship between the 
Capitalist market and Liberalism, its connections and its 
difficulties. His arguments are in some respects similar to both 
12 Polanyi and Habermas in that he argues for the dependence of 
Capitalism on pre-market and non-market forms, such as welfare 
intervention to cope with market dis-welfare and the necessary 
regulatory supervision of markets, to see they maintain a rational 
basis. Most important for Hirsch, is the production of a moral or 
normative framework, providing the necessary self controlled, truthful, 
agents for contractual relations. 
Hirsch argues that this moral legacy, which he views principally as a 
kind of religious capital stock, has been steadily depleted. His 
framework for understanding this tends to be a rather simple version 
of the secularisation thesis13 and an emphasis on the operations of 
the Capitalist system, itself. In the latter part of the argument he 
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makes a valuable contribution, as we will see. Religion's role in 
relation to Capitalism is, of course, complex. In contrast to Hirsch, 
and following Mac}ptyre' s general thesis, we are concerned with the 
collapse in the connection between moral frameworks and the social 
order, not their disappearance altogether. It is rather this 
separation that produces a privatisation and subjectivising of belief 
which achieves its apothesis in the concept of emotivisin (see 
introduction). In relation to religion as a form, this is well brought 
out by Turner: 
impersonal property in late capitalism no longer 
requires the discipline of bodies or the physiological 
regulation of populations with the separation of moral 
bodies and regulated property, religion no longer 
significantly contributes to the unity of social classes, 
the discipline of bodies or the reproductioin of economic 
relations. ( 14) 
This does not imply that capitalism does not require normative 
grounding, rather that it achieved its autonomy as an economic system 
by rejecting religious regulaton, but by also being parasitic upon the 
social character forms constructed by the older systems. However, the 
long run consequences of this separation has meant that religious and 
communal forms are less reliable in producing the necessary 
characters, because once less socially central these forms are more 
likely to change or decay. 
This is especially true when considered in relation to the operations 
of the capitalist system, itself. For, as Mac1ntyre notes, all social 
orders imply a moral sociology and a moral philosophy. The market's 
moral framework is not sufficient, (indeed has never existed on its 
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own), to sustain non-market elements. But Hinsch points to what he 
terms the 'commercialisation effect' carried through by a 'corrunodity 
bias' which 
implies that an excessive proportion of individual 
activity is channeled through the market so that the 
commercialised sector of our lives is unduly large'. (15) 
Because of the search for profit maximization this commercialisation 
increases, and leads to substituting explicit exchange relations for 
what were once informal sectors. It favours the presence of those 
services and items which can be most easily corrunodified and to the 
likely absence of that which cannot easily be treated so. This 
inevitably means an increase in individualistic concepts of self 
interest as the area of cornmmunal goods shrinks and conceptions of the 
d b . . 1 h' 16 corrunon goo ecome 1ncreas1ng y t 1n. 
The consequences of this for Keynesian state intervention are 
important. Firstly the form of the state and the history of its 
emergencce as a neutral bureaucratic body is a central problem and 
will be adressed in the main body of the chapter. However Hirsch is 
clearly aware of the difficulty of maintaining the liberal division, 
so dear to Keynes, of individual motivation and wider social results. 
As he argues: 
It involved the progressive extension of explicit social 
organisation without the support of a matching social 
morality - more rules for the common good, having to be 
prescribed and adhered to in a culture orientated 
increasingly to the private good. The burden placed on 
individual morality has in this way been greatly 
increased. (17) 
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Within this framework, and as the market system makes no claim beyond 
itself for legitimacy; the response of an individual within a 
bureaucratically regulated market, is likely to be in terms of its own 
criteria. This means the appeal for reward for risk and effort is 
generally applied. We noticed in the last chapter, Bauman's contention 
that early capitalists fabricated the 'work ethic' to elude this 
process. But because of such processes as 'commodity bias', _the 1narket 
framework will bring to promin.:..nce, questions of 'fairness' ie the 
conditions of the contract become problematic. Profit lflaximisation 
means most reward for least effort. On this perspective, the various 
I 
'corporatist' experiments that precede the collapse of the Keynesian 
consensus, look like very weak attempts to reintegrate one aspect of 
the Labour market, namely wage levels, within the state as nominal 
representative of society. 
The partial nature of this process is clear to most workers, because 
most other aspects of the market, including prices and control over 
the labour supply, are not so integrated. This means that what Hirsch 
calls acquisitive power, the product of market opportunity due to 
physical productivity, scarce talents, good contacts, 
scarce information and good luck (18) 
are not restrained. Whilst organisational power of say Trade Unions 
is. In developing Hirsch's work John H. Gold :thorpe notes that: 
I 
.... within a growing market economy, market relations and 
the principle of 'equal exchange' tend to enter an ever-
enlarged area of social life, as the dynamics of the 
"commercialisation effect" work themselves out 
which tends to undermine a 
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status order of a wide ranging structure of relationships 
that are formed not by the 'cash nexus' but by obligation 
. . . grounded in moral acceptance . . . the distribution of 
economic advantage and in authority in work relations, 
class inequalities come increasingly to be seen for what 
they are - the products of the market economy - without 
the benefit of the normative camouflage which the status 
order previously created. (19) 
The corporatist strategies of the bureaucratic state to patch up the 
spontaneous workings of the market economy, appear almost pathetically 
weak,· lacking any real normative power. As such they have been 
replaced in most western countries by the grim discipline of the 
market mechanism. 
The capitalist market remains the fundamental reality of western, 
'modern' societies. But if the market erodes those forms upon which it 
has depended, what mechanims of control and power are available to 
these social orders? It is to the analysis of the apparently neutral, 
managerial and bureaucratic forms of power, that we now turn. 
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A doubLe movementJ thenJ o.f state centraLisation on the 
one hand and of dispersion and reLigious dissidence on the 
other: it isJ I beLieveJ at the intersection o.f these two 
tendencies that the PJ:'obLem comes to pose itseL.f with this 
pecuLiar intensity of how to be ruLed by whom to what 
extent J with what methods, etc. It is a probLematic of 
government in generaL. 
Foucault 'On Governmentality• 20 
II 
THE LIBERAL SELF 
It is not necessary to entirely endorse Foucault's methodology to feel 
that the above quotation goes near to the heart of the problems of 
modern politics, with its double emphasis on both objective and 
subjective aspects. In what follows I connect both aspects together. 
However, I begin by looking at the subjective dimensions of the 
problem. 
We have seen how the market acts as a paradigm example of a form of 
social organisation dominated by external goods. Clearly the market 
depends upon and reinforces other elements which must allow it this 
freedom of operation. A key element of this is the kind of state, ie 
the liberal state which in part creates and in turn depends upon a 
certain notion of citizenship, ie a particular, socially produced, 
sense of self. However, our interest in the state is not merely 
because of its contribution to the creation of a market based culture 
of Capitalist Modernity, but also because of the complex effects such 
a culture has on the power of the state and most particularly upon the 
way that power is exercised, especially in its bureaucraticised form. 
Philip Rieff has seen that 
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ends, the causes there to be served, are means of acting; 
they cannot escape service to power. (21) 
Bureaucracy becomes in certain crucial ways immune from critical 
investigation and moral condemnation, as no clear source of its power 
is visible and no secure vantage point is attainable trom which to 
make moral judgements. 
As a preliminary we must briefly attempt to examine how this aspect of 
the liberal state came in existence, not from mere antiquarian 
interest, but because the charting of change aids theoretical clarity 
by allowing us to make contrasts, and highlight what is specifically 
new about our situation. 
It will come as no surprise to those familiar with the origins of 
modern politics, to learn that our modern conception of the state 
emerged from crucial conflicts and debates in the medieval world. In 
particular the critical conflicts that took place in medieval Europe 
concerning the 'Great Schism• as two Popes made competing claims to 
authority. The question for medieval theorists was how to ajudicate 
between different claims to authority. One important resolution as 
Quintin Skinner has shown, 22 was conciliar constitutionalism- ie that 
ultimate power in the Church, lay not with the Pope but with a General 
Council of the Church - proposed by Jean Gerson but having its origins 
in the work of William of oakham. 23 He argued that the Church was but 
one species of political society, and hence made general arguments 
about the nature of the sovereign state, which proved quite radical, 
leading to the view that no ruler can be greater in power than the 
community over which he rules. Ultimate power must always remain, at 
all times, within the body of the community itself, and as a 
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consequence of this the status of a ruler is that of a minister or 
rector, rather than an absolute monarch. Gerson developed a 
'subjective' theory of rights, which equates possession of a right 
with power to dispose of something freely. But he makes clear no 
ruler, not even the Pope, can treat a commonwealth or the goods of its 
members, as his own property. As Skinner points out: 
So it follows that no ruler may be said 
over a commonwealth: he has duties as 
trustee of other people's rights, but 
ownership himself. (24) 
to have rights 
a minister or 
no rights of 
So no ruler is above the law. Such ideas developed in the late 14th 
century and early 15th century, to deal with the problem of competing 
power in medieval society, would be of mere curiousity value had they 
not been taken up, in the dramatically changed political situation of 
16th century Europe, with its powerful nation states and religious 
conflicts. 
Gerson's conciliarism was first taken up by John Mair in the early 
16th century and then most dramatically by the Huguenots later in the 
same century. The Huguenots made a crucial move in the secularisation 
of the concepts of conciliar rights. As Skinner puts it, they moved 
from a purely religious theory of resistance, depending on 
the idea of a covenant to uphold the laws of God, to a 
genuinely political theory of revolution, based on the 
idea of a contract which gives rise to a moral right (and 
not merely a religious duty) to resist any ruler who fails 
in his corresponding obligation to pursue the welfare of 
the people in all his public acts. (25) 
The Huguenots then on this reading produced the first genuinely 
'political' revolution (Liberal revolution of a kind) in European 
history. Providing ideas that were quickly taken up in Holland and 
there moved to England and provided a crucial ideological background 
to the Revolutions of 1640. The reasons why they did this are 
instructive for us. Firstly they made up about one-fifth or more of 
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France's population ,too many to be easily crushed by the state, but, 
as they were rather dispersed from centres of power, not sufficient to 
make for a sensible Calvinist Revolution, of 'God's people rising to 
overthrow a Godless state' . 26 Hence, what Skinner describes as the 
need to engage in 
the vital ideological task of appealing not merely to 
their own followers but to the broadest possible spectrum 
of Catholic moderates and malcontents. (27) 
It was clearly force of circumstance that encouraged the Huguenots to 
make the move from relgious to that of political rights, which could 
serve the dual purpose of both defending the lawfulness of resisting, 
on the grounds of conscience, to their own Huguenot supporters, and at 
the same time, convince those of another faith of the constitutionnel 
basis of their action. Naturally such a move logically leads to 
religion being inessential, in regard to the state, and contributing 
powerfully to the secularisation of the state and political language. 
The key, therefore, to the emergence of the modern Liberal state lay 
in the collapse of definitive authority in the medieval world for 
complex reasons that cannot be addressed here. However as Skinner 
points out: 
as soon as the protagonists of the rival creeds showed 
that they were willing to fight each other to the death, 
it began to seem obvious to a number of politique 
theorists that, if there were to be any prospects of 
achieving civil peace, the powers of the state would have 
to be divorced from the duty to uphold any particular 
faith. (28) 
Clearly this view marked a tacit surrendering of any final possibility 
of achieving positive agreement on substantive issues of belief and an 
acceptance, albeit tacit, that belief is grounded in the ultimate 
sovereignty of the existential self. This marks the certain emergence 
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of Macintyre's criterialess self. For this settlement of religious 
disagreement in the 17th Century provides something of a model by 
which all irreconcilable beliefs have been dealt with, for once the 
state withdrew from the commitment to uphold 'true religion', it had 
implicitly accepted, in this area alone at first, the minimal, 
atomistic, alienated self, as the ul timaL e source of sovereignty. 
Hence, it could not hope to seek to embody a concept of the common 
good, that extended beyond mere negative liberties. 
III 
MANAGERIALISM, IDEOLOGY AND ARBITRARY WILL 
However, co-ordination and cohesion must be maintained, power is still 
to be organised and exercised. How is this to be achieved by a state 
whose subject is the minimal sovereign self of liberal theory. 
Macinytre gives us part of the answer in the emergence of bureaucracy 
and its embodiment in the form of the Manager. It is essential to 
grasp the relationship betweeen this particular notion of self, and 
the form of bureaucratic state which is its necessary complement. We 
will piece together this process throughout this chapter, but for the 
moment we must note Macintyre's understanding of the emergence of 
bureaucracy. He argues: 
It is when traditions begin to break down that modern 
bureaucratic organisations characteristically arise. 
Traditional societies have always had formal 
organizations, always had to justify themselves against 
appeals to the authority of the tradition which the 
organization served. (29) 
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These traditions can be various, from the Catholic Church to the 
disciplines of the natural sciences. The autonomous self can have no 
conscious tradition but it requires managing. The manager is generally 
seen in our culture as morally neutral and in virtue of the skills he 
possesses, can devise the most efficient means of achieving whatever 
end is proposed. He or she is the supreme example of the prioritising 
of external over internal goods. In appropriately Weberian terms, the 
high priest of formal as opposed to substantive rationality. 30 The 
upshot of this is that concepts of efficency and effectiveness become 
the ultimate source of their own legitimacy and become inseparable 
from a form of practice in which the achievement of ends means of 
necessity, the Manipulation of human beings into compliant patterns 
of behaviour. 31 But if the manager is neither morally neutral nor 
possessing special expertise, then once more i~ human history we are 
presented with ideology and spectacle, masking the exercise of power 
and domination. But is this, in reality, the case? 
Macintyre claims that managerialism is a moral fiction, because the 
kind of knowledge required to maintain it, does not exist, and that 
the claims of modern social science to possess such knowledge, are 
largely false. Managers, he claims, require something like factual 
law-like generalisations which would enable them to predict that if an 
event occurred, then some other event, of a specific kind, would 
result. In other words managers need causal explanations to control 
the social environment. Now we can break the claims of bureaucratic 
managerialism, down into two component parts. 
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l) That there exists a domain of morally neutral facts about which 
the manager is to be an expert. 
2) ThaL law-like yeneralisations and following appllcat10ns to 
particular cases, can be derived from the study of the domain of 
facts. 
It hardly needs pointing out that the great bulk of what we know as 
social science from the days of Comte, through Weber himself (though 
he sought probabilistic Laws), to the managerial sciences and 
Organisational studies. of our own day, have been concerned, with 
varient::; of the::;e two .celated issues. If bureaucratic power is an 
ideology (in the .sense we will discuss below) then social .science is 
what Marxist .social scientists and other radicals, like M. Foucault, 
have always said it was, a crucial accomplice in domination. 
But the question is, are these two points true? The nub of Macintyre'::; 
response is clear; it consists, as he puts it, in turning W.V. Quine's 
Wo.cd and Object on its head. 32 Quine argues that to provide a science 
of hwnan behaviour precise enough to have a law-like character, then 
it must be formulated in such a way as to eliminate all references to 
reasons, intentions and purposes, on the pa.ct of the human subjects 
involved. This is because knowledge of the beliefs of the subjects, 
and the massive complexity this would then introduce, due to the 
inherent contestability of beliefs, would not produce the kind of 
evidence which could be u::;ed to confinn or contest a law. Macinytre 
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agrees, but, because of his teleological Aristotelianisrn, believes a 
science of hwnan behaviour, which made no reference to beliefs or 
intentions would be not worth having (Macinytre's approach to this is 
examined in the final chapter). 
In essence no science of human behaviour can have the mechanistic 
quality that may be possible in the natural sciences. As is well known 
in the 19th Century a mechanistic science of human society was much 
sought after. However, as Macintyre argues, 
prophecies in this area may be translated not into real 
achievement, but into a social performance which disguises 
itself as such achievement. (33) 
We are jumping ahead a little here. For so far we have only noticed 
what a peculiar project, social science in a Quinian fonu would be. We 
have not seen, within its own tenns, whether it is achievable. 
The first element to note in answering this, is to remember that 
bureaucrats and managers want,above all else, from social predictions 
knowledge concerning the outcomes of alternative policies, and that 
social scientists are very poor at providing such knowledge. 
If we look at one of MacintYre's exillnples: Smythe and Ash, have shown 
that forecasts based on the most sophisticated economic theory for the 
OECD since 1967 have produced. less successful predictions than would 
have been arrived at by commonsense, or naive theories for forecasting 
rates of growth, by extrapolating the average rate of growth for the 
past ten years34 Humorous examples of the failures of almost all 
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social sciences to produce accurate predictions could be produced, 
much could be said about social science theory, concerning the 
inadequacies of positivism, and the necessarily recursive nature of 
social scientific knowledge, ie Lhat it can be read by its subjects. 
However, I shall confine myself to adumbrating four of the reasons put 
forward by Macintyre for supposing that the predicative law-like 
generalisation that bureaucratic power requires, are in fact 
impossible to achieve, now or ever in the future. 35 
l} Radical conceptual innovation in the natural sciences or other 
disciplines cannot be predicted, because in certain important ways 
making a prediction about what will be invented, has in some part 
contributed to inventing it already, at least as a concept, eg. it is 
suggested that at some point we will be able to grow back damaged 
lilllbs. This cannot claim the status of radical innovation, because it 
puts together two elements of existing knowledge. 1) Certain reptiles 
grow back limbs and this is connected with their genetic code; 2) The 
existence of genetic engineering, which may allow humans to do the 
same. It follows that any new discovery based on radically new 
concepts cannot be predicted, therefore neither can their 
consequences. 
2) This concerns the unpredictability of individual agents actions. 
Briefly put, this entails the simple notion that if I have not made up 
my mind between two different courses of action, I cannot predict 
which one I will take. Others will possibly to able to estimate what 
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my action may be but will not be able to predict their own future 
choices, which will in consequence. have there effects on other people's 
choices including wy own, and so on ad infinitum. As Macintyre points 
out, following Aqmnas o1rmiscience excludes making decisions: 
If God knows ever-ything that will occur, he confronts no 
as yet unmade decisions. He has a single will 
which, as Macintyre also points out, may give us some idea of what 
those who want to get rid of unpredictability are trying to do. 36 
3) A further source of unpredictability can be understood because of 
the efforts of game theorists, in the social sciences, to predict the 
future. All complex situations have an open and indeterminate 
character, ega general strike or a war have no limited set of factors 
which can be said to comprise 'the situation' , situations are never 
static and anything with an international dimension is probably 
urunappable. Further more Game theory is endlessly reflexive, "I 
predict your move, you predict mine. I predict you predict mine'; etc 
etc. 
4) Finally, we come to the role of pure contingency, also present in 
no.3. A crucial agent dies before getting to a meeting, or som~e is 
ill and can 1 t concentrate, such events can make all the difference. 
Incidentally, anyone who believes that awareness of contingency is 
alien to Marxism should read Trotsky 1 s in History of the Russian 
Revolution on the crucial role of Lenin, in making the Revolution. 
All this does not imply that generalisations about social life are 
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impossible or that a measure of predictability about life is 
iwpossible or that Social Science is worthless. It does imply that a 
well founded and thoroughly researched generalisation about the social 
WOL-ld, will have to live V-lith counter exai11ple.s to it, as it does no\·l. 
Also that the social science should not treat all predictive error as 
a failure. The absurdity of the grander claims of social sciences to 
be able to predict the world, are, I would suggest, one of the reasons 
for their relatively low social standing. Macintyre, in his paper 
Social Science Methodology as the Ideology of Bureaucratic Authority37 
elaborates his argwnent concerning the legi tirnising role of the social 
sciences for the bureaucratic manager. He argues that conventional 
social science methodology incorporates a very particular and limited 
view of the social world in its methodology, which in turn dovetails 
with the concepts and needs of managers and bureaucrats. He denotes 
five corresponding elem~ents between social scientists and bureaucrats. 
Firstly, he claims the world is seen as composed of discrete and 
identifiable variables. Secondly, that the researcher can label these 
in a neutral and non-contestible way. Thirdly, that the process of 
conceptualisation about the subject matter, is a matter of his 
scientific convenience rather than culturally detennined by social 
factors outside the discipline eg 'operational definitions'. Fourthly, 
the researcher constructs law-like or probabilistic generalisations 
from the data. And finally, fifthly, the kind of generalisation 
sought, provide some lever for producing reasonably predictable events 
in society, in other words, it provides those with access to this 
- 257 -
knowledge and resources, with certain types of manipulative ability. 
The response of many social scientists will be that this ideal type is 
really a straw man. Donald Levine, for exarnjJle, protests that few 
sociologi!::itS now want to produce universal, law-like generalisations 
but now rather concentrate on probabilistic ones38 . In fact Macintyre 
i::> well aware of this, but argues that restriction to probabilistic 
conclusions would not alter the nature of the methodological 
t . 39 en erpr1se. 
The key question is why do private and public bodies coJmlission 
research~ Certainly not principally out of intellectual intere.st. Is 
it really possible for a social scientist to honestly admit that none 
of their number have aspirations .surnmarisable in Macintyre's five 
points. What of those in organisational theory, or Business Studies, 
who, like Herbert Simon, the author of a classic text of that genre, 
A&ninistrative Behaviour, could write in the 1960 edition: 
We can p.cedict that in the world of 1985 we shall have 
psychological theories that are as successful as the 
theories we have in chemistry and biology. (40) 
But the affinity of this conception of social science with bureaucracy 
only becomes apparent when we see Macintyre's description of the 
bureaucrat. 
First the bureaucrat has to deal in discrete items which 
can be given an established and unique classification ... 
secondly the classificatory scheme which it gives rise to, 
which in an important sense creates those (discrete) 
variables, must itself be treated as non-contestable. The 
scheme has to be accepted independently of the evaluative 
viewpoint of particular individuals or social groups. 
Thirdly it is the bureaucrat who is free to create the 
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classificatory scheme; it is he, who, 
operationalizes his concepts so that 
handable by him in his way. (41) 
so to speak, 
items will be 
Obviously these correspond precisely to the form of the ideal typical, 
tlleLlJodological scheme he set out. In thernselves, they embody 
idealised self-picture of bureaucratic practice. 42 The same is true 
for the final two elements, because the bureaucrat must operate upon 
the classified materials, to produce desired consequences, so he or 
she must be equipped with sets of rules that correspond to causal 
generalisation. The operation of these rules then has definite 
effects, ie social manipulation. 
It is crucial to understand that Macintyre's argwnent is, in important 
ways, a culturalist one. He is not claiming that bureaucracy or social 
science directly corrrespond to these form, but that it is 
significantly important that they both exist together, in our culture, 
as modes of legitimation. The claim is that when authority is 
challenged, or answers are demanded for a problem, it is to these 
cultural forms that appeal is made. In this process conflict is made 
both marginal and manageable, technique and modes of manipulation 
triwnph over the claims of substantive value. 
It seems, then, we may well be in the presence of ideology, dependent, 
like all ideology is, on partial truths. There are built in features 
of uncertainty in human action, but can probabilistic approaches fill 
the expert gap? Macintyre argues not, because statistical correlations 
cannot alone provide a definite causal link between factors and that 
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the social science have inherent problems of repeatability of sets of 
. h l . 43 events, not present 1n t e natura sc1ences. 
It would seem that the law-like generalisations, the expert bureaucrat 
or manager requires, are not available. But what of the other prior 
condition, that is, that there exists a domain of morally neutral 
facts, _ which he (expert or bureaucrat) discovers out there, and 
then confront6 us with. For even if law-like generalisations are not 
possible, cannot·, at least, a manager or bureaucrat claim to be a 
master of the 1 facts 1 , and hence, the unavoidable nature of reality 
with which we must live. This is a peculiarly important claim within 
our culture, which takes us to the very heart of the claims made for 
the Liberal state, and those of citizenship, and sovereign 
subjectivity. We saw above, how in a critical ideological moment, 
religious conflict moved partially in the direction of a Liberal 
polity in the case of the Hugenots in France, setting an important 
ideological precedent. This marked the gradual withdrawal of the state 
from judgement about values and beliefs. This was partly the product 
of, and partly reinforced by intellectual and idealist tendencies, 
which moved in the direction of the separation of 'is' from 'ought', 
'facts 1 from 'values 1 or formal from substantive rationality. 
Crucially for Macintyre, in the philosophical and scientific rejection 
of Aristotle (see Chapter 2 above for some implication for our 
reception of Marxism now on this basis) and the consequent giving up 
of any notion of ; man-as-he-could-be-if-he- realised-his-telos' in 
favour something like 1 untutored-hwnan-nature- as-it-is 1 • 44 In the 
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first context ethics allows a human being to pass from where they are, 
to where it is in their nature to go. In the second, one is left with 
basic human nature on one hand, and a system of ethics on the other, 
which seem radically incompatible with one another, with no linking 
concept of necessarily guided development to an end. With the 
consequence that ever since, moral conservatives like Kant have 
advocated duty in ethics, whilst radicals like D.H. Lawrence have 
emphasised release. 
So too, in the social and political realm, it has been common now for 
several centuries to deny the possibility of deriving an 'ought' from 
an 'is• 45 hence the strong emphasis placed on purely negative 
liberties in that tradition. Also the strong imperative to distinguish 
a distinct domain of empirically knowable entities uncontaminated by 
'spurious' metaphysical assumptions like teleology. The implications 
of this radical distinction between the domains of Values and Facts 
are quite awesome when transferred onto the analysis of social 
relations. For once normative value judgement have been thoroughly 
severed (a process that historically has taken a good deal of time to 
work through, in western societies46 ) from the binding externalities 
of both nature and social relations, so becoming the property then of 
the sovereign liberal subject's choice. Then liberal theory becomes 
false, even on its own terms: this is because sovereign subjects 
must be free to choose, which they cannot all be: society 
must cohere, social relations continue, cohesion be achieved. It 
therefore follows that those liberal subjects who manage or engineer 
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social reality, have little choice but to treat others in the manner 
of a Quinian social !Science program. This is because intentionality 
and subjectivity are far too complex and lack the durability to 
enable them to be specified in a Jnanner that might allow, other things 
being equal, accurate prediction. Macintyre explains: 
... the concept of a state of belief or enjoyment or fear 
involves too many contestable and doubtful cases to 
furnish the kind of evidence we need to confinn or 
disconfirm claims to have discovered a law. (47) 
What seems to happen when this is tried, is that subjectivity is 
frozen into the tabulated fonns of Public Opinion Polls or market 
research findings, which transpose consciousness into one more set of 
objective disconnected social facts to be accounted for in the process 
of manipulation, in line with the manager's subjective valuation of 
necessity. 
Macintyre notes, utilising Marx's Third Thesis on Feuerbach: 
What Marx understood was that such an agent ( ie ,,1anager) 
is forced to regard his own actions quite differently from 
the behaviour of those whom he is manipulating . . . he 
stands at least for the moment as a chemist does to 
samples of potassium chloride and sodium nitrate . . . but 
(in the process of the) . . . changes the technologist of 
human behaviour brings about, (he) must see e.xemplified 
not only laws which govern such changes, but the 
imprinting of his own will on nature or society. (48) 
Nichols and Beynon found this approach permeating manager~ thinking, 
in that most sophisticated of 'managerial' industries; chemicals: 
One manager, pointed to a maintenance marke~ board. 'Pity 
we haven't got one for labour. You know, with a column 
here to tell you which ones are defective, one for those 
completely u/s, one for replacement ... for the most part 
this view of workers as things - as people - objects, to 
be worked on - takes more subtle forms. But that manager 
think like this is not surprising, in view of these men's 
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technical training and the job they are paid to do, which 
involves thinking in terms of 'labour costs' and treating 
the labour-power of other men as a commodity. (49) 
This seems to support the view that liberal capitalist societies are 
as Marx noticed (above all in the Grundrisse), societies of personal 
independence based on objective dependence. In this sense they are not 
'societies' in a traditional sense at all. Social coordination must 
take the form of either 'legitimate' coercion in the name of rational 
necessity or the manipulation of other apparently 'independent' wills, 
in accordance with social 'need' or 'utility', as expertly as 
possible, by those with knowledge, competence, and above all else, 
power. 
But as we have seen, such competence does not in any strong sense, (ie 
in the degree to necessary to legitimise the grand claims daily made) 
exist. It therefore follows that much of what passes as objectively 
grounded claims by managers and experts, are unreal performances which 
legitimise the use of power. 
It is at this point that we must develop Macintyre's account of 
bureaucratic power. This involves the question of the concept of 
ideology and of capitalism itself. Macintyre agrees that all his talk 
of masks and theoretical disguise is deeply connected with Marx's 
t o f "d 1 50 concep 10n o 1 eo ogy: 
Yet of course part of the conception of ideology of which 
Marx is the ancestral begetter does indeed underlie my 
central thesis about morality. If moral utterance is put 
to the service of arbitrary will it is someone's arbitrary 
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will, and the question of whose will it is, is obviously 
of both moral and political importance. (51) 
He goes on to say, that it is not his task, to answer this question. 
This seems to be rather disappointing, though clearly connected with 
his disavowal of politics especially Marxist politics, but also with 
h . . h I h d b . b . I 52 1s v1ew t at w at we are oppresse y 1s not power, ut Hnpotence 
because noone has the knowledge of a law-like kind to confer that kind 
of real authority, claimed by managerialisrn. There is important truth 
in this which explains, in part, why totalitarian societies like 
Hitler 1 s Germany and Stalin 1 s Russia are so inefficient, as well as 
why anything like total control by management in a capitalist society, 
is impossible. 53 But Macintyre does concede that he has no intention 
of denying that: 
the activities of purported experts have real effects and 
that we do not suffer from those effects and suffer 
gravely. (54) 
He is principally concerned to expose a masquerade of authority, but 
looking at the effects of that apparent authority is clearly of equal 
importance. 
However, my disappointment remains for several reasons. Firstly, the 
notion Macintyre presents of the absence of any real control over 
capitalist society, including that of capitalists, is in fac~ central 
to Marxism. No one does, or can, control capitalism. The capital 
accwnulation process controls capitalists, as well as workers, hence 
the understanding that they are alienated too. But secondly, and more 
importantly in this context, is the fact that the whole drift of his 
analysis points towards a view, as I have shown, that our current 
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conceptions are partly due to our market based capitalist culture. 
Indeed, we can echo Frederic Jameson's claim for After Virtue 
that the first section of this book offers the most 
probing and devastating analysis of the reification of 
moral categories under capital, which we possess. (55) 
We have outlined in Chapter Three Macintyre's relationship with the 
narrative of The Great Transformation, to a capitalist society, 
The simple truth is that a crucial aspect of that transition is the 
rise of a managerial capitalism, with both ideational or ideological 
and material aspects. For on Macintyre's own account, there seems no 
reason to deny that in large part, the interests that lie behind the 
exercise of 'arbitrary will' are those of capital. At least as 
conceptualised in a sophisticated manner as, say, for example, by 
Claus Offe. 56 
This makes it all the sadder that Macintyre, in his critique of 
managerialism has not chosen to deploy some of the important recent 
work on the origins of bureaucratic managerial power by such writers 
as Marglin, Pollard, Braverman. 57 (This seems to rather strengthen 
some of the suspicions voiced by Peter Sedgwick concerning Macintyre's 
self-imposed isolation from supporting intellectual positions in which 
he might find some degree of fellowship. 58 ) For what these writers 
stress in a variety of ways, and with a variety of emphasis, is the 
emergence of a new type of control and authority, which is no longer 
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decked out in the traditional forms and images, of a hierarchical 
social order, and without the p:JWers of compulsion that can be 
exercised over unfree labour. The matter is complex, but it seems from 
work like i'icuglin' s anu Pollard's, that the emergence of a generalised 
commodity based economy, p:Jsed specific problems for capitalists in 
relation to one special commodity, namely labour. The fluctuations of 
the market, gave the commodity producers at certain phases of the 
economic cycle, a degree of control and leverage, vis a vis the 
capitalist, especially over the rate and efficiency of production. 59 
The factory emerges as a key institutional embodiment of what Giddens 
describes as the transformation of allocati ve (rights of ownership) 
into authority relations (rights of control) via what is in essence, 
the dual nature of the worker as both a human being, and a 
od . 60 h f . . f d' d . h 1 bo comm 1ty. T e trans ormat1on 1s, o course, me 1ate v1a t e a ur 
) 
contract, which makes a certain period of the workers time the 
property of the employer, to be done with, more or less, as the 
employer thinks fit. The modern division of labour meant, however, 
more detailed control than ever before and it is this, of course, that 
provides the background to the question of scientific management. 
However, unlike ~- most Marxist writer:=; on the labour process and 
radical analyst of the emergence of surveillence and the disciplinary 
society like Foucault, my concern is not to emphasise the potency and 
effectiveness of such things, but rather their role as an ideology and 
masquerade of power. In this instance, it is interesting to parallel 
the above analysis by Macintyre of the 'performance' of managerialism; 
with a Marxist critic of Braverman, Michael Burawoy61 who argues that 
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what is absolutely crucial about capitalism, at least at a higher 
industrial phase of technique where relative and absolute surplus 
value are equally co-present, is that the capital-labour relation 
obscures surplu::; vctlue not only from the worker, but also from the 
manager. 
Burawoy argues that compared with feudalism, where the dues owed by 
peasants to their feudal lords made exploitation clear and open; 
capitalist relations allow no clear distinctions for either workers or 
capitalists, between the production of value and surplus-value. The 
struggle over the surplus between Capital and Labour is not over a 
tangible entity, visible to all. Profits are the product of complex 
procedures and are not normally constituted until well after the 
process of production has taken place. The wo.ckers1 share of total 
value is the result of struggle, material ideological and political. 
But capital's securing of the necessary surplus for capital 
accumulation to continue, is no clearer. This is because value depends 
not only on production, but also on realisation on the market -
frequently an uncertain arena. Therefore how much capital can concede 
to Labour is almost always a question that is genuinely uncertain; 
company 'figures', 'projected profits' are therefore part of the class 
struggle. This means that the corning to consciousness of the surplus 
is as much a function of ideological and political factors as of 
purely economic ones. It follows from this, that scientific management 
had an extremely important ideological role, in that 
crucial aspect of domination under advanced capital ism, 
namely the appearance of ideology in the guise of 
science. ( 62) 
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As a part of the process of obscuring and securing the surplus for 
capital. How does this process work? 
t)Urawoy' s major contentior1 1::s that inLe.re.st.<;;, lE' class interests, are 
not given 1 they are shaped by ideological and political under-
standings. This means: 
that capitalist control, even under the most coercive 
technology still rests on its ideological structure that 
frames and organises 'our lived relationship to the world' 
and thereby constitutes our interests. (63) 
Drawing on William Baldamus' s work Efficiency and Effort, Burawoy 
points to the way workers construct compensatory strategies as means 
of coming to terms with unpleasant or monotonous forms of work, or as 
he significantly puts it, 'work realities•. 64 
These strategies, as Burawoy points out, normally take the form of 
games, and are present in almost all work environment, as some element 
of psychological compensation, but also as a means of resisting 
management demands. However, Burawoy develops this point in important 
ways, he suggests: 
that participation in games has the effect of concealing 
relations of production, at the same time as co-ordinating 
the interests of workers and management. (65) 
In this context a 'game' consists of a set of rules with a range of 
possible outcomes, and a preferential ordering of these outcomes. The 
appeal of the gan~ is that it is both controlled, by the workers, yet 
uncertain in outcome. They provide the appearance of control and the 
exercise of reason and skill. In reality, of course, they have a 
marginal impact on the work environment, which generally sets severe 
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limits on what can be done. But 
the ideological effect of the game is to take 'extraneous' 
conditions (like having to come to work) as unchangeable 
and unchanging, together with a compensatory emphasis on 
the little choice and uncertainty offered in the work 
context. Thus the game becomes an ideological mechanism 
through which necessity is presented as freedom. (66) 
Burawoy argues that for the most part, shop managers aid and abet 
these games especially those connected with output. The preservation 
of these work games is one of the ways. the interests of workers and 
managers are co-ordinated, day to day adaptions of workers create 
their own ideological effects, it is this reality that managers help 
to shape and utilise, in moulding the opaque social relations of 
capitalism. 
Manager1al ideologies can also be part of the process of shaping the 
concepts of interest, and co-ordination, it is in this light, that 
Taylorism should be seen. In the US it may have had paradoxical 
effects, in making it more difficult to secure the surplus through 
intensifying control and sharpening class antagonism, £ather than 
co-ordinating interest. However, it was, despite this, incorporated 
into the self image of management. 67 Burawoy shows, by drawing on c.s. 
Maiers work, 68 that scientific management was taken up, and played a 
crucial role in the 1920s and 1930s, in those European countries 
facing political crisis. Both Right and Left took up the approach, 
Fascists in Italy, the new soviet leadership, Conservatives in Germany 
and even the IWW in the us. Although clearly all very different from 
one another, they all, as Burawoy puts it: 
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shared in the attempt to transcend immediate political 
institutions by mobilising scientism in the projection of 
a utopian vision of a harmonious society where 'politics' 
becomes superfluous. (69) 
This is the recurring theme of managerial ideologies, the offer of 
pure technique, neutral and value free. The environment of Macintyre 
emotivist self, because of its obliteration of the distinction of 
power and authority, manipulation and non-manipulation. It is in some 
versions of the Human Relations school of management, that this 
process reaches a peak, especially in the blurring of authority. James 
J. Cribbin of the American Management Association can write of what he 
calls the 'collaborator manager' -
He does not hesitate to be forceful when circumstances 
require, but he does not resort to directi veness as a 
matter of course. He prizes self discipline and 
constructive suggestion, over submissive conformity. 
Viewing authority as based on competence rather than 
position. This leader interacts with his followers in a 
process of mutual influence. As a team builder he realises 
that his objective is to help employees satisfy some of 
their needs, while achieving the goals of the group and 
the firm communication is free flowing, constructive and 
directed to the purposes for which the group exists. 
Finally, if possible, conflict is resolved by the 
synthesis of diverse views. (70) 
Richard Sennett tells us that this is a common view, held by those 
involved in American management training. He points out that just 
because the language is vacuous, does not mean it does not have real 
effects. Like Macintyre, he views these psychological concepts as 
means of human manipulation 
the point is not simply for the 
her self, but for the employee 
productive in the process. 
manipulation can be subtle. (71) 
employee to develop him or 
to become more loyal and 
And in practice the 
Theo Nichols has shown how 'Human Relations' approaches, encouraging 
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'participation' , can carry it through for complex reasons. It is 
partly done, because of a feeling that workers are under motivated. He 
reminds us that even F.W. Taylor thought a 'mental revolution' among 
72 
workers, a pre-condition for maximum efficiency in factory work. But 
Nichols, like Sennett, sees little sign of this happening. Sennett 
claims: 
In the midst of tight 
prosperous ones, what 
unmotivated resignation 
rise. (73) 
economic periods as well as 
industrial sociologists call 
have been steadily on the 
Nichols notes that ChemCo worker~ expectations of work are low. 
Accepting they are workers they do not expect their work 
to be satisfying and they have entered into a grudging 
bargain with their employer. Part of just one more 
generation of working class men and women, well used to 
being denied meaning and control over their lives, like 
industrial whores, they do enough, to get enough. 'It's a 
job', they say. This, is the real problem ChemCo managers 
face. (74) --
Macintyre argues that the problem is located in the forging of 
concepts of work and interest, upon which bureaucratic capitalism 
depends, ie in the wider context of Burawoy's 'game' situation. 
Bureaucratic authority, as simple and effective power, is dependent on 
the apparent merging of interests, ie of a particular conception of 
work and the institutions within which it is carried out, both public 
and private. He claims that: 
the dominant way of understanding such work under 
capitalism - and not only in America - is that whereby 
workers, management and investors all share in the 
distribution of what is jointly earned. In order to get as 
much as possible, what matters is that as much as possible 
is produced. (75) 
So this means all three groups have a common intet-est to which their 
particular interests ought to be subordinated. 
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This is, of course, the dominant view within all major political 
parties in Britain and America. But the basis of it is the view, as 
Macintyre notes, that: 
men are primarily consmners and they work in order to 
consume. ( 76) 
This can be seen as a quite rational and a viable way of concep-
tualising interests in Burawoy's terms. 
Central to Macintyre's case, is the view that this way of concep-
tualising work, is also much at home in public bureaucracies. 
Inhabiting as they do a society where external goods have triumphed 
over internal ones. 
But, Macintyre insists, there are other equally rational ways of 
viewing work, in terms of seeing 
what is essentially human is rational activity and 
consumption exists to serve activity and not to be served 
by it. (77) 
When work serves consumption then it is bound in some degree to be 
uninteresting and sapping of motivation, hence the endemic problem of 
motivation in well ordered and successful areas of capitalism. On the 
first view my fundamental interest as a member of one group, is how 
large a share of the product I consume. But on the second view I can 
have no fundamental stake in a social order based on such motivations. 
If the first view prevails, then conflicts over interest will be 
local, although sharp and real, but ultimately capable of containment 
by able management, mobilising common concepts of interest. These 
conflicts would be distributional in nature, whether over power, 
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resources or money. But on the second view conflicts would be central 
and endemic. Macintyre claims that the 
managing and owning class, do not have to fight this 
particular battle over interest and privileges; as 
fiercely as they might ... because they have for the most 
part won the battle over how interest and privilege are to 
be conceptualised and understood. (78) 
In this view Macintyre is supported by recent comparative studies by 
79 d h 80 . . h d h k d Duncan Gallie an Scott Las , on Br1t1s an Frenc wor ers an 
American and French workers. These works reveal the importance of 
ideological concepts, and traditions embodied, of course, in 
organisational forms, in maintaining political radicalism and 
alternative conceptions of work. As Gallie puts it: 
the experience of work, even in an authoritarian setting, 
was not sufficient to account for the translation of class 
resentment into specifically political terms. Rather the 
extent to which workers believed that the existing 
structure of society could be remoulded through political 
action depended on their exposure over time to radical 
party ideologies. (81) 
Similarly Lash claims: 
that worker militancy is not primarily determinded by 
objective variables, but by political parties and trade 
unions as agents of socialisation. (82) 
It would seem that the opaque quality of social relations under market 
capitalism, compared- say with feudalism, does indeed make for a 
culture in which emotivism is at hane. In which power is legitimate, 
because of its effectiveness in achieving ends that are 
organizationally given. If values and ends are private judgements, 
then it is those values and ends implicitly institutionalised in the 
market that will command power. It is to the institutionalised form of 
that power, as it changed into the state, that we now turn. 
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IV 
THE COMING OF 'THE STATE' 
I have shown in the above, the deeply problematic basis of modern 
authority, and how Macintyre's critique of this can be supplemented 
and deepened by utilising some aspects of contemporary Marxism. I now 
wish to continue this process by reconnecting the discussion with the 
development of the Liberal state, that we began with, by utilising 
some important retrieval work done by Derek Sayer, on the early 
Marx, 83 showing that Marx is far from exhausted as a theorist of 
modernity. Sayer's work reveals how Marx's understanding of the 
concept of the state, can be usefully employed to supplement 
Macintyre's views, in a way which, via our case study, illuminates the 
concept of 'bureaucratic individualism'. 
We traced briefly at the beginning of the chapter a crucial early 
moment in the secularisation of the state, (a process we will see 
repeated, in a formally similar way, in the case of English radicalism 
in the mid-nineteenth century) . This should not be dismissed by 
Marxists as being of no importance, for Marx clearly saw that feudal-
ism was structured by religion as ideology, where 'Catholicism played 
the chief part' . 84 We noted how Skinner saw this as crucial for the 
emergence of the liberal state. It is interesting to compare this with 
Marx's view of the state, that Sayer detects in The German Ideology, 
. h . h 1 h I · · 1 · 85 In t e Importance e p aces on t e state ci VI society couple. In 
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what amounts now to almost conventional fashion, Sayer shows the inter 
relationship of state and civil society. Civil society being the arena 
of personal and private interests, whilst the state is 'the locus of 
general, public, universal concerns' . 86 Marx is quite explicit in The 
German Ideology: 
The tenn 'civil society' emerged in the 18th century when 
property relations had already extricated themselves from 
the ancient and medieval community. Civil society as such 
develops only with the bourgeoisie. (87) 
So much is well known, but Sayer draws out the logical corollary of 
this, namely that civil society emerges with the bourgeoisie, so then 
in a sense, so must the state. This point is of potentially great 
importance for Sayer says: 
... it implies that the state is emphatically a historical 
category, in other words the concept is not a synonym for 
any and all forms of government (or ways in which ruling 
classes rule) but describes a definite and historically 
delimited social form; the social form, specifically of 
bourgeois class rule. (88) 
It is certain that Marx understood the matter is this way from a very 
early stage for in 1843 he was able to write: 
The abstraction of the state as such belongs only to 
modern times, because the abstraction of private life 
belongs only to modern times. The abstraction of the 
political state is a modern product. (89) 
It is surely correct to see this move in theoretical understanding as 
quite crucially important, for it breaks with a whole tradition of 
Marxist understanding, which despite its vaunted commitment to history 
has, in fact, seen the state as an eternal entity short of full 
90 
corranunism, and completely failed to historicise the concept. The 
word itself, as a political legal category not making sense outside 
the context of post-reformation Europe. But most important of all it 
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allows us to begin to grasp what is, both politically and culturally, 
specific about the modern state. 
It is valuable for my purposes is to tackle the problem of class! 
individuality and the state. Particularly, how the state can be both 
directly experienced as an instrument of domination and force, but 
also experienced as a source of meaning and identity. We have seen how 
the emergence of the modern state may be objectively grounded, in the 
emergence of the capitalist division of labour and market 
relationships that ensue, and subjectively in the opaqueness of social 
reality, with the unsettleable disputes between different, moral, 
political, economic and religious perspectives. As concepts of 
private, and public, became central means of organising society, the 
state becomes in important ways both greater, and lesser, than 
previous historically given forms of government. It becomes the 
central arena of general, public concerns, it becomes in this 
alienated world an 'illusory' or substitute community91 which enacts 
the general will through the abstract process of law. This process has 
the simultaneous effect of de-politicising civil society, partly 
because an individual's particular circumstances are no longer the 
bearers of different political and legal statuses, but also because 
they nominally encounter their own will, enacted through formal law as 
the general will, which acts upon them. This does not mean that there 
is no politics in civil society, merely that politics is only one's 
personal opinion until translated through the formal procedures of 
voting, parties, etc once more into an aspect of the general will. 
- 276 -
Politics then becomes a specialised activity, 92 an aspect of the 
division of labour in society. 
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li ves have been torn from them, in Alan Wolfe has called 'the 
expropriation of people's sense of community' 93 via the creation of a 
distinct civil society. However, this separation of the 'individual' 
from the bonds of society is only apparent, for this process 
underpinned by the increasing division of labour and market relations 
which generates the separation of economic and political life, also 
develops deeper levels of interdependence, as we become more separate 
in consciousness, so we become more dependent in reality: here is the 
heart of our alienated condition. We fail to recognise, because we 
fail to experience, our mutual relationships, so treating each other 
instrumentally, or as fonns of external necessity. The production of 
life, as we have noted, becomes opaque, out of anyone's personal 
control, life appears to be governed by chance more than ever before, 
in our imaginations, we as individuals, as Marx put it: 
seem freer under the domination of the bourgeoisie than 
before, because (the) conditions of life seem 
accidental, in reality, of course, they are less free 
because they are more subjected to the violence of 
things. ( 94) 
The imposition of external necessity or 'the violence of things' will 
be of special importance as we analyse an example of social conflict 
in 19th century Britain. As people observe others as 'means to ends' 
or the obstacle to the realisation of private wishes, so the state inay 
be the instrument, under its managers both old and new, by which 
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'necessity' i1nposes itself on those recalcitrant enough to ignore it. 
In essence then the post-feudal, materially and morally, fragmented 
capitalist classes, were forced to constitute themselves as Sayer puts 
it: 
... as 'we', as a moral person, as the state, in order to 
safeguard their common interests as much because of as 
despite their general fissiparousness as a class. In this 
sense the state is central to bours~ society, one of its 
conditions of possibility. (95) 
In other words it is forced to delegate to specialised bureaucracies 
some of its power. At the early stage of capitalist industrialisation 
this is most crucial to create and maintain the conditions for capital 
accumulation, 96 it is the paradox of bourg~society that its common 
interests as a class reside in its ability to continue to compete as 
distinct separate individuals. Law creates the framework of individual 
interactions and is the source from Smith to Hayek of the liberal 
tradition of circumscribing the role of the state, to creating the 
'free market' whilst not interfering in it. As Sayer puts it the key 
liberal principles for Marx are that they 
are formal, universal and abstract, in that their 
reference point is to the individual as such, irrespective 
of the differences in real individuals' material or social 
circumstances. For Marx they suppose precisely the 
'isolated individual' of specifically bourgeois 
society. ( 97) 
At this point it becomes crucial to emphasise the subjective and 
cultural aspect, so often elided in conventional Marxist accounts. To 
emphasise that Marx did talk of the state as an 'illusory' or 
substitu~comnunity, for without this dimension much of modern class 
politics becomes obscured. It is around the apparently contradictory 
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nature of the capitalist state as both, formal, universal, and 
abstract, as well as simultaneously that which is 
~t' v> t;tv,·) 
for conununal purpose, bt~ particular attention 
invested as a space 
ol'-
illustraLive case ~tudy. 
will focus ~,.in the 
I 
Before turning directly to the case study it will be useful for my 
account to explore a little further the cultural and ideological 
significance of the emergence of the liberal state. How does this 
'illusory community' that is the state, operate upon, or connect with 
its individuated citizens~ We have noted what a pervasive role 
'chance' and 'the violence of things' plays in these societies, yet as 
we have seen, some element of the notion of a moral community survives, 
of necessity embodied in the state. For reasons to be discussed in 
the final chapter, it seems unlikely that we can ever entirely ignore 
question of interpretation and purpose. Indeed, in the early stages of 
capitalist development, the state or rather the statesman, became the 
focus of a rejuvinated Republican philosophy, which attempted to limit 
the expanding and enveloping capitalist market, and the spiralling 
socially defined needs. 98 A good deal of this tradition of criticism 
survives in the interesting and important work of William Connolly, 
who contributes to our understanding of the basis of the relationship 
of the citizens to the state even in the corroded environment of late 
capitalism. The nub of the argument can be understood by recalling how 
'external necessity' or 'chance' etc limits the reality of individual 
freedom, despite our powerful self images as free citizens able to 
make our own choices and decisions. How does this contradiction 
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resolve itself? 
Connolly answers this problem by placing considerable weight on the 
ratinn~l element in feel ourselves to be free, he 
argues, if the kind of roles we play in social life, converge with 
meanings and purposes we adopt by reflection. He argues that: 
We can see ourselves as free, free as a people, if the 
central institution of electoral accountability and public 
action is widely believed to have sufficient resources to 
act with effectiveness in the pursuit of collective ends. 
The internal connection between my sense of individual 
freedom and my belief that the state is the locus of 
effective collective action is this: If I find certain 
role requirements to be both conventional and 
unjustifiably restrictive, if I can neither reconstitute 
them by myself nor adapt others, my freedom is still 
potentially intact if we can collectively reconstitute 
them should others come to agree with my assessment. (99) 
In other words, an unskilled worker on the receiving end of an 
uncertain and capricious labour market, is likely to have his or her 
self image as a free self determining citizen, seriously eroded by 
their life experience of work and consequent lack of access to 
resources and the means of control over their own life patterns. 
However, their self image might remain intact if they feel they can 
act collectively, and this tends to mean in some important 
circumstances, (not all, as the existence of bodies like Trade Unions 
indicates) via the state, as an electorally constituted entity. They 
can then reconstitute their social relations or, and, it is a 
politically important addition, act together via the state for other 
collective or 'national' purposes. As Connolly puts it: 
this is the basis - the rational basis 
bond between citizens and the 
patriotism. (100) 
of that emotional 
state, we call 
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The cultural and political significance of a desire, often felt most 
acutely by those with least material well being, for retaining some 
identification with a wider social order, should not be underplayed. 
The promises that this process holds out to people au~ undoubtedly, 
continuously frustrated. This is because, as we have noted, the modern 
conception of the state, arrives with capitalism and the bourgeoisie. 
This state cannot freely reconstitute its social relations, in an 
uninhibited way without undermining the conditions of its own 
. 
101 h. . l . b "l" th t f th t t . th ex1stence. T 1S cruc1a 1na 1 1ty on e par o e s a e, 1s e 
breeding ground for cynicism and disenchantment about the whole 
nature of politics, to the extent that can be readily seen in the use 
of the 'politics' as a synonym for self interested, corrupt and 
dishonest practices, in any organisation. This leads to the erosion of 
the citizens self image of freedom, whilst not destroying it 
altogether, for the state is still the locus for crucial co-ordinating 
and communal functions, eg welfare provisions and defence. 
In this situation, the pathologies of patriotism and collective 
national endeavour, in terms of nationalistic wars and ferocious 
internal repression, against those who seem to threaten the national 
common good, become explicable in terms of the frustrated promise held 
out by the 'illusory community' of the liberal state. 
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'RADICAL' OLDHAM 
\tie will now examine through the prism of a particular local case 
study, the process by which 'the state', as we have defined it in the 
last section, emerged. That is the process at the end of which, we are 
left with a state, which is both a formal, universal and abstract 
bureaucracy, and yet, the ill designed receptacle of the hopes of 
'illusory community'. The state is caught in the contradictory demands 
of a capitalist society in which market based external goods, have won 
priority, but with ineradicable traces of notions of purposes, beliefs 
and meanings, still available even if marginal, as questions to pose 
to the state. 
Although this is clearly not an exhaustive account of the emergence of 
such a 'state' . The case study will allow us to see in a concrete 
setting, the potency and consequences of the bureaucratic form, as the 
neutraliser and manager of conflict. The case study concerns a 19th 
century northern English industrial town in which class conflict and 
radical struggles generated a crisis of authority for the ruling class 
and the government, in the period from 1812 to 1847. 
Oldham is an old industrial town a few miles to the north of 
Hanchester. It is important since in both economic and political terms 
it provides a clear picture of the dramatic changes that affected 
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English workers in this period. And of the political and economic 
responses that working class pressure produced from the bourgeois 
class and the state. Oldham has been the subject of a major piece of 
historical research in John Foster's Class Struggle and the IndusLrial 
R 1 . 102 d . . h. h d b 1 103 evo ut1on an 1t 1s t 1s account t at I raw on e ow. 
Oldham lay at the centre of that area of Britain to the west and north 
of the Pennines which are deeply associated with the heart of the 
Industrial Revolution, having been the centre of the cotton industry. 
Politically, for the period from the 1790s to 1848 it had a more or 
less continuous history of radical activity. The United Englishmen had 
a popular base in the 1800s and according to Foster: 
during the guerilla campaign of 1812 it was the scene of a 
two-day battle between armed workers and troops. (104) 
During the second quarter of the 19th century the town was under the 
control of sections of the organised working class. The network of 
organisations that made up local government in this period, were 
generally subordinated to working class interests. Radical MPs like 
William Cobbett were elected to Parliament. The new poor law was not 
enforced for just over a decade. This situation only changed in the 
late 1840s in a process that Foster terms 'liberalisation', a complex 
matter to which we shall return. 
Oldham provides us with a particularly graphic example of the real and 
sharp consequences of a society that has made the transition to a 
capitalist market, as its principal social mechanism. From 1790 to the 
1830s the British state began, in a fairly through going manner to 
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separate the economy from its traditional embeddedness in society. 
Most economic controls were dismantled after 1815; trading 
restrictions went, taxes on consumer goods were reduced, the authority 
of local justices of t-.he peCl_ce to fix wage rates was removed and this 
was left to the market place. Monetary and banking policy was 
substantially revised with the restrictions on transactions in money 
and shares virtually eliminated. The Elizabethan law requiring 
craftsmen to serve seven years as an apprentice before they could 
practise trade, was repea~d in the Statute of Apprentices in 1814 -
many trades petitioned against it, but the interests of the hirers of 
labour won out and craftsmen were thence exposed to the vagueries of 
105 the open market. 
Within the context of these explicit attempts to re-fashion the social 
order, we can also, for the first time, see the full consequences of a 
working capitalist system on the new working class itself. From 1750 
to 1850, Oldham's main industry was weaving and cot ton-spinning -
replaced in predominance from the middle of century by machine 
building and engineering. From 1790 to 1850, the cotton industry 
underwent two periods of severe crisis. The first lasted from the 
middle of the 1790s to 1820. The growth of continental competition in 
the finished goods market - broke the prosperity of the merchant 
houses and placed the whole weaving sectors under threat. Although 
machine spinning enjoyed continual growth. Yet despite technological 
changes, handloom weaving remained by far the largest employer in 
Oldham, right into the 1820s. The response of the employers was wage 
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cutting and unemployment. Pressure on wages threw the whole 
traditional forms of authority and control into crisis. These forms 
had managed to absorb the conflicts and riots over rising food prices, 
1n part, because those in authorit-y regarded the merchanL ct:s somewhat 
1n the wrong, and hence shared some of the norms and values of those 
l. n b 11 · 106 re e 1on. 
However, the second crisis that lasted from 1830 to 1847, was the 
result of a structural imbalance between the mechanised spinning and 
unmechanised weaving sectors. This was the more serious of the two. It 
seems that by the turn of the 18th century European cotton producers 
were using English machine-spun yarn, so pushing England from her 
traditional markets for woven cloth. This in effect forced the largest 
sector of the English working class into competition with workers in 
Europe, who were generally more cheaply fed. This meant that for 
nearly two decades employers were attempting to push down living 
standards. 
Foster's work on Oldham is most famous for its account of the 
development of class consciousness. Foster sets this out by linking it 
explicitly to the two stages of crisis. The first crisis he argues 
produces a 'special form of trade union consciousness', which in the 
process of struggling against the pressure on living standards, 
resulted in the removable of bourgeois political control from the 
town, and fought off attempts by the state to reimpose control. The 
second crisis, Foster argues, went on to produce a mass revolutionary 
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class consciousness, and was explicitly anti-capitalist. This typology 
has been criticised by Stedman Jones: 
But working-class political control of the town was 
continuous from the 1810s to the 1840s. No sharp break 
appear: In itself, this argument is as compatible with a 
thesis of qualitative growth as it is with that of a 
qualitative leap. (107) 
Critical acclaim and criticism for this book, of which there has been 
a good deal, have generally concentrated on these questions of class 
consciousness and especially Foster's unusual use of the concept of 
'labour aristocracy•. 108 In this process other elements, in what is a 
complex book, tend to get ignored. I have, therefore, extracted and 
re-interpreted elements of Foster's work, highlighting the changing 
nature of the state form in its relationship with class politics. 
Drawing out the material and ideological consequences for the working 
class of the emerging bureaucratisation of the state. 
However, the question of social conflict is nonetheless crucial. 
Clearly whatever the mechanisms of consciousness involved, there can 
be no doubt that industrial conflict was at the heart of the social 
conflicts in Oldham,as Foster puts it: 
within only a decade of building their first factories 
Oldham's employers had been forced to put on army uniform 
and u~e their sabres. (109) 
Traditional forms were under pressure and indeed broke down 
principally because the new society of the late 1790s and 1800s was 
forced, as we have seen, to treat labour as just another commoditY.-
This in turn produced not only hardship but also outrage in a 
population immersed in the forms and ideas of a prior social order, 
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which provided the criteria of criticism and much of the motive of 
mobilisation against the new. 
Until 1824 trade union organisation was in itself illegal, and even 
after the repeal of the Combination Acts in 1825, many union practices 
such as attempts to enforce closed shops, apprenticeship schemes, etc 
remained offences at common law. 
Naturally this required the ability to organise effectively within the 
community, to be able to 'frame rules affix penalites, and inflict 
punishments•. 110 It seems most likely, though perhaps insufficiently 
stressed by Foster, that what made organisation possible within the 
local community, were pre-existing traditions and cultural practices 
from the 18th century. These traditions included gatherings in the 
alehouses, and the radical, free thinking congregations of Lord Street 
and Dobb Lane Chapel, with over a hundred, two pence a month paying 
members, connected to other groups in Manchester and Yorkshire. The 
strength of organisation was such that it proved quite impossible to 
even attempt to enforce the Combination Acts between 1818-1822, 
convictions only exist for well garrisoned centres such as Manchester 
and Preston, for Oldham there is nothing. One coalowner explained it 
thus: 
About Oldham the colliers are universally out ... the 
masters have not the courage to proceed against them for 
combination or neglect - although the workmen's committee 
sits on stated days at a public house in Manchester as if 
on legal business. (111) 
Regular union activity continued for the next 20 years with regular 
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incidents of disputes, picketing, machine breaking etc, and what made 
all of this possible was the inability of the central government to 
enforce law. Generally in the early years of the century law 
enforcement was difficult in working class areas, leading to an 
increasing use of troops. According to Foster in 1812 there were 
12,000 troops on garrison duty in the industrial areas of England and 
Wales by the 1830s this figure had risen to over 30,000. These troops 
were very blunt instruments to use against opposition that was 
embedded within the community. Small garrisons, ie anything less than 
200, were considered dangerous as they could become easily isolated 
and cut off from support. Because of this, Oldham lost its temporary 
garrison in 1820, 1827 and in 1834. ll2 Central government control 
involved a complex expansion of state activity and a change in social 
relationship which will be explained later. The key point, however, is 
that central government seems to have lost control of the situation at 
the local level in Oldham, largely because it lost control of the 
local administration. Without the co-operation of local officials, the 
army could do very little, save repress large outbreaks of violence, 
but it could not control the organisation that lay behind the 
opposition. The due process of law, as the ruling class in Britain at 
this time saw it, was effectively paralysed in its efforts to act 
against working class opposition, without the co-operation of jurors, 
the police (as they were then) and the Poor law officials, there could 
be no systematic arrests, no evidence presented and no successful 
prosecutions. For over 20 years the conflict raged between fairly 
successful working class organisation and the central state allied 
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with the local ruling class. 
What this raises are questions about how the working class won control 
and how in the long run, the state won it back'. 
When looking at working class domination of local administration in 
this period, we are examining a section of the population who were 
effectively excluded from participation in the electoral process - the 
franchise was based upon being a property owner or rate payer. The key 
point in this respect lay in the divergences within the electoral 
grouping in terms of their relationship with the propertyless classes. 
According to Foster, about one fifth of those entitled to vote 
consisted of the wealthy families who owned the industry and land of 
Oldham, plus those professional grouping closely tied to them, clergy, 
lawyers and surgeons. But for the rest, they were largely shopkeepers, 
publicans, small masters and small farmers. This latter group were 
almost all dependent in some form, upon working class custom, for 
selling provisions of various kinds, such as milk or beer and food 
stuffs. 113 
As we have noted above, English working class (or lower class) 
radicals had a considerable history and experience of organising 
around the questions of price rises in consumer goods (see Note 106). 
Consumer boycotts of shops that put up prices above those set as 
1 radical prices 1 , were organised well into the 19th century. It was 
but a small step from this to the practice of 1 exclusive dealing 1 , 
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which involved the organisation of a trading boycott of those who 
would not vote for radical candidates, there being no secret ballot at 
the time. In 1832 the radical candidates, Cobbett and Fielden, JOt into 
Parliament as MPs for Oldham with large majorities over the Tory and 
Whig candidates backed by the employers, and the seats remained 
largely in radical hands until the late 1840s. 114 
However impressive it may seem to be able to get your candidates to 
Parliament whilst still formally excluded from the voting procedures, 
the key element in working class political control, lay elsewhere. It 
was naturally the area of state power, or 1 law and order 1 , that was 
most central to those workers, whose everyday defensive industrial 
activites in trade unions lay formally outside the law. Hence it was 
control of the policing function that was the top priority for the 
organised working class. 
At the beginning of the 19th century the maintenance of law and order 
lay with the Vestry of each township, which meant in Oldham township 
and the out of townships of Chadderton, Crompton and Royton. Each 
Vestry elected two constables annually, who were jointly responsible 
for policing, which meant functions like hiring and supervising the 
police, giving permission for public meetings and appointing jurors at 
inquests. The vestry maintained over all control, by its right to 
refuse to sanction expenditure presented by the constables each 
t V t o t th v t 11 h 'd t 115 quar er. o 1ng a e estry was open o a w o pa1 ra es. 
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Such a close and formal connections between the voters and the 
constables had always meant they were susceptible to popular pressure, 
eg both in 1757 and 1796 the state failed to consCf'ipt its quota of 
militia men from many parts of the county because the constables would 
not supply lists of men. It seems that it was in 1812, through the 
usual practice of 'exclusive dealing' that the organised working 
class, put their own constables in, the so-called 'Jacobinical' 
h . d" 116 constables. Reports to t e Home Secretary 1n 1cate that they 
refused to intervene on occasions when property was attacked and in 
1816 allowed a universal sufferage meeting to take place. In 1818, a 
constable who was a working weaver, spoke at such a meeting. 
The state's response to such a situation was to try and reconstruct 
the legal and administrative framework in favour of the ruling class 
and significantly, in the long run, in favour of the central state 
itself. Firstly in 1818 the Regulation of Parish Vestries Act was 
passed, which meant that those in arrears lost their vote at Vestry 
elections, while persons with a rateable value of more than £50, got 
an extra vote for every £25 of extra rateable value they had up to a 
maximum of six. Whatever its effects elsewhere, the Act does not seem 
to have had the desired effect in Oldham, as Constables were still 
able to appoint hostile jurors the following year in 1814 to examine 
the death of a local man killed at Peterloo. 117 
The state then tried to use an old crown office: 'The Right of the 
Hundred Court Leet Steward' , 118 in this case the crown put forward a 
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stipendary magistrate from Manchester, who had the right to overrule a 
Vestry election and appoint constables of his own choosing. In 1820 he 
appointed two employers. But in 1821 the radicals appealed through the 
courts right up to the King's Bench, until the case was dismissed. 
However, this situation was inherently unstable, because although 
responsibility for law enforcement lay with the crown appointees, 
control of the expenses still lay formally with the Vestry. ll9 For 
example, in 1821 the Vestry refused to refund expenses incurred in 
garrisoning troops brought in for the period 1819-20. It was clear to 
the leading employers in the town that more legal reconstruction was 
necessary,to which effect they petitioned Parliament. The result was 
~ 
the 1826 Oldham Police Act, which set u~JPolice Commission funded by a 
levy on rates and mortgages. Qualification for membership of the 
Commission was E60 rateable value, which meant only the largest 
shopkeepers and, of course, the employers were eligible. 120 But once 
again this solution did not prove all that successful, somehow perhaps 
by 'exclusive dealing' or maybe by intimidation the local working 
class organisation was able to prove that it was not beaten yet, for 
in 1831 they were able to get a majority on the Commission and dismiss 
the police force. Clearly the organised working class's position had 
been weakened and they could not always hope to hold the Commission 
but as Foster puts it: 
... things were uncertain enough to make the police wary 
of interfering with the unions. In 1834 an example was 
made of two over-zealous policemen ordered by the 
magistrates to seize some trade union papers. After being 
man-handled by the mob, they were censured by the 
Commission and dismissed from service. (121) 
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It seems to have become clear to the authorities (defined by Foster as 
the Home Office and its local intelligence network, the local military 
command, the sixty or so capitalist families who, as Foster puts it: 
ct!:J!:JecU Vctriou~ly as yeomanry cavalry, special constables, 
and 'principal inhabitants', along with the JP (122) 
that the only long term solution lay in getting rid of the ratepayer 
controlled police, and replacing it with a body under more central 
control. In 1839 the County Police Act was passed allowing Lord 
Lieutenants to recruit a permanent police force paid for out of the 
county rates. These new police were used extensively in the early 
1840s and in 1842 during the General Strike, they arrested 49 local 
working class leaders on the cha~e of sedition. 123 In 1842 a Bill was 
passed removing control of the parish police from constables to 
magistrates, and at the end of the '40s the Carunission and Vestry were 
abolished when the town was incorporated and a new Borough force was 
created. 
Much the same story can be told about the organised working classes 
domination and control of poor relief, except that they seemed to have 
a firmer grip on it than they had on the police. They even managed to 
blod(the implementation of the Poor Law fuJ~ndment Act until 1847. In 
essence the administrators of the poor law in Oldham were generous. 
Clements, a government commissioner in 1846, compared the rate of 
increase in Oldham with other parts of Lancashire, where the amended 
Act was in operation, Oldham's growth was 279% compared with 68% 
elsewhere. As with the various pieces of legislation concerning the 
police, The Poor Law Amendment Act was, in part, aimed at 
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restructuring the balance of class forces in particular localities. 
The Board of Guardians was to be elected by secret ballot, no doubt in 
part to weaken 1 exclusive dealing 1 and intimidation, and rates were 
distributed in accordance with the size of one 1 s rateable value. 
County Magistrates were put on the boards with full voting rights. In 
addition to this a central board in London could challenge expenditure 
decisions. 124 This last elen~nt was perceived as a decisive shift of 
power towards the centre, and whatever the actual limitations of it_$ 
authority, it was clearly intended to back the restructuring of local 
class power, with some element of centralised bureaucratic authority. 
As Derek Fraser has noted: 
Many magistrates and middle-class political leaders 
opposed the centralisation of the new system and resented 
the slur on their own administration implicit in the 
condemnation of the Old Poor Law. (125) 
Whatever the intentions, the Amendment was successfully resisted for 
almost a decade and a half, largely because the organised working 
class controlled the administration and prevented the procedures for 
the election of new guardians from taking place. The end to this long 
and effective resistance came in 1847 when the Poor Law cormnission 
served writs of mandamus, and the workers did not contest the 
election, allowing the employers in. 
From the point of view of the state,the social conflict and absence of 
effective control, the situation in Oldham can be periodised into 
three. Foster summarises these thus: 
a defensive holding operation for the first years of the 
century; near paralysis by the end of the second decade; 
and from the middle of the fifth the reassertion of state 
power. (126) 
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Once it became clear that raising a militia from a cross-section of 
the co1rununity was a hazardous procedure, from 1790 onwards. One 
solution was to raise 1 volunteers 1 hand picked loyal forces, offio&>-t; 'l_....-
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entirely by employers.~~· But they, like small bands of troops, were 
considered too vulnerable and they were disbanded. The key problem of 
Oldham for the military was the lack of a barracks, billeting troops 
with the local population brought the danger of fraternisation, 
especially in the 1820s and early 1 30s. But as we have seen the 
authorities were loath to risk small groups of troops, without an 
adequately defended barracks, for fear of physical danger. 
The situation was that: 
for two decades the ultimate military sanctions of class 
rule could not be properly applied in Oldham. The results 
show up in the failure of the magistracy and the breakdown 
of the spy system. (128) 
By 1843 there was an adequate barracks built in Oldham. So by the 
early 1840s the build-up of the local presence of state power was 
quite considerable. The new County police force acted more or less as 
a political police so that by 1842 the area military command was able 
to keep a close watch on local working class leaders. As Foster puts 
it: 
Though arrests on the 1842 scale were not repeated, the 
memory of the imprisonment; the presence of the army and 
the reality of industrial victimization (used openly in 
the 184 7 election) must have done a good deal to weaken 
further resistance. (129) 
In looking at the way in which the grip of the organised working class 
was broken in Oldham politics, a key question emerges as to why was it 
possible for state repression to be successful in the early 1 40s. Also 
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why did the radical leadership appear to lose heart so quickly in the 
mid 1840s, after facing down so many carefully constructed assaults on 
its power over the past 20 years or so. Now clearly over this period 
Lhe mechanism and institutions ot state authority were being gradually 
restructured in favour of ruling class interests, and in the interests 
of the central state. So naturally the organised workers were 
experiencing the beginning of a bureaucratic state apparatus in its 
most repressive form. However, this in itself cannot constitute 
anything like a full explanation for clearly outright repression, of 
almost as severe a form, had been experienced before. The question is 
how was the process Foster calls 'liberalisation' so easily achieved. 
In a moment we look at Stedman Jones' interpretation of the process, 
on a national scale. But how did it occur in Oldham? 
In essence according to Foster by 1846 it was clear that another 
.severe depression was imminent; two leading Tories came out in favour 
of The Ten Hour Bill. This effectively split the radicals, for rather 
than risk losing this major working class demand, a Tory-Radical 
alliance was formed and the adoption of the pro-Anglican Morgan 
Cobbett for MP. Neither some of the non-conformist tradesmen nor some 
of the deist or atheists' old revolutionaries', could stomach this, and 
they moved to put forward another candidate. The following year the 
split became worse when another, 'Whig' group of big mill-owners put 
up a non-conformist candidate for Parliillnent, on a platform of Church 
disestablishment and household suffrage, both likely to appeal to 
radicals. With many supporters detached from the radicals, the two 
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groups 'Tory' and 'Whig' now did a electoral deal for the 1847 
election. As Foster writes: 
Against this the radicals, with their organisation 
shattered and faced with systematic victimisation by the 
employers, went down to fairly easy defeat. As Felden (a 
radical candidate) put it afterwards 'a more foul 
coalition never existed'. (130) 
By 1852 only a small and isolated group of old Chartists had 
independent existence, as the non-conformist tradesmen and many 
ex-chartists were tied to the group of 'Liberal' employers, whilst the 
'Tory' employers gained the support of the small masters, working 
class shopkeepers and trade union radicals committed~to the ten hour 
campaign. 
How was it then that the parties of the propertied class in Oldham and 
elsewhere had been able to gain so much of the allegiance of the 
working class and their allies~ The answer lies in the nature of the 
radical movement's conception of itself and its aims, and in the 
changing nature and form of the state itself, most particularly in 
relation to the economy. And as such, as we shall see, the explanation 
flows directly from the analysis presented in the first half of the 
chapter. 
In the first place the key to understanding 'liberalisation' or 
'stabilisation' lies not just in seeing what new events caused it but 
in examining the nature of the radicalism that was nullified. The 
central novelty of Stedman Jones' analysis lies in doing precisely 
this~ he puts radicalism, of which Chartism is for him but the latest 
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development, within the context of the political history and theory of 
the preceding century and before. Stedman Jones rightly sees 
radicalism as first and foremost, as the language of a politics of 
political ovrl11c: inn. nn ........... --.. ...... - ............ , .......... matter what the social character of those 
excluded: 
Its strength indeed its definition, was a critique of the 
corrupting effects of the concentration of political power 
and its corrosive influence upon a society deprived of 
proper means of political representation. As such, in 
varient forms, it could provide the vocabulary of 
grievance to a succession of political and social 
groups . ( 131) 
Taken in its widest sense, the, politics of the whole historical epoch 
from the decline of feudalism, to the rise of the liberal capitalist 
democracies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It can be 
traced right through, as we noted above, from the moment of the move 
from the language of religious to political rights in France through 
the Netherlands more sharply formulated in the English Civil War, 
passed on as Jones notes, in the ideology of the Country Party in the 
18th century and thence taken up, more radically broadened, and 
coherently codified, in the ideology of the French Revolution. The 
Revolution in turn stimulated the radicalism of Tom Paine and the 
English Jacob ins, and then the Chartists, such diverse social and 
cultural setting, so many different groups, inevitably means a diffuse 
set of ideological themes but they are none the less real for that. 132 
The franchise was extended to the middle classes and they were granted 
more of a place within the political structure. As the bulk of 
the population experienced the new problems posed by the impact of 
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the Industrial Revolution, so they extended radicalism's analysis to 
incorporate the theory of economic discontent; so the middle classes 
became more alien ated from radicalism. The consequence was that by 
the 1830s radicalism becd.ittt= more and more a working class movement, 
but this did not in any automatic sense lead to a fundamental change 
in radicalism's ideology, as Stedman Jones writes: 
The self-identity of radicalism was not that of any 
specific group, but that of 'the people' or the 'nation' 
against the monopolizers of political representation and 
power and hence financial or economic power. (133) 
This became de facto a working class ideology, not at all by intention 
but because others had changed, as the social situation changed. The 
ideology could remain intact as long as it was plausible to believe 
that the source of working oppression lay in the ruling class having a 
monopoly of political and legal power, rather than their control and 
ownership of the means of production. As long as the unreformed state 
could be typified as 'Old Corruption', so it remained plausible to see 
unemployment, low wages, poverty etc as rooted in a fundamental 
political disorder. As soon as this disorder was remedied it would be 
possible, to curb the excess of 'machine production' in a cross 
alliance which crucially included the 'productive' middle classes. The 
reason for this lay in the simple fact that radicalism was not opposed 
to property, but as Jones puts it: 
Chartism did not regard the working class as propertyless. 
For since the only legitimate source of property was 
labour, labourers were therefore in possession of the Jnost 
fundamental form of all property. (134) 
It is quite crucial to note the acceptance of property in the case of 
the radical workers of Oldham, for they never raised the legitimacy of 
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property as a political demand. They might be viewed as anti-
capitalist, but only so far as they subscribed to a Lockean labour 
theory of value, derived from popular radical writers, like Thomas 
Hodgkin, who saw the relationship between labour and capital as 
unequal exchange, which had been acquired by the capitalist monopoly 
of the means of production. Hence the enthusiasm for co-operatives, 
and the perceived need for political rights, by means of which it was 
135 
often assumed the capitalist had acquired his advantage. 
Chartism then, as the working class form of radicalism in the 1820s 
and '30s, acquired its strength as an organising political ideology, 
precisely from the sense it made of a situation like the one we have 
described, in Oldham, in this phase. It was also able to articulate 
this experience, into a coherent and nationally organised movement of 
a quite remarkable kind. The repression and the collusion of the 
Liberal Government with the Oldham employers must have all too clearly 
borne out the truth of radicalism as an ideology. Thus it was the 
owners monopoly of political power which gave them the ability to 
outlaw trade unions, break-up the old poor law system, and create the 
new police. However, the very strength and explanatory power of 
radicalism in the 1820s and 1830s was to be its undoing in the 1840s. 
It was because of the nature of the radicalism they faced, that forced 
the state and the owners, to act in a way that Foster says for Oldham: 
confused and dispirited the movement, and did so precisely 
because it resulted from a new plausibility in arguments 
for the existing order, not from outright repression. 
( 136) 
We saw above, how in Oldham, the radicals were unable to cope with the 
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transformation that local, and also national politic& was then 
undergoing. Most fundamentally of all, at both the local and national 
level, radicalism was unable to resist the important reconstruction of 
the state, undertaken most particularly by Robert Peel. 
The space for manouevre discovered in the political forms of the 1840s 
surprised many of the radicals, undoubtedly the ruling class had been 
seriously intimidated by the radical actions of the 1830s, culminating 
in the General Strike of 1842. But the desire of both Liberals and 
Tories, to support different aspects of the reform programme of the 
organised working class, had similar effects elsewhere to that it had 
had in Oldham. The Ten Hour Act nearly got through in 1844, and was 
finally passed in 1847. The fact of this, with the obvious 
improvements that it brought, was bound to throw into quest ion the 
whole notion of •old Corruption•, with its sealed and exclusive state. 
Improvement now seemed possible within the existing political system. 
Radicalism was ideally suited to the initial authoritarian thrust of 
the new bureaucratic state in its aspect of domination, as Jones puts 
it: 
The activity of the state could thus be. seen as the brutal 
culmination of the ambitions of artificial wealth and 
monopoly power, which had been at work ever since 1688. 
The centralisation of the fX>Wers of the state at the 
expense of local representation, combined with the 
apparent scheme to establish a tyranny over the producers 
in the context of the structural changes and by cyclical 
difficulties experienced in the economy, created a 
potentially formidable opposition in the localities - both 
working and middle class, Radical and Tory. (137} 
In this context, radicalism made a great deal of SEn82 since it was 
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designed to concentrate on the malicious activity of the state. 
However, it was not prepared for the kind of bourgeois politics that 
came into existence in the 1840s, partly in revulsion at the brutality 
anrl offence given to so many interests, both \·larking class and middle 
class. It was basically the creation of a coherent, fully liberal 
bourgeois state, that fundamentally undermined radical politics and 
provided the basis for a reconstructed political consciousness. This 
was the task that Robert Peel carried through in those famous 
landmarks of British social history: the repeal of the Corn Laws, The 
Mines Act of 1842, the creation of Joint Stock Companies, The Bank 
Charter Act, followed by the reduction of tax on consumption goods, 
particularly affecting the working class. In all these measures he 
attempted as Jones notes: 
the effective raising of the state above the dictates of 
particular economic interests whether landlords, 
financiers or manufacturers. (138) 
It should be clear, if one follows Sayer's argument that it is really 
only at this point that 'the state' as a social form specific to 
bourgeois class rule has emerged, at least in its full form, ie as the 
abstraction of the state standing above particular interests in civil 
society. Thus it seemed to loose the connection which had earned it 
the title 'Old Corruption'. However, it must be remembered, that this 
was a process of completion, whatever amendments had been made to the 
legislation of the previous decade much of the apparatus of state 
power, so created, remained intact and indeed developed. The Police 
f d . dl 139 th 1 . . 1 f orce sprea rapt y, e centra 1s1ng e .ements o Poor Law 
administration remain, to name but two. In essence the state as 
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bureaucratic domination was never to be frontally challenged in all 
its scope again. The Old Country Party ideology of Tory Radicalism and 
its counterpart in ideology, 'the moral economy', amongst the working 
classes, had been decisively defeated partly by the actions of state, 
140 but also as F. Hearn points out, by the operation of the market as 
capitalism became the only experiential mode. New forms of conflict 
and sectional strife emerged among workers who played the rules of the 
capitalist game sometimes successfully against the capitalist himself, 
and they no longer viewed these rules as aberrations from nature. Now 
it was no longer possible to see unemployment and poverty as directly 
political creations. Most of the political evils remained, the workers 
still did not have the vote, but the tight connection between this and 
poverty no longer held. Peel the believer in Laissez Faire began the 
process of separating the state and the economy; the state could be 
seen, more plausibly to stand above civil society as the collective 
'we' the bourgeois were forced to invent, as well as stand for the 
hoped for 'illusory community'. Thus the two moments of the state, we 
spoke of above, domination and substitute community, were in their 
recognisable modern place, and with it civil society as the private 
arena occupied by the liberal self, slowly emerged into its future 
full bloom. Now only a politics of material transcendence of these 
antinomies (ie socialism) would pose the vision of a different 
society. 
The 10 hour day is often seen in radical circles both then and now as 
a triumph of the political economy of the working class over that of 
the bourgeois. However, perhaps it should be seen as more of an 
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indication of how deep the fundamental nature of capitalist social 
relations had bitten, and as an example of the opaqueness of those 
social relations, that Burawoy has pointed to, in terms of the 
difficulty of securing the surplus. For what lay behind the acceptance 
of the Ten Hour Day Bill was the the destruction of handicraft 
production and the restabilisation of the labour process on a new 
basis. As is clear from Foster's work, the new skilled workforce in, 
for example, engineering, in places like Oldham, did not possess 
anything like the same control over production that the craft workers 
had had. Fundamentally this meant an acceptance by workers of the 
division of labour and the wage contract, and a relative ease for new 
technical innovation. Confusion was felt by both Capital and Labour in 
this new situation, it had the obvious effect of displacing conflict 
away from control and on to wage struggle. But the opaqueness of the 
'rising' surplus provided a material basis upon which a whole range of 
confusing bourgeois political strategies, concessions and new 
cross-class alliances, could be built. The Ten Hour Day Bill should be 
seen within the context of the shift from formal to real subordination 
of the working class within the labour process, which had in turn, 
produced the space for new cultural, political and ideological forms. 
As capitalism modernised, albeit unevenly, and as the moral and 
political culture of the previous century receded from memory, so the 
state as 'illusory corranunity' - now it had withdrawn from invidious 
associations and been· suitably moralised by Peel and then by Gladstone 
- would be the focus for those in all classes who sought a trans(..e.-~-W. 
of the new social relations. So that by 1880, bourgeois writers like 
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Ernest Barker could compare favourably what they termed 'economic 
socialism', with the political radicalism of 1848 and 'the idea of 
social readjustment by the state' (compared with laissez faire). In 
188~ Bland could write in the Fabian Essays of a 
sort of unconscious or semi -conscious recognition of 
the fact that the word 'state' had taken to itself a new 
and diverse connotations - that the state idea had changed 
its content among the working class also, who see it as a 
'potential saviour' rather than fearing it as an 
enemy' . (141) 
But the state as 'illusory corrununity' would also be accompanied by the 
state as, bureaucratic domination; the abstract manager of reality and 
the imposer of external necessity. These roles, given the opaqueness 
of social reality to both ordinary capitalist and workers and the 
public and private split, would be based on the maintenance of an 
image of authority and competence, but with real power. consequences. 
The state form had produced its ideological effects, helping to shape 
the political consciousness of its people. In the process a state was 
to emerge which eventually could be made to manage capitalism in the 
manner Keynes recommended. It would provide the bureuacratic side of 
bureaucratic individualism. 'Illusory community' would stay illusory. 
Only a politics based upon radically different conceptualisations of 
what it is to be a worker and a citizen could break from this 
situation. A politics based upon a rejection and transcendence of both 
liberal individualism and the priority of market exchange and 
consumption. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion: Narrative and Communities 
What "ought to be" is therefore concrete; indeed, it is the onLy 
reaListic and historicist interpretation of reaLity; it aLone is 
history in the making; it aLone is poLitics. 
Antonio Gramsci 
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This thesis has attempted to examine a core problem of the human 
sciences - the relationship between individual and corrnnunal life. I 
have located this problem through an assessment of the impact of 
market pressures upon forms of thought the state, and upon 
political and moral practices. This has been carried out by the 
utilisation of the work of the philosopher Alasdair Macintyre. It is 
to Macintyre's work that we return, in this conclusion. Here, we 
examine his account of human life as narrative. We do this in order to 
illustrate what resources there might be in ordinary human practice, 
to resist the individualising and abstracting processes of advanced 
capitalist societies, and to see what elements exist for the 
construction of a counter-process of human corrnnunity in life and 
thought. 
However, a cautionary note should be added, for it is clear that what 
follows is both the legacy and the cost of abandoning Marxism in its 
original form. The fragility and difficulties of what follows reveal 
that Macintyre and perhaps most of us are only at the beginning of a 
reassessment of the classical tradition of political thought, of which 
Marxism was the culmination. 
I 
FORMS OF LIFE 
Macintyre has perhaps inevitably been attacked for the apparent 
conservatism of his attempt to find a new coherence and unity to 
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social and moral life. 1 This issue must be carefully addressed, but in 
the end, can only be answered by an attempt to demonstrate the 
usefulness of this thought in reconceptualising socialism in a manner 
that transcends the tranition of radical liberalism. 
Nevertheless, there are those on the left who will push the argument 
about conservatism at a deeper philosophic level. Some see attempts to 
establish coherence, particularly of narrative ordering of social 
life, as either hopelessly anachronistic or downright reactionary, 
especially in the guise of an appeal to tradition. I am, of course, 
referring to the post-Nietzschean philosophy called Post-Structuralism 
or Deconstruction, most commonly asscociated with the work of Derrida 
and Foucault. The central point of this tradition was put well some 
years ago, minus the Nietzschean flourish, in a critique of Marxism: 
Epistemology conceives of discursive objects through a 
play on words which assimilates the specific entities 
designated in discourse to the general status of 
independently existing objectivity and objects-to-be-
known. To deny this form of conceptualisation is to argue 
that what is specified in discourse, ie its "objects" can 
only be conceived through discourse; either through the 
discourse which specifies them itself, or through another 
discourse. (2) 
This seems to be the central thrust of Derrida's work. It is what he 
means, in his much quoted phrase, 1 There is nothing outside of the 
text 1 • 3 
For our purposes, however, it is precisely this element of 
deconstruction that is the problem. Its emphasisis on the fatal nature 
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of the play on words, for knowledge, with its hunting down of the 
metaphysics of presence or logocentricism, the breaking up of settled 
attempts to describe a prescriptive truth spoken or written into an 
endless play of random sense; aJJ this threatens narrative un.i.ty. For, 
as Christopher Norris has put it: 
Deconstruction is therefore an activity performed by texts 
which in the end have to acknowledge their own partial 
complicity with what they denounce. The most rigorous 
reading, it follows, is one that holds itself 
provisionally open to further deconstruction of its own 
operative concepts. (4) 
It is not difficult to see why this form of philosophy and criticism 
is appropriate in an age of modernist and post-modernist art and 
literature since like the works themselves, it constantly calls its 
truth claims into question, and celebrates its own knowing self 
awareness, and disrupts the steadying influence of continuous 
narrative and coherent form. It is truly a culture 'when all that is 
solid melts • • 1 5 1n a1r . In this context, even the suggestion of 
constructing a narrative order of human life and social institutions, 
would seem to be doing nothing but providing more targets for radical 
scepticism about the coherence of such things as human identity over 
time. It must seem an example of the foolishness of trying to tell one 
story, as though it were the only one to tell. 
It is, however, possible to engage with this question of philosophical 
scepticism and thereby implicitly defend the possibility of a 
teleology of human life and community. I want to suggest that some of 
the resources for this task lie in the later work of the philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. 6 At first sight it might seem that Wittgenstein's 
concerns and arguments are very similar to those of a figure such as 
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Derrida. Like Derrida, Wittgenstein argues that once words are taken 
as primarily signs of something else, ie extra discursive, and 
verification is based upon intuitions of the reality these signs refer 
to, then there will always be a gap between direct experience ctnd 
linguistic expression. The attempt will always be to fill this gap by 
some concept of representation between signs and sources of meaning. 
We will then be caught in an infinite regress between expressions of 
knowledge on one hand, and a necessary but ultimately unreachable 
certain, direct knowledge, on the other. 
So their thinking is quite close, and there is a second and related 
sense in which Wittgenstein' s work seems to parallel that of the 
French Deconstructionists. This is concerning the so-called 'death of 
the subject'. As we shall see shortly, thinking for Wittgenstein is 
not a separate activity from doing. It is not something that takes 
place in addition to our relationships with objects; it is, rather, a 
particular way in which a person relates to his or her direct 
involvement in the world. From this it becomes clear that thinking is 
not representational; it is more a part of acting, than a separate 
form. As Altieri puts it: 
Consciousness is essentially not a way of relating to 
objects but of relating to actions we learn to perform. 
The basic condition of human experience is not minds 
facing a world of objects but a wide variety of activities 
constituting a complex interrelated web of cultural and 
natural forms towards which we can behave in a creative 
way if we need or care to. (7) 
But what sterns from this view in regard of the subject; is that there 
is no special subject that we can arrive at by self-reflection. As 
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Wittgenstein shows in the Philosophical Investigations, when he says: 
It's true, "Now I am having such-and-such an image", but 
the words "I am having" are merely a sign to someone else; 
the description of the image is a complete account of the 
imagined world - you mean: the words "I am having" are 
like "I say" . . . ( R) 
This means that if conscious thinking is a way of simply relating to a 
specific practice, then being aware of oneself is only being aware of 
oneself acting in a particular way; there is no getting at a separate 
thing called 'the self' that pre-exists the practices. Viewed in this 
way the constitutive self to Wittgenstein looks suspiciously as it 
does to Derrida and Foucault: the residue of a metaphysical ghost -
the philosopher, obsessed with attempting to find a point of origin 
for all phenomena. To anticipate the argument a little, the point of 
difference between Wittgenstein and the Post-Structuralists, is that 
the latter remained trapped within the Cartesian tradition even as 
they seek to transcend it. As Giddens puts it: 
Derrida' s denunciation of the "presence" of the idea as 
the essence of signification leads him to retreat from the 
signified as far as possible, into the signifier. He does 
not take the more radical step of rejecting the signifier/ 
signified distinction (as Wittgenstein does ) ... The 
problem concerns the signified. The withdrawal from the 
object into the internal play of difference, ... cannot be 
accomplished, hence the nature of the signified has been 
left in obscurity, or the term has been used ambiguously 
to include both concept and object. (9) 
As Giddens points out, for Wittgenstein however, signifier or concept 
and signified or object, are understood in terms of their inclusion 
within the practices which compose forms of life:as Wittgenstein says, 
'Don't look for meaning, look for use. •10 
The 'practicality' of Wittgenstein's philosophy can be illustrated by 
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looking at the use Altieri makes of it in understanding inter~ 
pretation. Clearly, if consciousness is a way of representing some 
external reality, then as Altieri says: 
it follows that consciousness is always interpretation; 
always the imposition of tenuous forms on an unknowable 
but felt flux. (ll) 
However, Wittgenstein argues that: 
the sense of the given as commonly held forms of behaviour 
greatly limits the sphere in which the problema tics of 
interpretation apply. (12) 
Altieri identifies three distinct ways in which Wittgenstein argues we 
make sense of situations. Firstly, 'seeing', when we recognise 
something by seeing that it fits with the 'forms of life', or language 
games we are used to seeing it in. Secondly, 'seeing as', when a range 
of contexts that something may occur, explains and gives significance 
to a particular action or object. Thirdly, 1 interpretation 1 in the 
traditional sense: in the second situation we still had not added 
anything that was not part of the internal relations of the 
situation. 13 However, two new elements are present in the third 
situation; a) a sense of doubt, that the situation does not allow a 
response in terms of our normal expectations; and b) a felt need to 
introduce a new concept or hypothesis, to make sense of the 
disjunctions in the situation. The central point is that inter-
pretations are problematic because we only use them when our 'normal' 
procedures have ceased to serve us. Altieri quotes Wittgenstein 
pertinently here: 
What happens is not that this symbol cannot be further 
interpreted, but I do no interpreting. I do not interpret, 
because I feel at home in the present picture. When I 
interpret, I step from one level of thought to 
· another. ( 14) 
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Altieri can now make his fundamental point concerning Wittgenstein and 
philosophy: 
... abstract philosophy is interpretation because it has 
traditionally been speech from the outside, from men who 
consciously reject a perspective from within ordinary 
experience in order to put these experiences in another, 
more systematic and abstract light. Philosophy then has 
always been second-order discourse and thus has been 
doomed to the continual uncertainties besetting those who 
cannot rely on the secure stopping points and agreements 
experienced in ordinary behaviour. (15) 
The point about Wittgenstein's philosophic intention can be clinched 
by one more revealing quotation from the Investigations: 
... The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of 
stopping doing philosophy when I want to. The one that 
gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented 
by questions which bring itself in question - Instead, we 
now demonstrate a method, by examples, and the series of 
examples can be broken off. Problems are solved 
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem. (16) 
The differences and similarities between Wittgenstein and the Post-
Structuralists should now be clear. To some it may seem that the 
divergences are virtually those of cultural temperament. For Derrida, 
having rejected the claims of a representational theory of truth, 
glories in the Nietzschean freedom of the free play of signifiers; 
accepting almost limitless possibilities; a perfect promethean 
philosophy for the culture of modernity, and now post-modernity. 
Wittgenstein is clearly opposed to such a move, by returning us to the 
'forms of life' that are rooted in real experience. 
This would appear to raise a political question, for is not 
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Wittgenstein inevitably a Conservative philosopher and Derrida the 
radical? The point has been made for many years that Wi ttgenstein' s 
17 
'forms of life' are a celebration of the status quo. Part of the 
answer to this paradox has been mentioned earlier in ~nderson's 
comment (see note 5) . A more fundamental explanation is offered by 
Fergus Kerr who sees the left having 
a misunderstanding of what he (Wittgenstein) meant when he 
spoke of "language games" and "forms of life". He 
introduced the term n language game n (his italics) so he 
says (Philosophical Investigations 23) to emphasise that 
speaking of language is always interconnected with some 
activity. Such an activity he calls a "form of life ... In 
fact the text could not be plainer that he has very basic 
small-scale activities in mind, without which no human 
society whatever, would exist, whether classless or 
otherwise. His catalogue includes ... reporting, making up 
a story, surmising, play acting, singing, joking etc 
etc. (18) 
If we are serious in regard to the necessity of theory being related 
to action, then we can understand the political implications of the 
famous remark of Hegel's that he did philosophy to be at home 
everywhere in the world. In this respect we can understand 
Wittgenstein's philosophy as an attempt to make philosophy at home in 
the world, rather than the indulgence of alienated intellectuals. It 
seems that in Wittgenstein' s view the gap between the mind and the 
world is closed, in the full appreciation of particular human forms of 
life and the full depth of 'convention' in human life. It implies, as 
Stanley Cavell has argued: 
that the sense of gap originates in an attempt or wish to 
escape (to remain a "stranger" to be "alienated from") 
those shared forms of life, to give up responsibility for 
their maintenance. (19) 
The central point of Cavell's massive commentary on the 
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Investigations, is the weight of conventions: not in the sense of this 
or that particular set of cultural arrangements, which separate one 
set of human beings off from another, but rather 'forms of life' which 
any group of humans shares, who possess a past! who respond tor a 
geographical/spatial environment, which they manipulate and exploit 
for understandable human motives. It is this that marks, 
Wittgenstein's discovery 
not only of the conventionality of human society but, we 
could say on the conventionality of human nature itself, 
what Pascal meant when he said, "custom is our nature" 
(Pensees 89) (20) 
We are now in a position to see how this scepticism about scepticism, 
can be so politically liberating, when appreciated in its full depth. 
So 'convention' or 'forms of life' can be understood as constitutive 
of what it is to be human, rather than as accidental and encumbering 
sets of social arrangements. Therefore, it follows that the intellec-
tual alienation of a modernist culture can be understood for what it 
is: an explicable response to and product of Capitalist modernisation; 
but one that misses fundamental elements of continuity through history 
and across cultures. It is these elements of continuity, these basic 
characteristics of living in and through human culture, that allow 
Macintyre to make the attempt to piece together from within the social 
and moral tradition, some core conception of the virtues, that could 
be extended into the future. Macintyre must root the search for a new 
community - that is as we have seen the core of the socialist project 
- in patterned, meaningful historical and cultural situations. It 
cannot be recovered from the free play of the signifier, in a world 
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that can be made afresh each day, by the free flow of interpretations. 
Such an awareness is also deeply rooted in Wittgenstein; Cavell 
captures this well: 
Tne internal tyranny of convention is that only a slave of 
it can know bow it can be changed for the better, or know 
why it should be eradicated. Only masters of a game, 
perfect slaves to that project, are in a position to 
etablish conventions which better serve its essence. This 
is why deep revolutionary changes can result from attempts 
to conserve a project, it takes it back to its idea, keeps 
it in touch with it. To demand that the law be fulfilled, 
every jot and title, will destroy the law as it stands, if 
it has moved too far from its origins. (21) 
II 
PRAcriCES AND TRADITIONS 
It is at this point we begin to see how important it is for a 
Socialist project to recover from the Right a distinct sense of 
tradition, and it should come as no surprise that this is central to 
Macintyre. However, for the central role of tradition to be 
understood, it is necessary, as promised in the introduction, to 
explain Macintyre's use of two concepts which logically precede it, 
namely a practice and secondly the narrative order to a human life. 
A practice is above all else for Macintyre, the social background 
within which a coherent practice of the virtues is intelligible. It 
can be most easily understood where in fact Macintyre agrees that it 
is at its most simple, ~e. in his discussion of Heroic society, those 
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societies that immediately precede, and in some senses, continued to 
morally inform, those of classical Greece (societies described or 
idealised in Homer) and early medieval Europe; (societies described or 
idealised in Saxon and Norse sagas). Here: 
every individual has a given role and status within a well 
defined and highly determinate system of roles and 
statuses, the key structures are those of kinship and of 
household. In such a society a man knows who he is by 
knowing his role in these structures; and in knowing this 
knows also what he owes and what is owed to him by the 
occupant of every other role and status. In Greek (dein) 
and in Anglo-Saxon (AHTE) alike, there is originally no 
clear distinction between 'ought' and 'owe', in Icelandic 
the word 'skyldr' ties together 'ought' and 'is kin 
to'. (22) 
Here morality and social structure are one and the same, questions of 
evaluation are for the most part questions of social fact, morality is 
inseparable from context, morality is wholly internal to definite 
social practices. 
It is important for Macintyre's argument that these societies are in 
most respects polar opposites to our own in regard to the connection 
between 'is' and 'ought', but it is also crucial that they and the 
intervening social forms, are part of our own tradition. It is the 
intervening social forms, especially the ethics of Aristotle that 
provide, in amended form, the resources for reconnecting,in a critical 
manner, morality and the social. 
A practice then is defined by Macintyre as a 
coherent and complex form of socially established 
co-operative human activity through which goods internal 
to the form of activity are realised in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
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appropriate to, and partially definitive of that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellence and human conceptions of ends and go~ involved 
are systematically extended. (23) 
Now it is clear from Macintyre's account of the concept of a practice; 
that although such a conception is perhaps marginal to our political 
and social life today, it is at least recognisable in such activity as 
playing a game, writing serious poetry, engaging in an academic 
subject. It is also clear that it is not only in modern society, but 
also in ancient and medieval ones that practices may be complex and 
highly diverse in character. Heroic society provides a kind of ideal 
type, rather than ideal form; for these practices are integrated and 
virtually synonymous with social structure. Here the possibility of 
deep conflicts within and between practices is limited, but also the 
possibility of change and historical development is curtailed. 
Let us now turn to see how a practice operates before discussing its 
implications any further. What then is meant by goods internal to a 
practice'? Macintrye uses the example24 of wishing to teach a child 
chess who has no particular desire to learn. So you encourage the 
child, by telling the child that although it will be difficult, with 
effort they can win a game for which he/she will get some sweets. 
However, so long as the child plays for sweets, s/he will have no 
reason not to cheat and indeed will have every reason to do so, if 
s/he can ~away with it. But as Macintyre argues, 
... we may hope, there will come a time when the child 
will find in those goods specific to chess, in the 
achievements of a certain highly particular kind of 
analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive 
intensity, a new set of reasons not just for winning on a 
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particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever 
way the game of chess demands. Now if the child cheats, he 
or she will be defeating not you, but himself. (25) 
Macintyre finds himself forced into using examples from games or other 
highly specific practices, like portrait painting, in part because of~, 
meagreness of our language for speaking of internal goods and because 
of the extremely subordinate place for such practices and goods in 
modern Industrial Capitalism. However, there remains even in these 
societies, partial elements of such practices sufficient for us to 
understand the difference between internal and external goods. We saw 
in previous chapters how the market functioned almost as a paradigm 
case of the dominance of external goods. However, it is worth 
emphasising that almost any practice, including chess can convey both 
internal and external goods, ie those goods that are contingently 
attached to chess - playing and other practices,by the accidents of 
social circumstances. What is crucial is which predominates in the 
actor's motivation. Now here we can begin to see important social 
differences between internal and external goods. It is a basic 
characteristic of external goods that when they are gained they are 
always some individual's property and possession. on top of this it is 
also true that the more someone has of them the less there is for 
others. This is true, both for tangible goods like money or property 
(in a market system) and intangibles like fame, or charisma which by 
their very nature can only be had by some. Therefore external goods 
are always the object of competition, in which there are going to be 
losers as well as winners. Now it is also true that internal goods 
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will be gained by competition to excel, but it is also characteristic 
of them that their achievement is good for the whole community who 
participate in the practice. For example when the four minute mile was 
run, or when Joyce's Ullysses was written, a practice was extended in 
a way that practioners could in some sense share in, emulate and 
perhaps ultimately surpass in turn. 
we can now see how virtues have a key role in sustaining these 
practices, for practices must generally have some kind of 
institutional setting, and are not maintained simply by the excelling 
in the goods of that practice. Macintyre put it thus: 
Every practice requires a certain kind of relationship 
between those who participate in it. Now the virtues are 
those goods by reference to which, whether we like it or 
not, we define our relationship to those people with whom 
we share the kind of purposes and standards which inform 
practices. ( 26) 
However, practices are not to be simply equated with institutions, 
because institutions are of necessity involved with the getting of 
resources, the distribution of power and status, and hence with 
external goods. But the relationship between an institution and a 
practice is generally intimate and quite crucial; the practice cannot 
be sustained without the institution, but is always vulnerable to the 
corrupting power of an unrestrained pursuit of external goods. Hence 
the making and sustaining of human communities and hence of human 
institutions, has all the hallmarks of a practice, and an important 
one for it is upon this practice, the success of other hw~n practices 
ultimately depend. It is this crucial question we shall return when we 
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discuss the necessity of particular traditions and a socialist 
politics of the common good. 
So far we have seen how the concept of a practice, drawn in part from 
the past as well as limited areas of modernity, might connect up with 
the pursuit of non-market based internal goods. However, the question 
arises how is one to choose between the multiplicity of goods 
available from within the context of a variety of practices. Macintyre 
refuses to place practices in any ad hoc hierarchical relationship, 
although he will allow a causal priority within his scheme to those 
practices which foster institutional forms which in turn provide the 
necessary social context, within which other practices can be 
sustained. This in itself, does not, however, settle the question that 
is Aristotle's 'what is the good life for man' . Even the causal 
priority of the sustaining of institutions may conflict with the 
manifest good of, say, being an artist or writer, they may even on 
occasion be incompatible, eg the poet Gerald Manley Hopkins' desire to 
write poetry, with hi~ commitment to the Jesuit order. 
In this context, has not the culture of 'bureaucratic individualism' 
reappeared, in which the goods internal to practices after all find 
their ultimate justification within the apparently arbitrary choice of 
the modern criterialess self. Finally, the question of authority in 
our lives raises itself, ie that which binds us to the social, that 
which is threatened to be severed by much modern epistomology. For 
finally without some conception of a telos for the human life viewed 
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as a unity, an inevitable arbitrariness must enter, which must leave 
us trapped in a modern differentiated market order. As we saw in the 
chapters on Marxism, this was a major element in understanding its 
appeal for Macintyre. No sense (as Scott Meikle sho\~~?s positively· 
castoriadis negatively) can be made of Marx's concept of a fully 
Communist society without the unifying concept of labour as the 
transhistorical essence of humanity, able to fully realise itself in a 
free social individuality. 
The question remains, can some teleological unity be salvaged on some 
other theoretical and social basis, than that posed by Marx, 
considered so problematic by the many modern social theorists? As is 
no doubt clear, the central terrain for rescuing these conceptions lie 
in the formulation of human life in terms of narrative and tradition. 
The key to Macintyre's argument lies in the view that there is no such 
thing as 'behaviour', that can be identified independently of 
intentions, beliefs, and settings. We can understand a human action 
only by situating it in two kinds of context. Firstly by locating the 
action with reference to the person's own history and secondly by 
reference to the actor's role in the history of the setting or 
settings. The examples he uses to illustrate these points seem banal 
enough, a man gardening and the possible reasons for doing so, but 
this example has deeper significance, as we will see. Macintyre asks 
what is this man doing, 'digging' , 'gardening' , 'taking exercise' , 
'preparing for winter' or 'pleasing his wife'. Which of these 
- 333 -
descriptions is the more important for the man is clearly crucial for 
understanding the significance of the activity. 27 
Firstly, the action is placed in a cycle of domestic activity because 
the behaviour presupposes a household-cum-garden setting with its own 
particular narrative history of which this behaviour is part. 
Secondly, this behaviour is also situated in the narrative history of 
a marriage in a different but related social setting. So therefore the 
behaviour is part of two particular narrative histories which happen 
to meet. It follows, that as we cannot understand this behaviour 
without knowing the intentions, it is also true that we cannot 
understand the intentions: independently of the setting or context 
which make the intentions understandable to the agents themselves. 
However, the setting of these two narrative histories may well have 
histories themselves, the household may have a history stretching back 
decades or centuries. The marriage itself clearly has a history which 
itself must presuppose the particular point that has been reached in 
the history of the institution of marriage. 
The example focusing on a household activity does seem to contain for 
Macintyre a prescriptive charge, for his work is itself dependent on 
the historical origins of our own concepts and our own institutions. 
He is at pains to tease out older elements in our culture of modernity 
that still exist in an incomplete form. The focus on the household 
seems.opportune, as the household in pre-capitalist times was both the 
centre of economic production and the locus of moral and emotional 
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life and ties. It is precisely the relatively marginal persistence of 
such forms in the modern world, that makes Macintyre's work 
intelligible to us and upon which he hopes to build. For as he says in 
his preceding discussion of self as a narrative unity: 
Just because it has played a key part in the cultures 
which are historically the predecessors of our own, it 
would not be surprising if it turned out to be still an 
unacknowledged presence in many of our ways of thinking 
and acting. Hence it is not inappropriate to begin by 
scrutinising some of our most taken-for-granted, 
insights about human actions and selfhood in order to show 
how natural it is to think, of the self in a narrative 
mode. (28) 
The prescriptive implications of the Household example can be clearly 
seen in the only vaguely political conclusion Macintyre can allow 
himself to draw: 
what matters now at this stage is the construction of 
local forms of corrmunity within which civility and the 
intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the 
new dark ages which are already upon us. (29) 
Unsurprisingly forms of life that stretch back behind the emergence of 
our capitalist market culture, make a natural point of reference for 
Macintyre. Through such examples he seeks to re-educate our 
intuitions, by reconnecting us to older patterns of human narrative so 
easily hidden within our culture. He is therefore bound to place some 
hope on the cultural and ideological impact of these examples, being 
able to contribute in whatever small measure, to a redirection of our 
conscious attention. How is this possible? 
If there can be no pure science of behaviour, because beliefs and 
intentions are central, indeed constitutive., elements in human 
behaviour. Then even the sociological pressure of modern Industrial 
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Capitalism with its prioritising of external over internal goods and 
separation of public and private, (work and leisure consumptio~ from 
production), cannot totally eliminate the elements of narrative based 
understandings, from human life. Possibly much of our 'unhappy 
consciousness' stems from attempts to do so. 
Macintyre provides a particularly telling vindication of this in his 
paper Epistemological Crisis, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of 
Science, 30 where he reveals the inability of Descartes' own radical 
doubt to disown the particular historically conditioned tools of 
interpretation, particularly his knowledge of French and Latin. As he 
argues 
he does not put in doubt what he has inherited in and 
with these languages, namely, a way of ordering both 
thought and the world expressed in a set of meanings. 
These meanings have a history; seventeenth century Latin 
bears the marks of having been the language of 
scholasticism, just as scholasticism was itself marked by 
the influence of twelfth and thirteenth century Latin ... 
he (Descartes) did not notice ... how much of what he took 
to be spontaneous reflections of his own mind was in fact 
a repetition of sentences and phrases from his school text 
books. Even the cog \ito is to be found in Saint 
Augustine. (31) 
Macintyre goes on to point out that to have put these matters into 
doubt would have been to take the road to mental illness not 
philosophy. 
If narrative, then, is crucial to being human, we can return to the 
process of spelling out what use the narrative ordering of a human 
life can have in overcoming market-modernity. How does Macintyre 
specify narrative role? Firstly by posing the question: 'In what does 
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the unity of individual life consist?' and answering 'unity is the 
unity of a narrative embodied in a single life' 32 The good is then 
defined by how best to live out that narrative and bring it to 
completion. Facts and values are reconnected in human praxis by the 
necessarily interpretative and connected nature of human action. To 
ask what is the good for man, is to find what all single life 
narratives have in common. Naturally, they have much in common because 
in a crucial sense, they are embedded in particular historically 
conditioned settings. However, at this point a further quality of a 
narrative must be noticed, namely that it is going somewhere moving 
towards an end, but not just any end, but towards some resolution or 
completion of the narrative itself. Every human narrative must then 
embody some purpose, quest or telos, to which it is constantly 
striving to move towards. As Macintyre puts it: 'Some conception of 
the good life for man is required' 33 for the narrative to have any 
meaning at all. His own provisional answer at this point is the 
apparently circular one, that the good life for man is the search for 
the good life for man. But this is only so because the analysis lacks 
its final component, which could be called that of a corporate 
tradition. For no one can be a questing agent, as a pure individual, 
it is not simply that the conception of the good life varies, from one 
place and period to another place and period. But also that each 
individual enters their social circumstances as the bearers of a 
particular social identity whether they realise this, or pace 
Descartes, do not. The agent always belongs in a whole set of ways to 
a community, or set of interlocking communities; son or daughter of 
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someone, citizen of some city or nation, member of some I?Olitical 
religious or intellectual tradition. All these elements are inherited 
in a way quite opJ:?Osed to all Liberal Individualist thinking, that 
assumes we are always free to choose in the abstract about what one 
will choose to take resJ:?Onsibility for. This conception must not to be 
taken as automatically or necessarily conservative, it is not an 
argument for accepting the limitations of a tradition as we found it. 
One can rebel against a tradition, by adopting another historically 
available tradition. Or on the other hand, one can also dissent within 
a tradition, for a tradition as Macintyre defines it, is partly 
composed by the debate over what the tradition consists, eg what it 
means to be English, Irish or a Socialist. 
The crucial point being made, concerns the futility and danger of 
attempting to ignore or disregard the presence of the inherited 
practice or tradition itself: 
I am born with a past, and to try to cut myself off from 
the past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my 
present relationships. The possession of an historical 
identity and the possession of a social identity 
coincide. (34) 
Without particularity to begin from, there could be no beginning and 
no movement towards culturally constituted goods and truths. To 
recognise this is to reconnect ourselves to our pasts, this can renew 
confidence and avoid the spurious arrogance of the detached observer, 
coming from nowhere and going nowhere. 
The parallels with our earlier discussion of Wittgenstein must be 
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clear. We are writing of what is specific to being social products. 
Something constitutive of being human, but which Enlightenment 
liberalism has hidden or refused to recognise for its own ideological 
reasons. Enlightenment liberalism could only use tradition as a 
negative; something to be abandoned. It left the concept to be taken 
over by conservatism, starting with Burke, who made a positive virtue 
of the implicit liberal contrast between reason and tradition. Modern 
conservatism (when it is not liberalism in another guise) is 
liberalism's alter ego, both failing to realise that all conflict and 
development take place within the context of some historically given 
traditional thought and action. For Macintyre, Burkean tradition is 
always a tradition in decay. This is because a concept of tradition, 
that simply counterposes it to reason, means that a key element in the 
life of a tradition has been lost. For, as we have noticed, a 
tradition to be meaningful must involve debate about what constitutes 
itself as a tradition. 
Clearly, therefore, the pursuit of the end or telos of a human 
narrative can neither be a one-sided celebration of the past, or an 
individualistic practice. It is the fact that our market based liberal 
culture is still marked by the inheritance of past non-individualistic 
communities, that makes possible the internal critique of these 
societies, from a perspective other than their own value system. In 
some respects, Macintyre's work on a telos governed human praxis, 
built from the forms of the past, recalls, despite differences, 
something of the form of the Hegelian Marxism we discussed in the 
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first and second chapters. There is something of a developmental 
notion of human consciousness that in its movement from the Greeks to 
the present, recalls the structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. 
III 
REPUBLICS, COMMUNITIES AND POLITICS 
I wish now to illustrate some connections between the kind of concepts 
employed by Macintyre and some recent developments in socialist 
thought. This means work that takes both narrative and community with 
great seriousness, and I will end with some discussion of the 
consequences for the historically constituted nature of real 
communities, of the attempt to foster a 'Politics of the Common Good'. 
The first of these tendencies renews emphasis on 'civic virtue' and is 
represented by writers like William Connolly in the USA and to a 
lesser degree in recent work by Raymond Williams and Michael Ignatieff 
. . . 35 h . f h 1n Br1ta1n. T ese wr1ters con ront t e problem . facing Marxist 
socialism as it has been summarised by Macintyre: 
Marxist socialism is at its core deeply optimistic. For, 
however thorough going its criticisms of capitalism may 
be, it iS committed to asserting that within the society 
constituted by those institutions all the human and 
material preconditions of a better future are being 
accumulated. Yet if the moral impoverishment of advanced 
capitalism is what so many Marxists agree that it is, 
whence are those resources for the future to be 
derived? (36) 
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This is a question that must haunt serious socialist thought if 
it is deprived of the developmental logic of essentialism. But even 
Hegelian essentialism which sees history mediated through 
consciousness, must be aware of the possibility of massive subjective 
blocks on socialist development. The tradition of civic virtue, 
therefore, self-consciously identifies itself with now older and 
historically marginal traditions. Connolly sees modern Utopian 
socialism as the bearer and preserver of the republican tradition, 
with its desire to promote civic virtue among citizens who 
reflectively identify with a way of life shared with other citizens. 
And who adjust their political demands and behaviour to the norms 
embedded in that way of life. 37 In this,sense this Socialist tradition 
is very close to Macintyre's own argument concerning the bearers of 
the tradition of the virtues for, as he says: 
Republicanism in the eighteenth century is the project of 
restoring a community of virtue. (38) 
Macintyre sees something of the tradition of the virtues at work in 
the Jacobin republican clubs, inheriting from the medieval guilds and 
the renaissance republics, a desire for equality between members, with 
a strong corporate ethos. Each member having equal rights and equal 
obligations, to the society and its members. It was also older 
traditions, handed down from pre-market societies that produced the 
new named virtue of fraternity, embodying something of the 
Aristotelian virtue of friendship and the Christian love of the 
neighbour. 39 
Andrew Fraser's work on American Republicanism and its complex and 
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ambivalent relationship to American Republicanism, and its equally 
complex and ambivalent relationship to American capitalism, is 
instructive at this point, 40 especially in the case of the rise of the 
Modern Business Corporation, Fraser shows that despite the elitist 
nature and class bias, inscribed in Republicanism in the early 19th 
century, it represented an attempt to hold on to a political community 
facing destruction in the shape of a generalisation of capitalist 
social relations. As he put it: 
Under the impact of money and commerce the realm of the 
political as a distinct sphere of human experience 
dissolves. (41) 
In a fascinating reworking of the Managerialist thesis of Serle and 
42 Means, he shows how the separation of ownership and control was 
crucial in generating a purely capitalist market orientated entity, 
the new Corporation. Fraser argues that: 
Most leftist critiques of the managerialist thesis have 
failed to perceive that the fusion of ownership and 
control endowed the traditional logic of property with a 
decidedly wlitical significance. (43) 
In essence he argues that: 
the common law doctrines governing the corporation assumed 
that even the private business corporation should be 
treated as a "body politic", that is "as an association of 
persons imbued with the civil ethos appropriate to a 
genuine republican community". (44) 
What this means is that the separation of ownership and control was a 
crucial step towards the elimination of the political dimension that 
the common law had introduced into the investment relationship. Now it 
was possible for stockholders to relate to the new coporation as 
simply investors and not as members of a legally constituted political 
community. 
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Paradoxically this shift, in the USA at any rate, was no simple 
working out of bourgeois class interests. For the shift seems to have 
been achieved in part, by an important element of American radicalism, 
ie the individualistic and anti-institutional, evangelical 
Christianity - secularised versions of which are important elements in 
contemporary western radicalism. The reason for this, Fraser argues, 
is that so long as the Corporation stood as a 'little republic' 
endowed with an identity and purpose of its own (by act of the 
legislature) it remained open to radical attack as a bastion of 
monopoly and special privilege. It was only when general incorporation 
opened the Corporation up to anyone \vho had the means to utilise it 
for their own private economic gain, was the spirit of radical 
individualism satisfied. In this sense it poses for us one of the 
clearest historical examples of the political problems posed to both 
Left and Right, by the emergence of capitalist market societies. In so 
far as the Left partakes of individualistically orientated politics, 
it both celebrates and intensifies the conditions of its own 
subordination. As Fraser points out in this context: 
Capitalism is a process of generalised abstraction which 
involves the ever deepening alienation of human beings 
from their own social being Capitalism becomes a 
process of generalised social wealth that liquidates both 
private property and the public realm, thereby undermining 
the necessary foundations of a genuine political 
community. ( 45) 
If, as I have argued throughout this thesis, the potency of 
bureaucratic forms in our culture, is in reality the other face of the 
individualisation of the human subject through a set of (Kantian type) 
c;., 
general principles, corresponding 1~_the abstract nature of capital, then 
- 343 -
what can a narrative socialist tradition do to oppose it? Fraser 
suggests in the American context - in his article on radical legal 
thought46 that: 
it is not inconceivable that the vision of a regenerated 
republican polity may yet turn out to be a more realistic 
solution to the 'fundamental contradictions' of our social 
being than a form of critical legal discourse that stands 
so much in fear of any stable or enduring source of 
authority . . . They (radical lawyers) may find they have 
much to learn from those who once championed a 
conservative republican ethos grounded in the 'traditional 
logic of property' against a socially corrosive 
capitalist rationalisation. (47) 
If elements of the American left seeks to build upon the republican 
tradition to resist market rationalisation, is it possible to discern 
in Britain- resistant social forms? 
It is possible to see the 1984-5 British Miners strike within a 
similar perspective. Here a determined workforce, located within very 
specific communities,were fighting an equally determined modernising 
right-wing government, prepared to use force and the arguments of 
nee-liberalism to break both a union, and forms of communally 
organised life. 
The year long strike astonished many observers, in revealing the 
degree of communal self-organisation and the powerful sense of purpose 
felt by the mining communities. It seems likely that miners were 
sustained in their struggle by the manner in which class, occupation 
and community, frequently coincided, and this combined with the sheer 
desperation of their situation, produced a level of communal 
mobilisation not seen since 1926. Initiated as an attempt to prevent 
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pit closures, and the massive reduction of coal mining capacity, the 
miners strike has been the most important strike to protect 
employment, in the post-oil shock recession. The desperation, and the 
way the strike was policed; 'produced' as Huw Beynon has written, 
an uncompromising amalgam of solidarity and bitterness 
emotions so intense that "this will never be forgotten; 
not in my lifetime anyway ... " (48) 
In some respects there are similarities in the nature of the miners) 
radical opposition, with that of the radicalism in early 19th century 
England, that I described in the previous chapter. As Craig Calhoun 
has emphasised this radicalism was greatly dependent upon the nature 
and organisation of the community, which acted as a crucial material 
and ideological 49 resource. Raphael Samuel has noted 
similarities: 
. . . in the first place a struggle for the survival of 
villages. Its heartland is in places knit together by an 
almost private sense of collective self. Like village 
radicalism in the 19th century it is animated at the local 
level by an exclusive sense of belonging, a republican 
spirit of independence; and an assertion of total and 
unilateral control over the conditions of the everyday 
environment . . . The ideology, as so often in the popular 
movements of the past, is that of radical conservatism, a 
fight to protect the known against the unknown, the 
familiar against the alien, the local and the human 
against the anonymous and the gigantic. (50) 
these 
Just as the early radicalism of the last century had been fought over 
the moral terrain of craft control and the 'moral economy' , so the 
1984-5 strike was fought largely in defence of crucial aspects of the 
1945 Labourist settlement. This settlement had, in partial and perhaps 
contradictory but nonetheless important ways, reproduced elements of 
this village culture in the network of social arrangements within the 
mining industry in its nationalised form; especially in the central 
place of the union in the complex set of industrial committees that 
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. . h f I . d Sl h . . , d h th adm1n1ster muc o t1e 1n ustry. T e m1ners, 1naee , ave more an 
any other group of workers in Britain, looked to the state for 
elements of industrial regulation, from the Mining Acts of the 19th 
. h. . h 20 h 52 t . century r1ght through to state owners 1p 1n t e t century. I 1s 
this phenomenon, that explains the depth of the miners1 political 
commitment to a form of state intervention. As McCormick puts it: 
The coal mines were nationalised because the miners were 
no longer prepared to work for the private coal 
owners. (53) 
The miners undoubtedly fought the closure programme because they had 
no alternative, but there can be little doubt also, that much of the 
bitterness sprang from the feeling that a whole set of 
long-established political and moral obligations had been unilaterally 
severed. 
The miners' experience has been remarkable and important. It 
illustrates again the two aspects of modern state power, noticed 
above, as an apparent bearer of communal purpose and identity, and as 
managerial power acting 'efficiently' to impose the external pressures 
of the market. 54 The Thatcher government had come to power in 1979 
with a clear commitment to the nee-liberal strategy of the imposition 
of market discipline on British society as a whole. From the 
beginning this government had wished to break the old consensus; doing 
away with the class compromises and collective forms of life and 
relationships. So the NCB was seen to be too 'cosy' in its 
relationship with the unions and Ian MacGregor was put in to restore 
discipline and market competitiveness. 
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With all corporate forms apparently in crisis the powerful 
articulation of individualism was made to seem both fresh and 
plausible. During the strike the tension between the strands of 
communalism and individualism in working class culture surfaced 
frequently, orchestrated and amplified by the aggressive nee-liberal 
populism of the government. The phrase 'right to work' was deflected 
from its social-democratic meaning of a public commitment to full 
employment, towards a citizen's right to sell unhindered, one's 
labour, as an indi vi udal, in the market place. The issue of the 
absence of a national strike ballot was connected to this theme (and 
exploited by the government) as the democratic and the solidaristic 
traditions of trade unionism pulled in different directions. The long 
tradition of balloting in the NUM has strengthened and deepened the 
democratic tradition, so that one miner could describe feelings in the 
1982 ballot '"It's my vote", that's the way they think.• 55 But, on the 
other hand, the pattern of proposed closures meant some areas seemed 
safe and others not, so that Peter Heathfield could argue: 
it cannot be right that one man can vote another man out 
of a job. (56) 
The Thatcher government in Britain, has raised in many painful ways, 
the question of individual self interest versus a collective tradition 
run into deep trouble. such a tradition is heavily dependent upon 
state regulated forms of work to sustain locality and community. In 
1912 the pamphlet The Miners Next Step published by the Unofficial 
Reform Committee in South Wales, insisted that nationalisation was not 
the way forward and would merely create a national trust backed by the 
state. In the same year Noah Ablett, the Welsh Syndicalist leader 
-----------------------------------
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argued that nationalisation would 
simply place an important section of the working class in 
the hands of a state servile to capitalists' interests who 
would use their opportunity to increase the servility we 
abhor. (57) 
A profound intuition of the immense difficulties of constructing forms 
of communal living and self regulation that can eliminate or minimise 
the pressures of the market. 58 It was perhaps inevitable that late 
19th century workers would begin to turn to the state to alleviate 
what Marx had called their subjection to the 'violence of things•, 59 
as this state claimed to be the collective 'we' of all citizens. But 
as we have noted this state could only provide a limited communal form 
whilst the capitalist market economy remained the dominant external 
reality. This state form would continually manoevre between the twin 
bases of legitimacy of democratic representation, and technocratic 
efficiency, corresponding to its twin roles as ' illusory community' 
and administrative power. 
Both these themes were powerfully present throughout the strike. The 
miners were portrayed as anti-democratic and a threat to the rule of 
law. The government, most of the non-Labour opposition and most 
liberal commentators, were agreed that the miners must be beaten for 
this reason. But perhaps more fundamentallly they were treated as 
deeply unrealistic in their objectives. Their heartfelt defence of 
their communities may have been applauded but 'hard-headed' realism 
had to prevail in the end. 
This last point is quite crucial for the exercise of bureaucratic 
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power. For during the strike, the deeply opaque and contentious social 
and economic relationships of advanced capitalism, were constructed as 
simple and clear cut, by the state and the NCB. The NCB, it was 
claimed, was massively unprofitable, therefore uneconomic pits had to 
be closed. But we now know that this is a particular rendering of 
reality, an alternative set of 'experts' could construct the NCB 
accounts in quite another way. One leading accountant who has examined 
these accounts, has described them as 'a supreme masterpiece in the 
art of obfuscation' and that 
for the purpose of identifying uneconomic pits - these 
accounts are virtually useless. (60) 
This authority turned, in his analysis, the NCB operational deficit of 
£358 million in to a surplus of £17 million. 
The correctness, or otherwise, of these figures is not our immediate 
concern, they do indicate, however, how the state reified a complex 
and shifting situation for political and coercive purposes. Public 
authority in effect used apparently formal and technical procedures to 
legitimate, as Raymond Williams has pointed out, a series of shifts of 
meaning, that as it were, constructed the meaning of the market place 
within the state sector. As Williams puts it: 
what 'management' says, is offered as a set of 
unchallengeable technical decisions, when the actual 
management - now very clearly the old master or employer -
again and again arrives at these within a determining 
context of short-term political and corrunercial 
calculations. (61) 
In this context, talk of restoring the 'right to manage', is clearly a 
crucial aspect of the theatricality of power we have examined in 
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Macintyre's work. It is a means of reasserting in an apparently modern 
and neutral guise the fundamental realities of power in a capitalist 
society. As Williams adds: 
It is in fact double-talk for the categorical and 
arbitrary rights of an employer. (62) 
In earlier chapters I have elbaborated the connections that Macintyre 
has laid out between individualistic conceptions of human association 
and bureaucratic power. It seems clear that any socialist rethinking 
must attempt to transcend the limits of liberal radicalism. Building 
on the core aspects of human sociality and perhaps on older 
intellectual and political traditions. For the problem is, to quote 
Raymond Williams again, but in another context: 
... what has really failed inside the movement and inside 
the whole society, is any valid concept of the general 
interest. That is why appeals to it are so often resisted 
or rejected. In the forms in which we have known it - the 
undifferentiated 'nation', the needs of the 'economy' - it 
has again and again been a false general interest ... That 
is a sort of success, for these versions ... are indeed in 
their usual form false. But it is a dangerous sort of 
success, if all that is left is the defence and 
advancement of particular interest. (63) 
The question is do we know any other? Is it possible to rescue 
elements of the older traditions of social and political conununity, 
both intellectual and material, to resist the worst consequences of 
our capitalist culture on our lives? Some guidance may be given by 
William Connolly who has attempted to revive the anti-liberal concept 
of the common good. The concept deriving from 18th century Rousseauist 
origins, was crucial for the formation of civic Republicanism and in 
many ways anticipated the political content of Marx's socialism. 64 
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In anticipation of the kinds of critic ism Williams referred to, 
Connolly is anxious to distinguish the common good from the politics 
of the public interest. The public interest, he argues, frequently 
amounts to no more than an aggregation of individual or group 
interests. The interests of the majority of people have as private 
individuals, as workers, consumers or owners, may at any particular 
moment outweigh the interest they share as members of the public. When 
the public interest is conceived in this way then policies designed to 
further it tend to concentrate on policies giving incentives or 
imposing penalties designed to bring the individual interest of each 
person more closely in line with the public. This is the familiar 
picture of compromise, badgering and on occasion, coercion or 
exploitation, experienced by all who live in the capitalist 
democracies. 
The common good takes us squarely back to the civic ethic and 
republican ethos, that was so clearly seen by Macintyre as looking 
both back to organic societies of Europe's pre-modern past, whilst 
looking towards the future of a free equal citizenship. They had 
sought to preserve the ethic of a political community from the 
depredations of the capitalist market. Connolly attempts to articulate 
a concept of the common good, that will yield to a socialist 
resolution of our discontents. In language that is strikingly similar 
to Macintyre's, he defines an appeal to the common good as an 
appeal to a set of shared purposes and standards which are 
fundamental to the way of life prized together by the 
participants. The participants have an obligation to 
respond to these appeals, even when the net interests of 
-351 -
everyone, when each consults only his own interests moves 
in another direction ... The citizen with civic virtue is 
asked to give presumptive priority to those dimensions of 
his own good shared with others. (65) 
He quickly notes the obvious objections of liberals and radicals. The 
liberal must fear a rhetoric of the common good, which suppresses the 
autonomy of the individual; radicals will fear that in a stratified 
capitalist society such appeals will amount to no more than those at 
the bottom carrying the bulk of the sacrifices while the ones with 
money or power prosper. Connolly recognises the moments of truth 
within these criticisms but then points to the logic of failure 
inscribed within the concept of public interest minus civic virtue. 
Our context, he argues, is one of expanded self-consciousness among 
citizens via the mass media, literacy, visible interdependence between 
states which makes people realise they participate in an order resting 
on human convention, rather than nature. Without civic virtue the 
public interest policy will be a hollow sham, as atomised cynical 
individuals keep the letter of the law whilst evading the spirit, 
summed up by Rousseau's dictum 
Laws are equally power less against the treasures of the 
rich and the indigency of the poor; the first eludes them, 
the second escapes them, one breaks the net and the other 
slips through. (66) 
So what are the resources for mobilising an authentic socialist 
orientated concept of the common good, amidst the exploitation and 
corruption that Connolly, like Macintyre, sees all around him. Like 
Hacintyre, Connolly attempts to see amongst division, dissolution and 
heightened consciousness of self, those basic elements which are 
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common to human beings. That to be an individual one must first be in 
society, and to share a language which is acquired before our 
capacity to criticise. To share a language is to share criteria for 
making distinctions and making judgements. He says: 
to participate in life is to carry an enormous load of 
settled criteria of judgement standards of appraisal and 
beliefs. In sharing a language we share impefectly these 
pre-understandings, and we bring them to bear on specific 
issues. ( 67) 
The similarity of this formulation with Wittgenstein's appeal against 
radical Cartesian doubt, is quite obvious. However, it does run in 
quite the opposite direction to another and very influential radical 
theory of the construction of a common interest, that of Jungen 
Habermas. Habermas argues that the very existence of human language 
creates the possibility of a rationally arrived at consensus between 
people. This is possible because 
the "rationality" of the discursively formed will consists 
in the fact that the reciprocal behavioural expectations 
raised to normative status afford validity to a corrunon 
interest ascertained without deception. The interest is 
common because the constraint-free consensus permits only 
what all can want; it is free of deception because even 
the interpretation of needs in which each individual must 
be able to recognise what he wants became the object of 
discursive will-formation. (68) 
We will not enter into the full ramifications of Habermas's views here, 
except to point to the excessively rationalistic element in this 
approach. Compared with Macintyre and Connolly Habermas, as Anderson 
has noted, is a rationalistic intellectual. Within his work 
lies no fin-de-siecle Wagnerian overtones, but the earnest 
ideals and serious optimism of the German 
Enlightenment. (69) 
In an important survey of Habermas's recent work Jeffrey Alexander has 
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revealed the sharp contrasts between mythical and rational thought, 
interpreted in a progressivist way, that creates problems for his 
70 handling of culture. Alexander argues that this problem flows from 
Habermas's desire to argue for communication based on agreements that 
are completely unconstrained. This means that actors must not only be 
free from external material constraints; they are also 
free from internalised controls that would place the 
meaning and the ong1n of their behaviour out of their 
conscious reach. (71} 
It seems then, that Haberrnas is the latest of social theorist seeking 
to ground what Macintyre calls the Enlightment Project in the 
72 
'transcendental' guarantees of the rules of speech, subjects without 
presupposition making their rational choice! But the problem for such 
theorists, as Alexander points out, and Macintyre would concur, is 
that despite cultural differentiation and the real growth of 
rationality, 
. . . arbitrary, unconscious, fused and, yes, irrational 
elements of culture have not at the same time disappeared. 
Language and world view continue to predefine our 
understanding of the object world before we even begin to 
subject it to our conscious rationality. Nor can we regard 
our linguistically structured world views as simply 
humanly constructed interpretations, which are therefore 
completely open to criticism, since our 'regard' is, 
ineluctably, conditioned by the preconscious world itself. 
It follows, then, that there is an inevitable investment 
in the world of things and the world of ideas with some 
kind of dogmatic, uncritical status ... there seems to be 
abundant evidence that moderns still seek to understand 
the contingency of everyday life in terms of narrative 
traditions whose simplicity and resistance to change makes 
them hard to distinguish from myths. (73} 
It is clear that both Macintyre and Connolly place a good deal of 
weight upon these rooted, pre-understandings and the elements of 
cultural particularity, as providing the basis of a shared life. The 
fragility and uncertainty of such an approach is clear, Connolly is 
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painfully aware of them when he states somewhat hesitantly: 
Out of this background of imperfectly shared 
distinctions, standards and purposes a sense of the common 
good, might crystallise, though there is no guarantee ... 
that it will occur. (74) 
For both Macintyre and Connolly, the institutional setting for 
pre-understandings is vitally important. But again such institutional 
settings must share collective values and purposes to orientate 
behaviour towards some desired good, whether it is scientific research 
or the production of an affluent society of free and equal citizens. 
If the bearers of socialist politics find themselves rejecting Marx's 
essentialist concepts and with it the teleological movement towards 
unalienated social individuality, they must replace them urgently! A 
Republican civic ethic, with a cormnon moral framework committed to 
constraining economic growth, ie the criteria of market efficiency as 
life's framework; this may be a possible motivating ideal. A 
progressive sociology after Macintyre, could contribute to this as 
Donald Levine suggests, by being a discipline that 
seeks to identify the social and cultural functions proper 
to pafticular historical settings, to delineate the 
external resources and internal practices needed to 
realise them, and to show ways of establishing conditions 
that both sustain us in the quest for the good and furnish 
us increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of 
the good. (75) 
Levine ends his review with Macintyre's call for a new sociology, 
which is, of course, an old sociology: that of Adam Ferguson. I shall 
end there too: 
It is Ferguson's type of sociology which is the empirical 
counterpart of the conceptual account of the virtues which 
I have given, a sociology which aspires to lay bare the 
empirical, causal connection between virtues practices and 
institutions. (76) 
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